Augustine distinguishes natural and given signs. The first signify with no intention of signifying, while the latter signify because a person has an intention to signify. The distinction, at least in part, is a distinction of will. Peirce’s typology of icon, sign, and symbol depends on a . . . . Continue Reading »
Some reflections on a lecture by Mitch Stokes, a new fellow at NSA, concerning the differences between philosophy and theology. Ultimately, I don’t believe there is any room for an absolute distinction of theology and philosophy. This is what Stokes said: He defined both theology and . . . . Continue Reading »
The following thoughts are largely inspired by Rowan Williams previously-mentioned book. 1. Art is about making, not primarily about making a point. It is not fundamentally self-expression, or copying something that’s already there. It’s about constructing a new thing, an object. 2. If . . . . Continue Reading »
Lloyd P Gerson has just published a book entitled Aristotle and Other Platonists , an effort to show that the two great philosophical opponents of ancient Greece are not opposed at all. He points to the “Neoplatonic” writers of antiquity, who attempted to harmonize the two philosophers. . . . . Continue Reading »
There’s a slight false step, in the midst of a very helpful point, in Bruce Ellis Benson’s superb Graven Ideologies : He has been explaining the “double transcendence” of Platonism - metaphysical (Truth’s being is beyong the sensible world) and epistemological (human . . . . Continue Reading »
There should be - probably there is - an anthropological study of Western philosophy as a highly rarefied form of dirt avoidance. Plato with his “pure and unadulterated” access to truth; Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas; Kant’s purity of reason. I’m thinking of a . . . . Continue Reading »
Marion points to Husserl’s suggestion that essence and existence are not really different principles but rather “two modes of being in two modes of self-givenness.” This is attractive, and perhaps not incompatible with the Thomistic tradition that sees the distinction of . . . . Continue Reading »
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online) provides this helpful summary of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of phenomenological reduction: “The transformation of the object of perception into the thought of the object of perception, that is to say, the attempt to reconstitute the world in . . . . Continue Reading »
Jean-Luc Marion points out that “method” comes from the Greek meta-hodos, and explains why phenomenology is not methodological: “The method does not run ahead of the phenomenon, by fore -seeing it, pre -dicting it, and pro -ducing it, in order to await it from the outset at the . . . . Continue Reading »
Still on Pickstock on Derrida. Famously, Derrida says that speech dies with its author, the sound fading on the air. Writing survives. But he claim that speech is always under erasure makes the prior assumption that death and life are mutually exclusive territories, that it is impossible for the . . . . Continue Reading »
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