In his introduction, Ganssle provides a lucid description of McTaggert’s A and B series (or theories) of time: “The B-theory holds that the most important thing about locating events in time is their relation to other events. So something happens before, after or at the same time as . . . . Continue Reading »
Knight says that modernity has not left the upper/lower, intelligible/sensible dualism of Platonism behind, but only tipped it on its side. The modern “subject” is a variation on the world of ideas, while the inert “object” corresponds to the lesser reality of the sensible . . . . Continue Reading »
Knight criticizes Frederick Beiser’s treatment of rationality in the early English Enlightenment because he “does not relate ‘reason’ to reasoning together, converse, public talk, and the skills of the development of public talk. Reason therefore for him never appears as . . . . Continue Reading »
I suggested in an earlier post that time is not a lava flow that is liquid and dynamic until it reaches the past, at which point it hardens to rock. If not lava, then what? How does the past keep flowing when it’s no longer present (except as the “present of the past”)? Perhaps . . . . Continue Reading »
We instinctively think that what’s most real or true is what has always been the case. Timeless truth means truth that was already true at the dawn of time. That’s a big problem. It means that nothing that emerges in time is fully real or true. It’s true, only in a manner of . . . . Continue Reading »
Mead thinks that each emerging moment changes the past. It’s difficult to see how it could be otherwise. This doesn’t mean that the directionality of the past is an illusion or reversible. Things done cannot be undone. But what those things are and mean changes as time moves along. The . . . . Continue Reading »
Abstract time is (Anthony Giddens says) “pure duration, as disconnected from the materiality of experience.” This comes to be seen as “real, ‘objective’ time” because “it is expressed in a universal and public mode.” This is helpful. 2 PM Pacific . . . . Continue Reading »
“Abstract” time often has reference to durations of time, particularly in relation to economic activity. If I work a 40-hour week for a set wage, I get paid the same no matter what I do or don’t accomplish in that time. In the account books, there’s just the number of hours . . . . Continue Reading »
Mead says clock time and calendar time is time only “in a manner of speaking.” He also argues that clock and calendar time is not “absolute” but relative to one’s frame of reference. True that, as my kids say: “Monday” spells gloom within the framework of a . . . . Continue Reading »
George Herbert Mead focused his thought on temporality (especially in Philosophy of the Present ), and particularly on “time in” events and roles rather than time as a background of events. Time in the strictest sense is the moment of present emergence that reflects into the past and . . . . Continue Reading »
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