Why do men (almost always men) expose themselves to strangers? The redoubtable Diane Ackerman ( A Natural History Of Love ) suggests that what happens after the victim shrieks and runs reveals the motivations: “The flasher rarely runs away. Flashing the woman fills only the smallest . . . . Continue Reading »
The OED indicates that the first known use of the word “psychological” is from 1812, but de Grazia says that “Coleridge had been using the term in his lectures since 1800.” He used it mainly to describe Shakespeare’s ability to characterize “habits of . . . . Continue Reading »
Charles Barber ( Comfortably Numb ) writes, “In 1916, Dr. Henry Cotton of Trenton State Hospital, believing that germs from tooth decay led to insanity, removed patients’ teeth and other body parts, such as the bowels, which he thought might by the causes of their madness. In so doing, . . . . Continue Reading »
Walker Percy wrote in Lost in the Cosmos (foreseeing the craze for antidepressants): “Assume that you are quite right [to be depressed]. You are depressed because you have every reason to be depressed. No member of the other two million species which inhabit the earth - and who are luckily . . . . Continue Reading »
Solomon says that emotions are judgments that, like many judgments, are not necessarily deliberative, articulated, or reflective. If so, why do we feel that emotions “come on” us? Solomon explains that it’s because we focus “on the feelings and flushings that typically . . . . Continue Reading »
Robert Solomon notes the familiar experience of emotions that intensify ” as we express them,” adding that this requires explanation “since Freudian theory and most psychological theories since seem to think that emotions are ‘ventilated’ through expression and . . . . Continue Reading »
In his 1969 book on self-deception, Herbert Fingarette pointed out that self-deception could only work if the self was divisible, and suggested that the self is not a unit but a community of “subselves.” Fingarette traced this theme to Plato, and saw it intensified by the New Testament . . . . Continue Reading »
Gadamer notes the ambiguity of “keeping something in mind.” We sometimes hold something in our mental “gaze” in order to knock into it head on. We watch it carefully until we can grab it. But keeping in mind can also be a form of forgetfulness. We might also keep something . . . . Continue Reading »
Terry Eagleton puts it this way: “for Lacan all discourse is, in a sense, a slip of the tongue: if the process of language is as slippery as he suggests, we can never mean precisely what we say, or say precisely what we mean. Meaning is always in some sense an approximation, a near-miss, a . . . . Continue Reading »
In a web article on the “Cult of Lacan,” Richard Webster analyzes a paragraph from one of Lacan’s early works. Referring to his “mirror” theory of childhood development (which, Webster shows, Lacan borrowed without much attribution from one Henri Wallon), Lacan writes, . . . . Continue Reading »
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