In his summary of “identity description,” which he ultimately applies to Jesus, Hans Frei speaks of “the irreversible passage or movement from . . . intention to action. The enactment of intention always differs from the intention to enact; and each person has inside knowledge of . . . . Continue Reading »
It is widely argued today that the early German romantic movement anticipates postmodernism; the early romantics were postmoderns before their time. Frederick Beiser differs, and notes three critical differences between German romanticism and the mainstream of postmodern philosophy. First, the . . . . Continue Reading »
German idealism is often seen as the completion of the subjectivization of knowledge and reality begun by Descartes. Not so, says Frederick Beiser in his massive 2002 history of German idealism (Harvard): “In fundamental respects it is more accurate to say the exact opposite: that the . . . . Continue Reading »
Jean-Luc Marion challenges the Cartesian cogito by stressing the primacy of the erotic. According to Descartes’s formula ( Ego sum res cogitans ), “it follows by omission that I am no longer supposed to love, nor to hate; or better: I am of such a sort that I have neither to love, nor . . . . Continue Reading »
Kant bristles at the demand that he claims to hear “on all sides”: ” Don’t argue !” Officers tell us to obey, tax-officials to pay, clergy to pray in a certain way. But Kant wants to argue. Or does he? Maybe not: “in some affairs which affect the interests of the . . . . Continue Reading »
Kant’s appeal in “What Is Enlightenment?” is not primarily intellectual but ethical. Enlightenment, Kant says, “is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.” Immaturity he defines as “the inability to use one’s own understanding without the . . . . Continue Reading »
An essay of mine on Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy is currently available on the First Things web site, here: http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/?p=786. . . . . Continue Reading »
In her recent book The Mirror of the Self , Shadi Bartsch argues that ancient notions of introspection and self-examination do not employ the image of the mirror in the way we do in post-Cartesian philosophy. In the words of the TLS reviewer, for the ancients “the mirror was the means by . . . . Continue Reading »
Metaphysics is making a comeback, but Merold Westphal ( Modern Theology , April 2007) thinks that the project of overcoming metaphysics is still worth the trouble. His article examines Kant, Heidegger, Marion, and Milbank. Along the way he says the following about Kant: On Westphal’s reading, . . . . Continue Reading »
Zizioulas locates the central difference between patristic and postmodern views of “otherness” in the way each conceives the relation of old and new. For postmodernism, “alterity involves negation, rupture, ‘leaving behind’, for patristic thought the ‘new’ . . . . Continue Reading »
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