In the above clip, Peter Singer pretends that his call for allowing infanticide is merely about preventing the suffering of infants with ultimately terminal conditions, and limited to situations in which a decision has been made by parents and doctors to let them die by withdrawing life-extending medical treatment. At that point, he says, he supports taking actions to end their lives “swiftly and humanely” since they are going to die within a relatively short time anyway after a miserable life. And he can’t understand why disability rights groups would oppose such humane ideas when they should support eliminating the suffering of their doomed brothers and sisters.
But that is lying by omission. Singer believes infants are not persons and thus, do not have a right to life. But knowing most people would not support killing “normal” infants, he uses examples of killing a disabled baby to promote the morality of infanticide based on utilitarian equations. And this is a very calculated strategy to make the odious concept more palatable (which it shouldn’t) to general society.
Indeed, he has written in support of killing babies with non lethal disabling conditions, not to alleviate otherwise unending misery, but to benefit parents and siblings. In Practical Ethics,for example, he argued that hemophiliac babies can be killed to benefit the life of a hypothetical future sibling–even if the killed infant could have been happy had he been allowed to live:
When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing the hemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it would according to the total view, be right to kill him.
In Rethinking Life and Death he argued in favor of allowing babies with Down syndrome to be killed–based on the burden of care for the parents–not on an unlivable suffering life for the baby, using euphemistic language to soften the cold harshness of his beliefs:
Both for the sake of ‘our children’…and for our own sake, we may not want a child to start on life’s uncertain voyage if the prospects are clouded. When this can be known at a very early stage of the voyage we may still have a chance to make a fresh start. This means detaching ourselves from the infant who has been born, cutting ourselves free before the ties that have already begun to bind us to our child have become irresistible. Instead of going forward and putting all our efforts into making the best of the situation, we can still say no, and start again from the beginning.
In the same book he states that the life of a mackerel is equivalent to that of a baby:
Since neither a newborn human infant nor a fish is a person, the wrongness of killing such beings is not as great as the wrongness of killing a person.
Disability rights groups disdain Singer’s views–as should we all–because he harnesses antipathy toward disability in the cause of supplanting human exceptionalism and the Judeo/Christian ethic–in the entirely secular sense, as he admits–with a broader utilitarian transformation of society that would destroy universal human rights. We should never let him disingenuously attempt to pretend that he is not seeking just such a radical and oppressive transformation of society.
Oh yes: Disability rights activists do oppose letting babies die by non treatment because they will be disabled. That is why, for example, they oppose futile care theory. So, once again, Singer lied by omission.
August 16th, 2010 | 11:47 am
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Vince Humphreys, Wesley J. Smith. Wesley J. Smith said: Disingenuous Peter Singer Tries to Wiggle Out of Infanticide Scorn » Secondhand Smoke | A First Things Blog http://t.co/SfdE1Tz [...]
August 16th, 2010 | 12:22 pm
Peter Singer starts from the principle that there is a general and wide consensus about the value of a human life, and that consensus does not exist. Furthermore, he incurred in the “naturalistic sophism”, by taking a moral conclusion out of a fact.
This guy is so intellectually basic that I cannot understand as he would become a university professor.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 16th, 2010 at 2:50 pm
Orlando: Because his views are profoundly subversive.
August 16th, 2010 | 12:32 pm
Why would Singer want anyone to kill a “normal” infant? He might not believe that infants are philosophical persons but he hardly derives any joy from their deaths. His argument is: if there is a genuine utilitarian benefit to be derived from the death of an infant – either by the prevention of its future suffering or (far less likely) by the benefit the infant’s death will provide to its parents there is no countervailing “right to life” argument to stay our hands.
His emphasis is on the welfare of the infants themselves but his philosophical approach means that the killing of non-disabled infants is permissible even if it happens to be generally undesirable. You seem to want to believe that he has sinister motives (and not just that his ideas have undesirable consequences).
A wise man once said: “You aren’t lying if you believe what you say” – or words to that effect. Singer apparently believes his statements about disability rights activists. He may be mistaken – but he isn’t being dishonest.
[and btw, saying that "the wrongness of killing a fish or a human infant is not as great as the wrongness of killing a person" is rather different from saying that the lives of fish and babies are equivalent. Compare "the wrongness of stealing a drowning man's pencil or gold watch is not as great as the wrongness of stealing his life jacket". Does that statement imply that pencils and gold watches are of equal value?]
August 16th, 2010 | 6:51 pm
Why did Singer feel the need to make such a statement right now? Ie, was the clip a recent interview/statement? What triggered it?
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 16th, 2010 at 7:27 pm
I am not sure when he made that particular statement. But this is when I first became aware of it, so I thought it was worth discussing. It was on an online “think” feature.
August 16th, 2010 | 8:11 pm
Raven, you state that Singer is concerned for the welfare of the infants themselves. But how can this be, when he doesn’t believe that they’re persons?
Also, why so much compassion, for defective babies, if they’re not really persons? It seems that Singer, not an uncommon occurrence, seems to contradict himself. Isn’t it odd, that he has “compassion” for non-persons?!
August 17th, 2010 | 12:48 am
“Also, why so much compassion, for defective babies, if they’re not really persons?”
P Singer, contrary to most of his human brothers, believe that the fact that someone can’t be considered as a person is not a reason to exterminate, torture or kill it. You have to read Practical Ethics if you want to make an effective critic of his thought.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 17th, 2010 at 12:50 am
Tom. I have read Practical Ethics. It is a prescription for tyranny against so-called human non persons.
August 17th, 2010 | 2:06 am
Bret,
In his own words “The question is not Can they reason? nor Can they speak?’ but, Can they suffer?”
Singer is concerned about animal welfare (about this there can be little argument) but this isn’t based on claims about animal personhood. A non-person may have the right to be free from suffering without having a right to life.
Singer’s central perspective is actually “be more concerned about the suffering and well-being of conscious beings”. This is the thread which runs through his positions on animal rights, infanticide and euthanasia.
August 17th, 2010 | 2:15 am
Safepres:
This is part of the “Big Think” interview series (one of over a 1000 interviews conducted with a range of different “experts”). Singer didn’t choose the questions but he gets asked to speak on this one issue ad nauseum because it has come to define him in the public imagination.
The full interview:
http://bigthink.com/petersinger
August 17th, 2010 | 4:32 pm
Raven, unless you can provide me a source, indicating the contrary, he only believes that persons should be part of the utilitarian calculus. Your quote from him is correct, but I think, I may be wrong, but I think it’s because he believes that these creatures who suffer, are persons.
August 17th, 2010 | 5:37 pm
Quoting Singer:
“When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second.”
This is frankly insane. if the net amount of happiness in the world is the standard of measure, murdering unhappy people would be a social good. Heck, I could make a case for carpet-bombing Detroit to eliminate unhappy people in a depressed city so that we could build a better city on the spot and move happier people in.
August 17th, 2010 | 6:09 pm
Bret,
Singer’s utilitarian calculus includes all creatures with preferences (that’s why it’s called preference utilitarianism). All conscious creatures have them – but only persons have preferences which include an interest in their own continued existence. Singer’s interest in animal welfare (in the treatment of cows and other farm animals) is based on the fact that these animals can “suffer” not on the idea that these non-rational creatures are somehow persons. Singer has repeatedly made these distinctions and expressed these opinions. Read his books (again). Listen to the interviews. (start with this one which I posted earlier.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYYNY2oKVWU)
I honestly don’t know where you got the idea that only “persons” count in Singer’s utilitarian calculus. Certainly not from the man himself.
August 17th, 2010 | 6:32 pm
Raven, Singer does believe that non-humans can be persons. Now, as you state, he does allow for beings that can suffer, but in his view, don’t count as persons.
I think that Wesley’s point, is a good one, in that Singer knows that his view that infants can, and in many cases, should be killed, in hardly likely to be popular with the public, so he’s giving the impression that he only supports the killing of the disabled.
Like I’ve said before, I don’t think that Singer is a bad person. Profoundly and completely mistaken, but not bad.
I think though that his view that any infant, in principle, can be killed, is morally bankrupt.
Does Singer believe that adult humans can, in principle, be killed? If not, I think that it’s because he states that they count as persons. And the whole reason that infants are fair game, even if he acknowledges that they can suffer, is that they’re not persons. “personhood” is much more important, in his philosophy, than you seem to give him credit for, Raven.
August 18th, 2010 | 1:09 am
Bret,
I didn’t say that “personhood” was unimportant to Singer (or even that he viewed all animals as non-persons).
I said: non-persons are included in the calculus. Their interests matter. If you thought of Singer as “the philosopher of animal rights” this would be clear to you.
You have chosen to frame his statements based on your preconceptions about him. Read his views on global poverty and animal liberation. Singer is all about reducing suffering (even the suffering of conscious non-persons). You might disagree with his motives (and conclusions) but at least give him that.
August 18th, 2010 | 5:15 pm
Raven, I do want to be fair to Singer. I think that his “preference” perspective, is interesting, and yet arbitrary. I’m unclear which animals would have “preferences”, but my guess is, all conscious animals want to continue existing, if one is careful here, not to anthromorphize. So his distinction between animals that merely suffer, and one’s that suffer and have “preferences”, and therefore now are persons, strikes me as without a reasonable foundation.
Likewise, fetuses, and infants, if we imagined that they could talk, would “prefer” to continue existing. Certainly, their bodies behave in a teleological manner, reflective of a being whose continual existence, is better than its nonexistence.
Singer does not believe in animal rights. Rights, Raven, as you know, are not apart of any version of utilitarianism. In fact, this is one of Tom Regan’s criticism’s of Singer’s views, is the latter does not believe that any animal is nonexpendible.
I don’t disagree with Singer’s motives. I believe that he honestly believes that he’s devised a proper moral system. Yes, I obviously disagree with his conclusions.
And like many great philosophers, throughout history, his ideas cannot be implemented into reality, easily, and if they could, the world would be a pretty bad place. Think of Plato’s “ideal city”, in one of his dialogues, The Republic, or Marx’s Communist Manifesto, or Das Kapital, just to give two examples.
I have pointed out Singer’s own inability to implement his own system, into practical reality. his caring for his Mother, who has Alzheimer’s. But also he owns two houses, and, although he does give a considerable sum of his income to the poor, which is commenable, he still lives a comfortable life.
Obviously, the fact that Singer is inconsistent with his own theory, is, frankly, a little bit hypocritical, does not logically invalidate his theory. But the wise person, ought to look art this system of his sceptically, and wonder if Singer, like so many philosophers before him, is spending a wee bit too much time between his own ears.
August 18th, 2010 | 10:24 pm
“total amount of happiness”?????
Seriously?
Is it because I am Catholic that this calculus seems so absurd?
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 18th, 2010 at 11:30 pm
No holyterror: It is because it IS absurd–and dangerous.
August 18th, 2010 | 11:01 pm
[...] enough to actually say that disabled people are less deserving of life (Peter Singer being a notable exception), in many ways, this is the way many people throughout the world feel, evidenced by their treatment [...]
August 19th, 2010 | 1:54 am
Bret: Marx’s Das Kapital (more commonly referred to by English-speaking scholars as Capital) is an analysis of the workings of the capitalist economic system and an attempt to build a theoretical model of that system. It has nothing to do with painting a picture of communism. Marx wrote remarkably little about his hoped-for communist future. He and Engels disdained what they called “utopian” socialism (drawing up blueprints for an ideal society), and Marx said he wasn’t interested in writing “recipes for the cook-shops of the future”.
Raven is right: You don’t have to be a “person” for your preferences to count in Singer’s calculus. But being a person, someone who can experience their life as a narrative, is important because the fulfillment or frustration of your desires to get an education, raise a family, become an opera singer, visit Japan, etc., mean that your overall interests have considerably more weight than those of a being, like a chicken, who doesn’t have the capacity for such interests. You have a lot more to lose, and death is a much greater misfortune for you because it frustrates all those future-oriented plans.
Fetuses are indeed teleologically oriented to survive. But so are plants. Plants don’t count, except instrumentally, because they have no subjective interests. (There’s no one there.) Fetuses, in Singer’s view, begin to count as soon as they become sentient and therefore have interests, even if it’s just an interest in not experiencing pain. But even so, one must balance the good of the fetus against the good of the mother if there is a conflict.
August 19th, 2010 | 2:15 am
For a creature to “prefer to to continue existing” it must has a sense of its own existence – it must be self-conscious (rather than merely conscious). A creature with no sense of past, present and future and no concept of a continuing self through time has no interest in the preservation of its consciousness (though it would want to have pleasurable experiences while living)
My guess is that you haven’t read (or listened to) Singer’s defence of his treatment of his mother (in spite of the fact that I’ve linked to its several times). Your criticism of Singer is based on what you think he’s saying – not on his actual work and perspectives.
[btw, as we have discussed before, "rights" are very much a part of utilitarian philosophies. They just don't represent independent moral truths]
August 19th, 2010 | 8:36 am
Me: “rights” are very much a part of utilitarian philosophies. They just don’t represent independent moral truths
And so I suppose it would be fair to say that they aren’t really “individual rights” in the conventional philosophical sense.
August 19th, 2010 | 10:17 pm
For a creature to “prefer to to continue existing” it must has a sense of its own existence – it must be self-conscious (rather than merely conscious). A creature with no sense of past, present and future and no concept of a continuing self through time has no interest in the preservation of its consciousness (though it would want to have pleasurable experiences while living)
My guess is that you haven’t read (or listened to) Singer’s defence of his treatment of his mother (in spite of the fact that I’ve linked to its several times). Your criticism of Singer is based on what you think he’s saying – not on his actual work and perspectives.
Raven-
Who gives a flying blankety blank about how Singer treated HIS mother? That means NOTHING. In fact, Singer had NO CHOICE but to provide medical care to his mother-If he had tried to euthanize her, he would have GONE TO JAIL. I care about what he’s saying about OTHER PEOPLE’S MOTHERS. Moreover, Wesley, I, and I am sure many others on this blog HAVE read his work EXTENSIVELY and KNOW what we are talking about, you just want to say that we don’t to pad your elitist defense of Singer’s mysanthropy.
August 20th, 2010 | 2:11 am
Raven, you say that, for a creature to want to continue its existence, it must be “selfconscious”. No creature, except for humans, and chimps (maybe), are SELF conscious. so is Singer then concluding that no other animal (since all other animals, to the best of our knowledge, are merely conscious, not self conscious) has preferences, and therefore we can safely exclude from the moral community? I don’t think he’s saying that at all. Is he?
by the way, I have read his “excuse” for his mother’s treatment, which makes me wish I didn’t. I would have had much more respect for him, if he cared for her, because he loved her. He said, that his sister wanted to care for her, so he reluctantly gave in. If it was up to him, he “may” have not cared for her. I love the way he says “may”. If his philosophical system is so correct, why use the word “may”? I think that it’s because he wants it both ways; he wants to “cover” himself, and prepare for any contingincies, such as some statement of his, coming back to haunt him, he can fall back on “may”.
August 20th, 2010 | 2:20 am
Safepres,
the reference to Singer’s treatment of his mother was in response to Bret’s citing that as an instance of his philosophy’s impracticality.
To call Singer “misanthropic” is to misread him completely. He is a textbook philanthropist (one consumed by the effort or inclination to increase the well-being of mankind) You might disagree with his ideas but it’s hard to deny that motives are beyond reproach. Singer’s utilitarianism might be (in your eyes) a road to hell but it is, as these roads so often are, paved with good intentions.
August 20th, 2010 | 2:25 am
Let me also add, that, Singer may love his mother. My point is, that that would be enough, for a normal person. If my mother becomes ill, I will give her the best care in the world, not because I’m adhering to some abstract philosophical system, like utilitarianism, or deontology, but because I love her.
the fact that love is not enough for Singer, is chilling.
I guess for me, Raven, the fact that a being is conscious (like a cat, monkey, dog or pig) or will be conscious (such as a fetus or infant), is enough to conclude that they have a right to exist. To deprive the fetus of its life, is depriving it of all the experiences that we are fortunate enough to have. The fetus is a human being with the full capacity for consciousness, built into its DNA and associated organelles. To kill it, will not hurt it, true, as you say, but if you give me a painless injection during a sleeping night and I die, I ‘ll never be hurt either.
Mijhneer: My point was that Marx’s theory concludes that capitalism is immoral, because of its inequality, and he predicted that the poor, working class, (prolietariat) would overthrow capitalism, and the existing government, where we woud have a temporary dictatorship, then the communist system would emerge, where equality would exist.
August 20th, 2010 | 2:18 pm
Bret,
Love is, I am told, a wonderful thing (and this is not an assertion I’m prepared to question) – but the idea that it should be sufficient reason to do anything is strange, from a moral perspective.
If my repentant son happened to be convicted of murder and were sentenced to death, would I be justified if I hired an small army of mercenaries to rescue him because “I love him”?
If you had to kill one hundred innocent strangers to save the life of a person you love, would you do it?
The duties of morality (properly conceived) outweigh the duties of love. The task is to properly determine what those ethical duties are.
In Singer’s case, obviously, there was no duty to kill his mother – but, from his perspective their was also no ethical duty to keep her alive beyond the point when she failed to meet his criteria for personhood. His decision to care for her was probably based on many different factors – emotion, the fact that other people were involved in the decision, legal issues etc – and reflects the fact that most of our choices are not based on ethical duty (nor can they be). As you have admitted several times, Singer is not a bad person and has not, as far as I’m aware, launched a “kill your ailing mother campaign”. He has however pointed out that sometimes the person you love dies long before their body does and while you might feel duty bound to keep patching up the building when its occupant has left, sometimes this course of action causes more suffering than it alleviates.
With regard to loving, in general: One would assume that when you love a person, your affection is not focussed merely on their biological corpus but on a constantly shifting array of psychological traits given expression through that body. Any attempts to preserve and protect the body in question are made in the expectation that this constellation (or something recognisably like it) will persist or re-emerge at some later date (if the person has slipped into unconsciousness or sub-rationality). If a loved one has irreversibly lost his or her rational faculties, if the storehouse of beloved memories, thoughts and desires has become permanently inaccessible, then there is a real sense in which that loved one is no longer there. That person is irretrievably lost and anyone who tends to their bodily health for emotional reasons is like the bereaved parent or spouse who keeps their loved one’s room tidy in the forlorn hope that one day they will walk through the door.
In dementia patients, it is, of course, difficult to determine when this “point of no return” occurs (and I do not know where Singer draws the line here) and personally, I do not think we should try. A patient who appears amnesic and confused one moment may suddenly lapse back into lucidity or recall a familiar face. Unless a patient has (while lucid) clearly expressed contrary wishes I feel they ought to be cared for until “heroic” measures (e.g ventilatory support etc) are required. But those are my views, not Singer’s.
You might not be hurt by a painless lethal injection but the preservation of your life is something you care about prior to this injection. Your interests in this regard are thwarted by your being killed whereas those of an infant who is similarly treated would not be. They are deprived of futures only in the same sense that a sperm and egg are deprived of a future if they both happen to be killed just as the sperm penetrates the zona pellucida. If a being has no concept of its own life, its interests are not thwarted when this life is painlessly taken away.
August 20th, 2010 | 9:45 pm
“You might disagree with his ideas but it’s hard to deny that motives are beyond reproach. Singer’s utilitarianism might be (in your eyes) a road to hell but it is, as these roads so often are, paved with good intentions.”
Motives are meaningless. Actions matter. Almost without exception, every evil committed in human history has been committed by people who thought their goals were laudable. From slavery to genocide, there’s no deed so foul that people can’t convince themselves that they’re committing it from noble motives.
As to Peter Singer, I’m starting to notice a trend of his advancing monstrous ideas (kill the senile, kill infants) and then backing off when the implications become too obvious (caring for this mother, only killing disabled and/or terminally ill infants).
August 21st, 2010 | 2:54 am
I think that you are right, Raven, that ethical decisions are composed of more than just love. But “love” plays more of a role in ethics, than we would care, perhaps, to admit. Whether it’s love of our families, or love of our pets, or love of humanity, or sentient creatures, in general. It’s what motivates us, to device “consistent” ethical theories.
Of course, our love for our families, is qualitatively different, and stronger, than our love of friends, or humans in general. and it could be argued, that it interferes with being objective. But it’s the human codition, like it or not, and when we try to override it, with more “rational” ethical theories, there’s a danger that we may do more harm than good.
I think we have to attempt to synthesis the “love” and “rational” elements, and not try to do away with either.
Some insight, can be gained, into human morality, by looking at “anti-social personality disorder” or “psychopathy”. The individuals afflicted with this, understand, on an intellectual, rational level, what ethics is, and its importance. However, they lack the emotional component. Looking at this disorder, has convinced me, that the emotional element, is the most important. Why? Because these individuals, are capable of anything. They have no attachments to anyone, not even family members. They can do the most horrible things, without remorse. They have shown that any ethical theory, such as utilitarianism, or deontology, that attempts to deny, or eliminate the emotional component to morality, is essentially mistaken.
You state, Raven, that, the fact that I possess a phychological life, prior to sleeping, makes me fundamentally distinct, ethically, from the fetus, who has not had a mental life yet. I fail to see the relevance. After all, I take it, that you give creidance to the notion that, say, a dementia patient, who’s in a sufficiently advanced state of mental dysfunction, is no longer a person. Are you not, here, being inconsistent? After all, you claim that my PRIOR mental life, makes it ethically impermissible to kill me, when I have no mental life sleeping. But the dementia person, had a mental life, PRIOR to developing dementia? You might respond, well, the dementia patient will NO LONGER have a mental life, thererfore, she’s not a person. But, the corollary of this, is that the fetus, who WILL have a mental life, should not be aborted.
What it boils down to, Raven, is with the dementia patient, the sleeping patient, and the fetus, all are lacking in a mental life. You’re saying the fetus, has no right to life, because it had NO PRIOR mental life, although it WILL have one, if left unharmed. You say that the sleeping adult, has a right to life, because she HAD a prior mental life. But you are saying the advanced dementia patient, does not have a right to life, even though, she also HAD a prior mental life. Is this not inconsistent?
you may respond, by saying that, the dementia patient, had a mental life, but WILL NOT have one in the FUTURE, which is of relevance here. But the fetus, WILL have a mental life in the future, so why not let her, have the right to life?
August 21st, 2010 | 4:07 am
SparcVark,
Singer’s motives may not be of consequence when we decided how to treat his ideas but they are certainly relevant to how we treat and refer to him. A bad idea ought to be resisted regardless of the motivations of its originator, but a man with good intentions ought not to be vilified even if we disagree with him.
Let’s be clear here. I disagree with Singer’s conclusions about infanticide and people with dementia but I, unlike most of his critics, accept their internal logic (i.e if you grant his premises, his conclusions follow). My locus of disagreement lies elsewhere: with my impression that he has misapplied the utilitarian calculus and is simply mistaken about the idea that treating infants and the senile in the way he recommends would be of benefit to us.
His ideas might have “monstrous” consequences but please give the man a break. I don’t think he sits at home in his underground lair tallying up the number of infants killed as part of his Master Plan.
The motives (and not just the methods) of most of the architects of slavery, genocide and the other sundry horrors you alluded to earlier are abhorrent to us. In contrast, Singer’s stated goals are commendable. Condemn the ideas, by all means – but recognise the man’s integrity.
August 21st, 2010 | 11:12 am
Bret: You say that, for a creature to want to continue its existence, it must be “self-conscious”. No creature, except for humans, and chimps (maybe), are SELF conscious. so is Singer then concluding that no other animal (since all other animals, to the best of our knowledge, are merely conscious, not self conscious) has preferences, and therefore we can safely exclude from the moral community?
All conscious creatures have preferences (and hence are included in the moral community) but only self-conscious creatures have preferences about the continuation of their lives.
Bret: If his philosophical system is so correct, why use the word “may”?
Because, in this instance (and by his own calculus) he felt he was under no moral obligation to either care for his mother or stop caring for her. That decision was constrained by factors other than ethical duty. The “correctness” of an ethical system is not dependent on its determining our every action (we will always be faced with decisions with no moral compulsion in either direction).
August 21st, 2010 | 11:58 am
Bret,
I never suggested that we “do away” with love. I just stated, very plainly, that the duties of love are subordinate to the duties of ethics. If there is a conflict, we ought to choose the ethically “right” course of action and not necessarily that motivated by our love for one individual or one limited category of individuals. One hopes that these duties coincide – but sometimes they do not and we have to stick to our principles and “do the right thing”.
So-called psychopaths do display a lack of empathy and a persistent disregard for the rights of others. They tend to be just as aware of ethical codes of conduct but choose to disregard them. Imagine, however, a psychopath who wanted to be “moral”. Would that be a bad person? Would that individual make bad ethical decisions?
Ethical decisions ought not to be governed by emotion but we should, obviously, factor our feelings and the feelings of others into the moral calculus (because emotion is one of the unavoidable “facts of the world”). The ability to empathize and connect emotionally is important (this process of “placing oneself in another’s shoes” is one way of appreciating what their interests are) but ultimately deciding what is “right” and “wrong” is a rational and not an emotional process. A sudden surge of love or revulsion or indignation might give us to the energy to behave morally but none of these irrational feelings determine the morally appropriate course of action.
As I have said before, I have no use for “personhood” as a philosophical concept. My references to personhood criteria and who does or does not meet them have all been related to other people’s ideas on the subject and not mine.
I believe it is ridiculous to speak of a “right to life” for creatures who are not self-conscious or who have experienced such a degree of cognitive decline that they will never again rise to self-consciousness. But I do not, as a result of this, feel that we ought to remove legal protection from these creatures. We have discussed this at length elsewhere and it would be pointless to go into it again.
About psychological histories. As I have written elsewhere the whole “psychological history” thing is just an indication that there are conscious creatures who have an interest in the precedent being established (who may, in the future, find themselves in that state). There are no conscious creatures who will become unconscious fetuses and hence no conscious individuals have interests which may be directly affected by the precedent established. On the other hand, many presently conscious individuals will eventually become senile and sub-rational. Their preferences should be given due consideration (in much the same way that we respect the dead partly because the living care about how they will be treated when dead).
August 21st, 2010 | 12:10 pm
“To call Singer “misanthropic” is to misread him completely. He is a textbook philanthropist (one consumed by the effort or inclination to increase the well-being of mankind) You might disagree with his ideas but it’s hard to deny that motives are beyond reproach.”
LOL-a “textbook philanthropist?” I think that YOU misunderstand the meaning of THAT word. Gandhi was a philanthropist. Martin Luther King was a philanthropist-they affirmed the worth of every person and sought to help people through their actions. Singer’s “philanthropy” amounts to little more than “look at me, I give money to charity.”
“You may disagree with his ideas but his motives are beyond reproach.”
This is indisputably NOT true. For instance, he asserts that he would like to eliminate all disability. Many of us with disabilities are quite happy the way we are and view attempts to cure or change our disabilities as being ableist. Hence, that motive is open to reproach.
He wants society to adopt his “replacement baby” theory if an infant is born who does not suit his or her parent’s preferences, because presumably that would make everyone happy-that motive-to fulfill everyone’s personal desires, is hedonistic and destructive-it is certainly open to reproach.
Moreover, you’re focusing on the motives he ADMITS too. If he said, “I hate all handicapped people, they should be placed on an island and shot,” (which is basically what he says in a nicer way), it would be more difficult (though certainly not impossible in today’s climate) for him to hold down a job.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 21st, 2010 at 12:58 pm
Not to mention that Singer’s eliminating disability would often entail eliminating the person (not in Singer’s sense of that term) with disabilities. Safepres is right: You can’t want to benefit all humankind but leave some of us out. And his promotion of the Great Ape Project reduces the human status, a project he conceived, as he has written, to “break the species barrier.” You can’t be for all humans when you want animals to be given equal consideration, even at the expense of some humans.
August 21st, 2010 | 1:48 pm
Safepres:
Philanthropy: (n) love of mankind especially as shown by contributing (money, time etc) to general welfare. (from The Chamber’s Dictionary (New Ninth Edition), the only dictionary on my bookshelf)
Utilitarianism is by definition philanthropic in its intentions.
Singer wishes to eliminate disability (not people with disabilities). That’s a commendable goal. The fact that we wish to reduce the incidence of physical and mental impairments doesn’t mean that we harbour any ill-feeling towards people who currently have those impairments (or consider them in any sense less “human”). His position with regard to disabled infants is motivated by the goal of reducing suffering. You might disagree with his conclusions and his methods but, in fairness, you can’t possibly claim that the reduction of suffering and the promotion of well-being is misanthropic.
As I’ve repeated ad nauseum, its one thing to say that a man’s ideas are unwise, unworkable, and have repugnant consequences – it’s another thing entirely to claim that the man himself is driven by sinister motives.
Wesley: Promoting the Great Ape Project reduces the status of humans only in your eyes. Moral consideration isn’t a finite resource. The fact that we accord a degree of dignity to other creatures doesn’t mean that humans are granted less.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 21st, 2010 at 2:05 pm
Raven: It isn’t “a degree of dignity.” It is EQUAL dignity. Big diff.
August 21st, 2010 | 1:49 pm
“The motives (and not just the methods) of most of the architects of slavery, genocide and the other sundry horrors you alluded to earlier are abhorrent to us. In contrast, Singer’s stated goals are commendable. Condemn the ideas, by all means – but recognise the man’s integrity.”
I cut Peter Singer slack in the sense that while I think his ethics are flat evil, he has never to my knowledge killed an infant, senile old person, deliberately backed over a dog, etc. He gives to charity, takes care of his mother, and probably gives correct directions to strangers. His actions matter. But his ideas have to be fought before they’re put into practice.
But motives? The USSR starved millions of people to death in the Ukraine and sent millions more to die of scurvy in prison camps north of the Arctic Circle in the belief they were building a perfect, classless society for future generations. The Aztecs used to kill 10,000 people in a day in the belief that it kept the Sun happy. Accept their “premises” and you might wind up with their conclusions. Motives are meaningless. Actions matter.
August 21st, 2010 | 4:59 pm
SparcVark:
I think you will find that the individuals who “starved millions of people to death in the Ukraine and sent millions more to die of scurvy in prison camps north of the Arctic Circle” did not actually think that they were thereby bringing about a better world or classless society. The motivations for these actions were probably the rather more prosaic ones that have moved dictators in all ages (the consolidation of political power etc). Stalin didn’t have people murdered or sent off to death camps because he was concerned about their welfare. He did so because he was concerned about his.
The Aztecs were ignorant and primitive. If we were to discover a tribe today engaged in similar practices our first impulse would not be punitive – We would rather attempt to “set them straight” (and anyway the Aztecs rulers were not concerned with general well-being. The raids and sacrifices were not carried out for “the people”, they were for the benefit of the ruling classes themselves).
Motives matter. If a man’s actions result in the death of my entire family the magnitude of my loss is unaffected by his motives. My treatment of this man, however, and my thoughts about him are, to a much greater extent, affected by his motives. Was it deliberate or accidental? Did he mistakenly believe that his actions were actually saving their lives? Was he driven by religious or racial hatred?
Or imagine a man who fervently believes a poisonous drug is life-saving. Such a man might be dangerous. But is he evil? Of course not.
Wesley:
Merely equal consideration when it comes to the rights to life, individual freedom and freedom from torture. I somehow think we can manage that without bringing down Western Civilisation.
In practice, what would change? No more great ape experiments. No chimps locked in tiny cages. How would that endanger human rights?
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
August 21st, 2010 at 5:19 pm
Raven: No, that brings it down. By definition.
August 21st, 2010 | 7:47 pm
Raven, clearly, I think that our differences, regarding the rights, or lack there of, of fetuses,infants, is irreconcilible. we just come at this issue, too differently, to find common ground. I do believe that the fetus’s eventual consciousness (after all, we all started out the same way), is morally relevant. It’s simply a fact, that the fetus is a human being. I do accept the notion, that being a human being, regardless of the mental capacities, of this human,entitles it to moral consideration. You seem to believe that the moral worth of a being is entirely, or mostly contingent on the wishes of the being. And I do believe that this has validity, but it cannot be the whole story. We have to look at the ontological status of the being in question, and whether our moral decesions, regarding this being, are for the objective good of the being. Also, we must realize that the potential future cosequences, of our behavior, have moral relevance.
My central point, in bringing up psychopaths, was to show that, emotion is inextricably linked, to moral decesions, in the normal person. And, I think that a good case can be made, for the view that, if we try to eliminate all emotion, from our moral decesion process, we may end up doing more harm than good.
you state that only “selfconscious” have an interest in having their lives continued. I think that this highlights, what I believe to be the flaw, in the whole “preference” approach. A fetus, or a monkey, or a cat, may not be self conscious, and therefore may not have an explicit “interest” in its continual existence, but if one looks at it from the standpoint, that this creature’s exisence, and continuing existence, is an objective good, then it does not matter what, if any, “preferences” it has. Ontologically, it’s better for the fetus, the elderly person, the monkey, cat, to be living, than to be dead.
August 21st, 2010 | 8:21 pm
Raven, with respect to your question,whether a psychopath “wanted” to be moral. Could you clarify, what you mean? It seems a little ambiguous. It seems that, if he wanted to be moral, he wouldn’t be a psychopath. They don’t want to be moral, they seem incapable of it.
August 22nd, 2010 | 1:46 am
Ontologically, it’s better for the fetus, the elderly person, the monkey, cat, to be living, than to be dead.
Life itself is not an unqualified good. What matters are the experiences one has will living. A cat condemned to a life of torture would be better off dead. Such a creature has no preferences about its continued existence (though it may have other preferences) so if we did decide to kill this cat to end its suffering we would not be thwarting its wishes.
The morally relevant facts are psychological ones. What is a creature capable of experiencing? Would performing this action either cause suffering to this creature or establish a precedent by which other conscious creatures felt themselves liable to experience suffering? A being might be human (in the biological sense) and be completely unconscious (an anencephalic infant, for instance). Would there be any moral duties towards such a creature? In what sense is it reasonable to cultivate moral obligations towards creatures incapable of psychologically benefiting from the discharge of our duties? What’s the rationale for basing our evaluation of a creature’s “moral worth” on something as philosophically irrelevant as genetic humanity?
Our differences with regard to the treatment of the fetus etc are due to the fact that we have fundamentally very difference conceptions of what morality is about. I believe that ultimately its about what makes all our lives better. It’s not just about following arbitrary and inflexible rules like “don’t kill anything shown to have human DNA”. If our morality fails to reduce suffering or improve well-being then it’s worthless.
Emotion is linked to all our decisions. The question is should it be? Do we make better decisions when we are under the influence of strong emotions? The psychopath example (and my poorly phrased hypothetical) illustrate that the important thing is not a lack of emotion per se. A completely unemotional person who wanted to be “moral” would still make good moral decisions as long as he were able to accurately factor in the emotional states of others. People diagnosed as having antisocial personality disorder, in addition to their lack of empathy also demonstrate a degree of amorality (these are not necessarily causally linked) so his violations of ethical standards are not encumbered by feelings of guilt or compassion. My question was about a hypothetical individual who, like a “psychopath”, lacks empathy but nonetheless commits himself to following a moral code (like a more virtuous version of the character Dexter from the TV series). Would such a person necessarily make bad moral choices? Empathy, of course, enables us to better evaluate what the interests of others are but (one would assume) this is something one could compensate for cognitively.
But, once again, no one advocates that we banish emotion. What a bleak and colourless world it would be if we did! What one ought to appreciate though is the fact that rational decisions ought to be precisely that: rational.
August 22nd, 2010 | 6:18 pm
Raven, I think that it’s necessary to clarify some issues. Let’s talk about the psychopath example. You provide an interesting example, but I think that you maybe (or maybe not, please correct me, as needed) misunderstand what a psychopath really is. They not only seem to lack empathy, but, much more importantly, they lack feelings of guilt, remorse, even more important than empathy. People, with, say, autism, seem to lack empathy, which makes them unlikely to accurately interpret social cues. But, those with autism have consciences, they feel remorse, and guilt for wrong they have done. also, there are various other conditions, where people lack proper empathy,but because of their guilt, they are able to function normally, morally, or at least compensate. This has lead me to believe, that feelings of guilt, are the most important trait, that humans have, for behaving morally. Of course, as guilt can be excessive (as in the case of obsessive compulsive disorder), which makes it maladaptive. but guilt, properly felt, is essential.
your question presupposes that the “psychopath” CARES, about morality. He doesn’t, or doesn’t seem to. I think that a person, who did not feel, the same about morality, as a normal person, and yet , still wanted to be moral, could compensate, cognitively, for his lack of emotion, but he would not be a phychopath, at least as traditionally defined.
Your question, whether emotion should, be apart of our moral decisions, is interesting. I’m coming close to the belief, that in normal humans, IT CANNOT BE OTHERWISE. In theoretical discussions, it’s easy to disassociate oneself, from the emotional aspects, of moral choices, but in real life, I don’t think it’s possible, or even wise, to attempt to eradicate emotion from moral decisions.
Of course, one can be TOO emotional, which hinders proper moral decision making, but one can be TOO rational, as one sees in the systems, of Kant, Mill, and Singer. As much as we may believe that morality should, or should not, be lead entirely by reason, I think that balance, as in many things, is needed here.
When weve dicussed the fetus, I think that we both have had a tendency, to focus, on the embryo. But we should never forget, that abortions are allowed, at least in the U.S., up to the moment of birth. Here we have a being, with arms, legs, a heart, etc., in short, almost indistinguishible from a newborn. You accuse me of adhering to “inflexible rules”, but I think that one could easily argue that, allowing abortion and infanticide, because of the lack of “preferences, on the part of the fetus, and infant, respectively, is rather rigid as well.
August 22nd, 2010 | 9:18 pm
Singer wishes to eliminate disability (not people with disabilities). That’s a commendable goal.
Dude, I just want to eliminate your gay-ness. I don’t want to elminate you! You’re just to messed up to KNOW that you need to be fixed-someday there won’t be any more gayness, because we’ll cure all of you! Won’t that be nice????
The fact that we wish to reduce the incidence of physical and mental impairments doesn’t mean that we harbour any ill-feeling towards people who currently have those impairments (or consider them in any sense less “human”).
Yes, it does, Raven. It means that the people with these impairments are invariably looked down upon as pitiable.
His position with regard to disabled infants is motivated by the goal of reducing suffering.
Yeah, the PARENT’S and SOCIETY’s suffering.
You might disagree with his conclusions and his methods but, in fairness, you can’t possibly claim that the reduction of suffering and the promotion of well-being is misanthropic.
Killing infants does not “promote their well being.”
August 23rd, 2010 | 5:38 am
Bret,
Maybe I do need to clarify my use of the term “psychopath”.
As you know, a “psychopath” is a largely obsolete term for someone who meets the diagnostic criteria for anti-social personality disorder. Psychopathy itself is not defined in either the DSM-IV or ICD-10. My preference for the term (rather than its more accurate correlate) is an indication that I am using this “psychopath” as a fictive construct – as a puppet in our private screenshow. (rather like the idea of “zombies” used in discussions about qualia and consciousness).
We were discussing the influence of emotion on ethical decision making, the “psychopath” was meant to represent an individual lacking in empathy but having, in contrast to people with autism, a well-developed theory of mind. The question under consideration was: Would a person with these limitations make bad moral decisions if they in fact decided (for reasons of their own) to adhere to a moral code?
The implied assumption (for this thought experiment) was that “psychopaths” have certain deficits even if these are not expressed. A man with a “psychopath’s” brain might be placed in a situation in which he didn’t need to (or didn’t want to) flout moral convention to achieve his personal goals. That man would still (for the limited purposes of this discussion) have a psychopath’s brain (and, in that sense, be a “psychopath” as I have been using the term) even if he were not “symptomatic”
- in much the same way that a man may be diabetic even if his blood sugar is perfectly controlled. The reference was more to characters in fiction (like Dexter, the one I referred to before http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSv6uhM-uKM).
The diagnostic category Antisocial Personality Disorder is not of much philosophical interest, representing as it does a constellation of signs and symptoms with no real indication that there is an underlying (and unifying) neurological disorder. The diagnosis is granted only if the patient actually flouts moral conventions – and this explains my preference for the obsolete term. It’s possible to imagine a “psychopath” (as I’ve been using the term) who successfully pretends to be “normal” for decades as part of his master plan. Such an individual, however would not meet the diagnostic criteria laid down in the DSM-IV.
—-
I understand how an individual may be described as “too rational” – but how could that be applied to a decision? Are there some problems which would be better handled by our being less reasonable? Surely if there is such a thing as objective truth a greater degree of rationality will only bring us closer to it? Perhaps there are some truths we are emotionally unprepared to accept, or emotionally primed to celebrate – but ought we not to realise that it is the task of the intellect to achieve control over the emotions (and not the other way around)?
A preference based approach would indeed be rigid if it said “fetuses and other creatures with no preferences ought always to be killed”. Thankfully this is not the perspective urged on us. Have rules, by all means – but recognise that these rules are but means to an end. If we discover that these secondary rules fail to further our primary objectives, we should be prepared to change them.
(and, as I have pointed out before, I personally support greater restrictions on late-term abortions).
August 23rd, 2010 | 6:13 am
Safepres,
A drive to eradicate diabetes, cataracts or polio doesn’t mean that we consider individuals with these conditions “pitiable”. It just means that we realise that these are in fact obstacles to be overcome rather than benefits.
I have myopia – but if someone launched a campaign to eradicate myopia I wouldn’t feel threatened. I am not attached to my visual impairment. It is not who I am.
If a child is rendered deaf because his meningitis is poorly treated, we feel that he has been harmed. We do not say “being deaf is just as good as being able to hear. The doctor’s negligence has not adversely affected this child.”
Similarly, if a drug administered to a woman during pregnancy results in her child’s cognitive impairment, we take it for granted that she ought to be compensated. This is, once again, not based on the presumption that the deaf or cognitively impaired are “less human”. It’s simply a recognition that an impairment of this sort is a “harm” which ought to be prevented when possible.
Homosexuality is not an impairment or disability. We would commend a parent who attempted to stop their child from going blind or deaf but (unless we happened to be religious fundamentalists of a certain stripe) would not be as comfortable with the idea of their trying to “prevent” their adolescent from “turning gay”.
Killing infants does not reduce their suffering. Maybe not – but it sometimes brings their pain to an end or prevents them from experiencing further suffering. Singer’s position on this issue is not necessarily one I share, but I understand his perspective. He may be wrong – but he certainly isn’t malicious.
August 23rd, 2010 | 1:37 pm
“Homosexuality is not an impairment or disability. We would commend a parent who attempted to stop their child from going blind or deaf but (unless we happened to be religious fundamentalists of a certain stripe) would not be as comfortable with the idea of their trying to “prevent” their adolescent from “turning gay”.”
Well, Raven, there is a big difference between injury and disability. If a person is born with disability, that is an idenitity that the child grows up with. If a person becomes disabled later on, it requires a period of adjustment that is often painful. Thus, to save the child or whomever from going through that, parents endeavor to prevent injury which would lead to disability, which would cause changes in their life that they are ill prepared to deal with. Many disabilities can only be eradicated through prenatal testing and abortion, and if Peter Singer had his way, via infanticide. There is no “cure” for down syndrome, diabetes or hemophelia, and hence, Singer would allow these infants to be killed for their parents sake, not theirs. MOreover, you should stop using the pronoun “We”. Disability activists, of which I am one, do not agree that disability is any different than homosexuality and do not feel that it ought to be corrected any more than one’s sexuality should.
August 23rd, 2010 | 5:28 pm
Raven, thanks for your response. I’ll respond to your last point, first. You have, to your credit, on many occasions, stated that you favor restrictions on late term abortions. But if the fetus, is incapable of pain perception, and in fact lacks the general traits that make a person part of the moral sphere (as conceived by preference utilitarians), what possible rational basis do you have for restricting late term abortions, or even infanticide. That is, if the fetus and newborn, are MORALLY indistinguishible from, say, a rock, aren’t you advocating an immoral position, by restricting the freedom of women, who, obviously are part of the moral community, they’re persons with preferences?
You’re right, that the term “psychopath”, is generally obsolete, although some scholars advocate keeping the term. Your question is an interesting one. “psychopaths”, are good at “faking” emotions, and appearing normal, and have, in fact been known to engage in moral, even heroic, behavior, if it suits their purposes. Their intentions, are not the same as everyone else, but they can, make moral decesions.
But I think that evolution has equipped us, to look at moral issues, from an emotional, and reasoned standpoint, and we need to try and understand why this is the case. It may be that if we use reason, exclusively, we are perhaps missing important social or emotional elements, that only emotion, in conjunction with reason, can give us.
Take a social situation. One might argue, that, it’s impossible to use too much reason, to desipher, or interpret a social encounter. But social psychology is full of evidence, and we know from our own experience, if we try to think of, every variable, to get through a social situation, we end up creating a failure of the social encounter. Often, in social encounters, thinking can be a problem! It’s possible, that thinking “too much”, in moral matters, creates an immoral “solution”.
August 23rd, 2010 | 5:32 pm
Safepres:
A disability is by definition something negative. As defined by the WHO it includes “impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions”. If you feel that none of these ought to be corrected (even if full correction is medically possible) then I guess there isn’t much else to say.
August 24th, 2010 | 1:51 am
Bret,
I have also repeatedly said that (1) although current evidence shows that the late-term fetus (after 24 weeks) is unlikely to consciously perceive pain, this is by no means certain (2) newborns are conscious and hence have preferences. They are part of the moral calculus and hence are moral distinguishable from rocks (3) our treatment of creatures is affected by, but not completely determined by, their “moral status”. Sometimes there are wider societal reasons for choosing to proscribe or encourage an action.
Ethical decision-making is just that: decision-making – and decisions should be more rational rather than less.
There are obviously some aspects of human life which are governed by subconscious instinct and which we ought not to overthink. Our gait becomes awkward if we think too much about where to position our arms and legs during everyday walking but a soldier who finds himself surrounded by mines and tripwires had better think unemotionally about his next step if he wishes to get out alive.
Similarly with moral decision making. As I have said before, most of our ethical decisions are trivial. It’s impracticable to subject them to anything even approaching a full calculus. We, rather like individuals in casual social interaction, follow our intuitions in these cases (unless reason has demonstrated their error) – but when we do find ourselves faced with a difficult choice, we ought to be as rational as possible.
August 24th, 2010 | 5:28 pm
I think that your comments, Raven, indicate the basically different approach, that we have toward moral issues. Bit there is, at least some common ground. We both believe that these issues, are of immense importance, and I do think that we agree that consequences are essentially important to morality. But I believe that some actions, are just intrinsically wrong, torture, for example. Also, although I agree with you, that amelierating suffering is very important, I don’t think that it can be the ONLY factor, in an action being moral,or immoral.
In a thread, responding to someone else, you mention that the intentions of a person, are of impotance. It seems difficult to see how they could be, except insofar as they lead one to produce either good or bad consequences. But if good consequences, result, even from the actions of someone with malevolant intent, the action is moral, and his intentions are strictly irrelevant, morally.
One could not, coherently, say that the bad intended person, who produced good consequences, was bad at all, and that feeling that he’s, say, “not a good person”, is irrational, because one is trying to sneak in a moral evaluation, of this person, through the back door, as it were, when, if only consequences matter, it’s only his behavior, that’s morally relevant.
August 24th, 2010 | 6:58 pm
Apparantly, my comments, didn’t go through, so I’ll try again.
I think that we do have some common ground, Raven. We both believe in the importance of consequences, in morality. And we both believe that the reduction of suffering, should clearly be part, of any moral view. However, I do believe that certain actions, are intrinsically wrong, torture, for instance. And although I agree that reason, should be part of our moral reflection, I think that it’s fair to say, that I believe that emotion should play a greater role in our decision making, than you do.
In a thread, to someone else, you were stating that, intentions are important. But it seems hard to understand, how, if consequences are what’s essential to morality, the intentions, as long as they result in good actions, are relevant.
If we have a person, with bad intent, but he creates moral results, is it not irrational, to evaluate him negatively, based solely on his intentions?
August 25th, 2010 | 2:14 am
Intentions affect our evaluation of the actor. Consequences affect our evaluation of the act. We resist a “bad” action regardless of what outcome its perpetrator intending but we do not condemn a man with good intentions (i.e a man performing an action he believes has good consequences) even if we do have to restrain him from acting.
Torture is intrinsically wrong? So if a confirmed and self-confessed terrorist has to be tortured to reveal the location of a city-destroying bomb and save millions of lives would that be wrong?
I honestly don’t know what “I believe that emotion should play a greater role in our decision making” comes down to in practical terms. Are you saying that sometimes (when making ethical decisions) we should discard our careful analyses and “go with our gut”? Decision making should factor in emotion but shouldn’t be controlled by it. One would have thought that would be an uncontroversial statement.
August 25th, 2010 | 7:29 am
As I’ve said, Raven, speak for yourself. Not everyone does think that disability fits the definition provided by WHO. A disability is only limiting when appropriate accommodations are not provided and when the disabled are affected by the prejudice of people like you.
August 25th, 2010 | 3:04 pm
Safepres:
This isn’t about a difference of opinion. It’s about the accepted definition of a widely used term.
If a physical or mental trait doesn’t constitute a “limitation, restriction or impairment” it isn’t considered a “disability” (it would instead be called a variation). You might claim, for personal reasons or maybe as a result of independent research, that blindness (or deafness or quadriplegia) are not, in fact, limiting and should hence not be called “disabilities” – but you may not, unless you have recently amended the Oxford English Dictionary or redefined the word by fiat, deny that the term “disability” itself refers to something negative.
When Singer speaks of “disabilities”, he’s referring to things which are negative by definition (and hence worthy of eradication). This is the linguistic convention. If it isn’t negative, it isn’t a disability.
Disability rights activism is (or, rather, ought to be) about ensuring that people with these impairments are treated with respect and consideration. It shouldn’t be about pretending that these conditions are not, in fact, obstacles which are often overcome with grace and courage.
You speak of the disabled being adversely affected by “the prejudice of people like [me]“. People like me are more likely to recommend support and assistance for the disabled precisely because we feel they often require extra help (e.g occupational therapy, prosthetic devices, assistive technology etc). It’s your perspective that’s the dangerous one – and the sad thing is you don’t even realise this.
August 25th, 2010 | 9:02 pm
Raven, your evaluation of the intentions of the actor, would not, if one is an endorser of utilitarianism, be moral, since utilitarianism only considers actions as morally relevant. So, I’m curious as to how you classify the “evaluation” of a person’s intentions? Is this a purely emotional reaction, of approval of his intentions, if they’re “good”, and vice versa?
The evalution of someone’s intentions makes perfect sense, if one presupposes the validity of deontology. but, if a version of utilitarianism, is the corret moral theory, it seem that this scrutiny of his/her intentions, is completely irrelevant. You say that the actions matter, morally, and the intentions, don’t matter, morally. AND YET, you feel the need to evaluate, in a rather quasi-moral way, the intentions of the actor. These intentions are completely irrelevant. And, if I “feel” a certain way, about his intentions, these are irrelevant to anything moral, they must be merely preferences.
I stand by my assessment, of things being intrinsically wrong. Murder, rape, and torture, are intrinsically wrong. It would not be wrong, to find every way possible, to find the bomb and defuse it. What if the only way to convince the terrorist, to disclose the location of the bomb, is to rape his wife? Should we do it, Raven, since it may save millions of lives?
August 25th, 2010 | 9:13 pm
Raven I hope my last question was not unfair. Ir was meant to see how far, or how much you believe that utilitarianism, is consistent. But I regret asking it. Please feel free not to answer it. I have the greatest respect for your moral integrity, and I’m worried that, irrational readers may misinterpret any response you give, or distort it.
I certainly see the logic, and possibly the morality, of wanting to save millions of innocent lives, by torturing one terrorist, and there’s no other way to save them. but I cannot bring myself, to advocate someone doing this.
My refusal, to consider this, may be an evolutionary adaptation, that humans derived, where we cannot bring ourselves to kill someone “face to face”, as it were. We evolved to deal with individuals, one on one, and not, in groups, (where utilitarianism comes into play).
I must stand by the notion that some things, such as murder, rape, torture, kiddnapping, are intrinsically wrong. Once we deny that, anything is on the table, and I cannot imagine our moral world at that point.
August 26th, 2010 | 2:30 am
Bret,
In the words of J. S. Mill, “the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent”. Classifying a “motive” as praiseworthy is based on its intended consequences. The evaluation of an action is based on its actual consequences.
A problem here is that you appear to be conflating different uses of the word “bad”. We might agree, from a utilitarian perspective, that certain actions are “bad” in the sense that they ought to be discouraged – but these actions may not be blameworthy (in the sense that their consequences might not be foreseeable by the actor).
The simple answer to the question about the terrorist is yes. If indeed we are certain that this (admittedly horrible) action is the only way of preventing immeasurably more horrible things from happening we shouldn’t simply say “This action is beyond consideration. We’ll have to allow millions of people to suffer and die”. In practice, however, this never occurs. Raping or injuring a terrorist’s innocent relatives is never the only option available and for hardened men who have resisted other forms of physical and emotional torture and steeled themselves to the suffering of others it is by no means certain that this sort of action would be effective.
The question I asked however was about a far more likely scenario. A man confesses he is a terrorist but refuses to reveal the location of his bomb. Millions of lives are endangered. Other options have been exhausted. Are the authorities permitted to torture him?
August 26th, 2010 | 6:47 am
“You speak of the disabled being adversely affected by “the prejudice of people like [me]“. People like me are more likely to recommend support and assistance for the disabled precisely because we feel they often require extra help (e.g occupational therapy, prosthetic devices, assistive technology etc). It’s your perspective that’s the dangerous one – and the sad thing is you don’t even realise this.”
Raven-
Disability rights isn’t just about access and accommodation, it’s about acceptance into the larger human community. When you assert that disability is negative but being of a different race is not, you distance the disabled community from the broader human community that has struggled for civic equality. It isn’t about “grace,” or “courage,” it’s about EQUALITY, and Singer’s views directly contradict this, as do yours.
August 26th, 2010 | 11:47 am
Bret: One problem with your idea of multiple “intrinsic wrongs” is the fact that we recognise a hierarchy of evils. It is, for instance, more “wrong” to kill someone than to rape them and so if a man is forced to rape someone to prevent her from being killed (a choice people in recent war zones have been forced to make at gunpoint) we do not condemn his action as “intrinsically wrong” (though we acknowledge that one harm has been done to avert a greater one).
Kidnapping individuals is to be discouraged but would it be ethically unacceptable if a man were to have his adult daughter kidnapped to save her from the clutches of a suicidal cult (like the Heaven’s Gate group or Koresh’s Branch Davidians)?
Things are wrong because of their effects -because of the extent to which they affect the one thing which is unarguably of instrinsic worth: happiness, broadly defined. The difficulty lies in balancing the happiness of the individual against the happiness of the group, creating ethical structures which maximise group well-being while giving each individual the assurance that they will not be used instrumentally (as merely a means to the happiness of others) unless, of course, something of overwhelming importance rides on this instrumental use (like the survival of the group as a whole).
As you intuit, our evolutionary history has not adequately prepared us for these “global” perspectives. We have been equipped with our generally reliable moral “rules of thumb” but these rules are not suited to extreme cases (like that of the hypothetical terrorist). For these “moral dilemmas” we often need to think things through, influenced by out moral intuitions (in all their evolutionary imperfection) but not completely bound by them.
August 26th, 2010 | 7:07 pm
Safepres: Educate me. Since you disagree with the WHO, how would youdefine “disability”? How am I to tell if someone has one? When is it appropriate to use that label?
August 26th, 2010 | 7:43 pm
[...] choice to kill an infant with a disability since an infant isn’t a person (you can read more here). They want you to believe that it is normal and natural for a healthy pre-born baby to be [...]
August 27th, 2010 | 2:00 am
Thanks, Raven, for your response. With respect to J.S.Mill’s statement, I would agree, with it, at least to some extent, but when he says the “worth” of the person, who intented good, it’s hard to see where this “worth” is derived, IF only consequences matter. It seems as if “worth”, is a moral term, but how can this be, if only consequences matter, in a moral sense.
When you state that, the “intended consequences” are what make the intentions “praiseworthy”, what does this really mean? Are you deriving “praiseworthiness”, and is Mill deriving “worth”, from something other, than morality? If you can show this, fine, I see no inconsistentcy. But if they’re DERIVED from morality, it seems to make no sense, since only actions, or consequences, have moral standing, in utilitarianism.
Now, if, and only if, the intentions, lead to moral consequences, they can be relevant to morality. that is, the intentions, are merely precursers, to the right action, but they’re distinct. They’re not moral, per se, since, obviously, good intentions can lead to bad, or immoral consequences, and “bad” motives, or intentions, can lead to moral consequences. But the evaluation, of an intention, as “worthy”, “praiseworthy”, imply that they’re “moral”, but, based on utilitarianism, they’re not. Now, we may say, that we have an emotional affinity, toward, certain people, and will label their intentions “good”, but this has nothing to do with morality, according to utilitarianism.
You, as always, provide excellent rebuttles, to my assertions! It’s very difficult for me, to refute, your terrorist example, because, I have mixed feelings/and thoughts. I believe, on the one hand, that the deontological approach, where everyone, has intrinsic rights, but on the other hand, it does seem immoral, to let thousands of innocents die, by not torturing the terrorist. I’m at a loss!
I have changed my moral view, from an almost exclusively deontological approach, to one that blends deontology, with utilitarianism. And that’s because, at least to some extent, on your persuasiveness Raven. Right now, I feel that, a pragmatic approach, incorporating both, is needed, but it would be great if we could, coherently synthesis, them, in a way, that is completely consistent.
August 27th, 2010 | 2:17 am
Raven, I think that my comments, on intentions, was a little obscure. I’ll try to clarify them.
If only consequences matter,for morality, and if only people had good intentions, that always leas to good consequences, I could see the causal link between the two, and one could argue, that, the intentions, are “good” in the sence that they cause the good consequences. But even here, though, only the “consequences” are really good morally, because they’re DIRECTLY related to the good things, but they could not be good, unless, there were the good intentions, so the intentions, are not directly good, but our “derivitively” good, since they always cause the good effect.
Now, obviously, the above thought experiment, is NOT the way the world works, people don’t always have good intentions, and for those that do, have good intentions, it does not, of course, always lead to good effects, and bad intented people, can result in good effects. So, there’s no NECESSARY connection betwwen the intentions, of the people, and the effects that they produce, which shows that intentions, although, we intuitively know, that, if one has good intentions, it seems more likely, that good results will follow, there’s no logically airtight connection between the two. And, also, when, someone has bad, intentions, but it results in good actions, why not say that the person is a “contributer to good”? and consider his intentions irrelevant?
September 3rd, 2010 | 1:40 am
Bret,
This (debate about motives) is primarily a verbal argument. When we say a man’s intentions are “good” we are evaluating the intended acts or outcomes and not the state of intending itself. This is merely a matter of linguistic convention (a convention which is used regardless of the ethical theories used to evaluate the morality of the intended acts).
Our describing a man’s intentions as praiseworthy simply means that we accept that if his intended acts had been fully realised we would have judged them “good” by the ethical standards we choose to apply. Once again it is not the act of intending we evaluate (if “intending” may itself be called an act) but the outcome which the individual intends to bring about.
The individual’s acts, however, are judged by their consequences. If these consequences are negative, we discourage the acts (label them “bad”) and if the consequences are positive, we encourage them.
Utilitarianism seeks to establish the foundation of our ethical decision making (the ultimate end to which our morality ought to tend). It does not involve a wholesale reworking of the linguistics of ethical judgements. Persons with good intentions are those who intend to perform “good acts”. Different ethical systems might treat such persons differently but the basic meaning of “a good intention” remains unchanged.
A person with bad intentions who inadvertently performs a good act (like a man who gives another a life-saving drug under the mistaken impression that it is poison) is, as you say, a “contributor to good” but his intentions are indicators of his future actions and are hence not “irrelevant” to our treatment of him. It would, of course, be ludicrous to call this intended murderer’s actions “good” – and this brings to mind a useful distinction drawn by J. S. Mill between “motives” and “intentions”. “Intentions” indicate what one seeks to do and “motives” indicate why one seeks to do it. Strictly speaking it is “motives” which are morally irrelevant from the classical utilitarian perspective (to use Mill’s example “He who saves a fellow
creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble”) while “intentions”, on the other hand, are important. A man who, while attempting to kill his wife, saves her life instead has incompetently performed the action “attempting to kill one’s wife”. Our moral evaluation of the act is based not on the fact that he preserved his wife’s life but on his intention to kill her. An intention is often the only way we can tell what an act is. A man presses a button and this sets off a bomb. We cannot morally evaluate this act until we know if he intended this outcome. Was the act he performed “remotely detonating a bomb” or was it simply “pressing a button to see if it controlled the light bulb”? Intentions are relevant.
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