Desmond thinks that dialectic makes some gains: It affirms the “complex sense of unity,” appreciates mediation, critiques dualism, defends the “interplay and community of immanence and transcendence.” But dialectic cannot be the final moment of metaphysics. Why? “The . . . . Continue Reading »
Desmond points out that an origin but be both one and more than one: “even if we want to say that the origin of coming to be possesses some kind of ‘unity’ with itself, this ‘unity’ cannot be univocal. Why so? Because, such a univocal unity would be hard to distinguish . . . . Continue Reading »
Gilles Emery writes concerning Thomas’s view of essence and person in the Trinity, defending Thomas against Rahnerian-style charges: “There is . . . not ‘derivation’ of persons from an essential act in Thomas. This observation clarifies anew the structure of the treatise on . . . . Continue Reading »
Bonaventure wrote: “Behold, therefore, and observe that the highest good is unqualifiedly that than which no greater can be thought. And this good is such that it cannot rightly be thought of as non-existing, since to exist is absolutely better than not to exist.” So far, so Anselmian. . . . . Continue Reading »
William Alston challenges Trinitarian critics of substance metaphysics, arguing that they have misrepresented classical notions of substance: “there is absolutely no justification for saddling substance metaphysics as such with these commitments to timelessness, immutability, pure actuality . . . . Continue Reading »
Dumitru Staniloae has this to say about the asymmetry between the economic and ontological relation of Son and Spirit in Orthodoxy: “from the order in which the divine persons are manifested in the world Catholic theology infers an order of their relations within the Godhead, and admits no . . . . Continue Reading »
Thomas is not typically viewed as a theologian of gift, but Matthew Levering argues that Thomas teaches that the Trinity is a communion of gift-giving. Thomas says in a comment on John 5:20, “because the Father perfectly loves the Son, this is a sign that the Father has shown him everything . . . . Continue Reading »
Obvious enough, but here goes: God must be outside time, Lord of time, to be within all time. If he was within time as creatures are within time, He could not be present at all times. As John Frame likes to say, our theology should be done in “because of” mode rather than “in . . . . Continue Reading »
Levering also cleverly argues, drawing again from Aquinas, that a “metaphysical” account of God’s being and knowledge accomplishes the aims of “non-metaphysical” accounts, but better. Non-metaphysical theologies claim that classical theism has rendered God inert and . . . . Continue Reading »
Matthew Levering ( Scripture and Metaphysics ) argues that God’s self-knowledge and His knowledge of creation stand and fall together. If His knowledge of the latter is limited, so is His knowledge of Himself: “Could God perfectly comprehend himself if he did not comprehend to what his . . . . Continue Reading »
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