God and freedom again

Smith’s article sums up David Burrell’s argument that we cannot have freedom at all without a Creator as a final cause. Burrell writes: “if I cannot be pushed to will something, but only drawn to do so, not even God can cause me to do something freely, if we are thinking of an . . . . Continue Reading »

Ten-stringed lute

Augustine from a sermon on the two tablets: “the Decalogue pertains to the two precepts, that is, those of love for God and neighbor. Three strings belong to the first precept because God is Trinity. While to the other precept, that is, love for the neighbor, there are seven strings: how one . . . . Continue Reading »

Use and Enjoyment

One of Gregory’s contributions is to show the central relevance of Augustine’s distinction of use and enjoyment to political thought. He notes early on that “Arendt recognizes that Augustine’s greatest question may not be that he became a question to himself. Rather, the . . . . Continue Reading »

The Lord is Unsplit

The shema is often taken as a declaration of monotheistic faith, or at least of henotheism. In ANE context, it may have another aspect to it. Yitzhaq Feder ( Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical Ritual (Writings from the Ancient World Supplements/Society of Biblical Literature) ) analyzes a . . . . Continue Reading »

On not knowing what we do

Stanley Hauerwas ( War and the American Difference: Theological Reflections on Violence and National Identity ) offers a neat definition for American freedom: It is the modern “attempt to produce a people who believe that they should have no story except the story that they chose when they . . . . Continue Reading »

Not Just Nothing

Bavinck affirms that evil is a privatio boni , but is not satisfied to leave it there: “Sin is a no-thing , can only be a privation or corruption of the good. Sin is a defect, a deprivation, an absence of the good, or a weakness, imbalance, just as blindness is a deprivation of sight. The . . . . Continue Reading »

Perspectival Bavinck

Bavinck notes the traditional division of providence into preservation, concurrence, and governance, but then adds: “These do not divide the work of providence into materially and temporally distinct and successive parts for they are always integrally connected. From the very beginning, . . . . Continue Reading »

Confession

A splendid Dostoevskyan passage from Bonhoeffer’s ethics speaks for itself. “The place where this recognition of guilt becomes real is the Church . . . .If my share in this is so small as to seem negligible, that still cannot set my mind at rest; for now it is not a matter of . . . . Continue Reading »

Disunion and judgment

For a man in the disunited state of sin, each individual is a standard and criterion of good and truth. Thus, Bonhoeffer argues, the essence of fallen man is to be a judge. Obviously, this is a false judgment, since it does not arise out of union with God. Reversing common sense, Bonhoeffer says . . . . Continue Reading »