The Case Against False Assertions
Sep 22, 2011
Christopher Tollefsen and Alexander Pruss
The controversy over Live Action’s tactics in exposing Planned Parenthood’s abuses is now well known. And in the face of that controversy, some who are willing to countenance lying for a good cause have seemingly abandoned argument in favor of dismissiveness. Lila Rose’s lawyer, for example, was quoted in USA Today as saying that critics had made “much ado about nothing.” Such an attitude to a matter of grave concern—what it means to defend the lives of the unborn in a fully upright way—is unworthy. By contrast, Professor Janet Smith, who has never shirked argument on behalf of the truth, has made a serious effort to support the often ill-defended claims on behalf of Rose and her Live Action colleagues. However, we believe that her recent intervention in the debate on lying and Live Action goes astray and warrants comment. We think that Smith’s commitment to truth should lead her to the conclusion that, as we will show, false assertion is always wrong.
Smith makes a general point concerning the fidelity to Catholic teachings of those who defend the licitness of false assertion (by which we mean here, assertion contrary to what one believes). Relying on the difference between the first vernacular edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which defines lying as speaking falsely to one “who has the right to know the truth” and the later, authoritative Latin edition, which drops the qualifier, Smith suggests that the former view is merely “less probable”, and is not officially condemned.
However, while not always proposed by the Catholic Church as revealed truth to be believed de fide, a teaching contained in the Catechism calls for religious assent by Catholics, or submission of the will and mind to the teaching of the Catholic magisterium. Moreover, as the teaching on lying is shared by Saint Augustine, Saint Gregory the Great, Saint Thomas Aquinas and almost every other significant medieval theologian, and since it is stated unequivocally in the Catechism of the Council of Trent as well as the authoritative Catechism of the Catholic Church, the demand for such assent is quite strong.
Scripture does, of course, describe cases of lying by well-intentioned persons such as Rahab; yet it does not praise the lies themselves and contains a number of expressions of general and grave disapproval for lying and liars (Prov. 30:8, Ps. 5:6, John 8:44, Col. 3:9, Rev. 21:8,27), as well as Jesus’ exhortation that our yes be a yes and our no be a no (Matthew 5:37). And while there are, particularly among Eastern Christian thinkers, some figures who support the telling of lies in extreme circumstances, they are a distinct minority in the Christian tradition as a whole. Thus, not only Catholics, but Christians generally should give careful consideration to the weight of Scripture and Christian tradition against false assertion. And absent significant evidence to the contrary, we should assume that the words of Jesus, of Scripture, and of the Church condemn all false assertion as lying.
Most of Smith’s essay argues against three points of St. Thomas Aquinas, who held all false assertion to be wrong. Her first argument attempts to show that Aquinas overlooked various postlapsarian purposes of speech, holding that all “enunciative signification” must have the purpose of communicating truth. The second argument is against St. Thomas’ claim that a lie does some wrong to the individuals lied to, while the third seeks to undermine his claim that false assertion damages the integrity of the one who asserts falsely. We believe that each of her arguments is flawed.
Aquinas believed that the purpose of assertion through speech is the communication of truth. Assertion is intrinsically a disclosing act, revealing both the world and the speaker’s inner self, or mind. This disclosing relationship between words, world and self is an ordered relationship, and thus, according to Aquinas, it requires a virtue, truth, if it is to be duly ordered. This virtue, truth, serves two goods in ordering the disclosing relationship, the good of sociality and trust among people, and the good of integrity: “that truth by which a man, both in life and speech, shows himself to be such as he is.” It is in light of this earlier discussion of the virtue of truth that Aquinas’ later claim about the wrong of lying must be understood: “For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind.”
Aquinas is not saying here that every use of words, or every speech act, will be unnatural if not assertive; nor is he saying that assertions may not have other purposes besides the signification of what is in the mind. Smith supposes that Aquinas’ “mistake” is to assume a prelapsarian understanding of “the purpose of signification” as being solely for the disclosure of truth. Yet Aquinas is certainly aware of other prelapsarian speech acts not directed at disclosure of truth, such as commands, questions, prayers, and exclamations. His position on lying prescinds from consideration of these other speech acts, since lying concerns only one kind of speech act: assertion. Given the purpose internal to assertion—communication of truth—and given the goods to which assertion is intrinsically, and not merely conventionally, ordered, to assert falsely is always to act contrary to this purpose and the goods it serves.
Thus, it is no argument against this claim to point out that there are other purposes for speech. Neither is it an argument against Aquinas to point out that assertions can serve additional purposes beyond the communication of truth. This is true in all cases in which an act is internally ordered to a good, as sex is related to procreation and eating to nutrition: other licit purposes may be pursued but one must not make a choice that is contrary to the essential purpose.
Of course, as Aquinas recognizes, reasonable moral constraints on deceiving are considerably less stringent than those on lying, for deceiving is a broader category than lying. Smith incorrectly claims that Aquinas’ position would prohibit deceptive practices such as placing an empty tent on a battlefield. Placing tents is not asserting—it does not have the disclosure of truth as its inner purpose—and hence Aquinas’ argument that it is unnatural “to signify by words something that is not in [the speaker’s] mind” is simply irrelevant in such cases. In fact, Aquinas explicitly distinguishes deceiving by means of false assertion or false promise, which is always wrong, from the soldier’s “art of concealing his purpose”.
Smith’s second argument concerns the injustice done in lying to an evildoer. Aquinas addresses the relationship between justice and assertion in terms of the notion of trust. An important discussion by J.L.A. Garcia has extended this thought: in asserting, one actively solicits this trust on the part of another, whilst in lying, one also breaks faith with that solicited trust. But Smith counters with three questions: “Why . . . should we imagine that everyone enjoys an inviolable right to truth in all communications? Isn’t giving the truth to a Nazi like returning a loaded weapon to a madman? Does he have any right to the truth?”
First, if “all communications” is taken broadly to include speech acts other than assertions, then of course the right to truth is not involved in all communications. Now, there are some truths that the Nazi has a general right to. Not the right to be told where Jews have been hidden, but the right to the truth that only by conversion from his wicked purposes can his soul be saved. However, despite the limits of the Nazi’s general right to the truth, the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it. To do that is contrary to the love that we owe to all. It is not that the Nazi is somehow worthy of the truth (are we?), but that by making an assertion we have chosen to falsely offer ourselves as trustworthy. In refusing to return a loaded weapon to a madman we are not soliciting the madman’s trust. Finally, Smith takes up St. Thomas’ claim that false assertion is destructive of the integrity of the one so asserting. She claims, rather, that false assertion to protect the innocent leads to growth in virtue, and that those who “failed to deter the Nazis by false assertion would suffer terribly from a sense that they have violated some deeply good part of their being.”
The claim that lying violates an agent’s integrity or self-integration is complex: following on Aquinas’ suggestion, we can say that when our “externals”—our words and deeds—are at odds with what we take to be the case, and what we take ourselves to be, this introduces a kind of disorder into the fabric of our entire person, which has both internal and external, spiritual and material, dimensions. Human persons easily and often recognize that such dis-integration is a bad, and that its opposite is a good to be pursued: we speak well of those courageous enough to speak their mind, and ill of hypocrites, false friends, and flatterers. If false assertion violates this integrity, and this integrity is always good, then false assertion is always wrong, even when done for good purposes. False assertion should not, if this account is true, be expected of itself to lead to growth in virtue.
Of course, lies made to evildoers in situations of great stress are what Aquinas called “officious” lies, and are unlikely to be more than venial sins, if there is culpability at all. So the fact that those who lied to the Nazis, or to Pharaoh, did not go on to wicked lives is hardly surprising, and gives no evidence against the traditional view—venial sin often occurs even in a generally exemplary life. The case of Catholic recusants is more problematic: the lies and deceptions to which some Jesuit missionaries were forced may have had, ultimately, some deleterious effect on their character. The virtues of these Jesuits, in any case, seem much more clearly related to their firm adherence to the Catholic faith in face of many trials, than to their willingness to lie or equivocate on behalf of that faith.
At the same time, it is also to be noted that there are misleading assertions—what Blessed Newman calls “evasions”—that appear not to rise to the level of lies, and it is an open question in the Christian tradition how far these can be used. Newman’s example was that when soldiers were pursuing Saint Athanasius and came upon him without recognizing him, they asked if he had seen Athanasius. Athanasius answered: “Yes, he is close to you.” Such cleverly evasive truth-telling can perhaps be inspired by the Holy Spirit.
It is also worth saying something about those who refused to lie to the Nazis from an unwillingness to do what they took to be wrong. No doubt, among those people of upright will in, for example, the Netherlands, majority opinion supported lying to the Nazis. But the view was not unanimous, as we learn in Corrie ten Boom’s The Hiding Place. Corrie’s sister Nollie was, together with a young Jewish girl, arrested by the S.D. after she answered the question: “Is this a Jew?” with “Yes.” But, she said to her sister from prison: “No ill will happen to Annalies. God will not let them take her to Germany. He will not let her suffer because I obeyed Him.”
In point of fact, Annalies was rescued almost immediately. Surely such a happy result could not be counted on in every case; but in every case of fidelity to the will of God, who is Truth, Christians can expect that the burdens suffered will not be too great to shoulder, and that Christ himself will take the larger share of such burdens. Paul insists that we are not to do evil that good might result (Romans 3:8), and when the only way to preserve a good such as life is by means of an evil, there we have to commend the situation to Providence, which will bring justice ultimately to pass.
Nollie ten Boom’s witness to faith reveals that rather than violating “some deeply good part of [her] being,” in speaking the truth Nollie did just the opposite. Nor was her unwillingness to lie born of an empty or formalistic obedience to divine command, but from the love of others that God in fact desires of us. More than once, in The Hiding Place, Corrie describes her own amazement at the love showed by Nollie for all persons, including her Nazi oppressors. Surely Nollie was a profound embodiment of one of the deepest Christian norms—that we love and respect all human beings, including sinners (and we are all such).
There is much more to be said, of course, about this issue; the conversation is far from over, and we thank Smith for her presentation and defense of the more permissive view of false assertion. Nevertheless, we find her arguments unconvincing, and believe that there are very strong reasons, in the Christian tradition, in Catholic teaching, in philosophy and in practice, for adhering to the more rigorous view.
Christopher Tollefsen, a senior fellow of the Witherspoon Institute, is a professor of philosophy at the University of South Carolina and author, with Robert. P. George, of Embryo: A Defense of Human Life. Alexander Pruss is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University. His book One Body is forthcoming from University of Notre Dame Press.
RESOURCES
Janet E. Smith, Fig Leaves and Falsehoods
Doubting Thomas on Lying
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Comments:
9.22.2011 | 7:48am
Remember Rollen says:
"...Athanasius answered: “Yes, he is close to you.” Such cleverly evasive truth-telling can perhaps be inspired by the Holy Spirit."
I wonder what you would say about Grice's Cooperative Principle. If "the purpose of assertion through speech is the communication of truth," why not more generally say that the purpose of speech (or a reply to a question) is cooperative? And why not concede that Grice's maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner are also constitutive of this cooperation? You say that "the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it...." Why should the Nazi be able to expect compliance with the Maxim of Quality, but the soldier pursuing Athanasius shouldn't be able to expect compliance with the three other Gricean maxims? Or, if neither the Nazi nor the soldier can expect that their respondents' replies are essentially cooperative acts, then how can they expect that their respondents' claims have the purpose of communicating the truth?
I wonder what you would say about Grice's Cooperative Principle. If "the purpose of assertion through speech is the communication of truth," why not more generally say that the purpose of speech (or a reply to a question) is cooperative? And why not concede that Grice's maxims of Quantity, Relation, and Manner are also constitutive of this cooperation? You say that "the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it...." Why should the Nazi be able to expect compliance with the Maxim of Quality, but the soldier pursuing Athanasius shouldn't be able to expect compliance with the three other Gricean maxims? Or, if neither the Nazi nor the soldier can expect that their respondents' replies are essentially cooperative acts, then how can they expect that their respondents' claims have the purpose of communicating the truth?
9.22.2011 | 8:07am
Humane Pursuits says:
An adequate understanding of the morality of language must grow out of a postlapsarian understanding of the purposes of human communication. And while Thomas’s direct account of lying fails to consider this, it is perfectly consistent with other areas of his thought. As Smith aptly notes, Aquinas accounts for the realities of postlapsarian human interaction in his treatment of things like private property and violence. So, for example, a police officer may shoot to kill in the defense of innocent life without violating the moral law. That would be both impermissible and incoherent in prelapsarian teleology, but “new forms of behavior are permissible given new realities” post-lapse. Analogously, Smith suggests, there are probably instances of false signification that would have violated the nature of speech before the Fall but are acceptable after it.
Smith does not purport to determine one way or the other whether the specific practices of Live Action fall within that category. The scope of her argument is limited to suggesting “that a strong case can be made, using natural law principles and affirming the absolute condemnation of lying, that not all false signification is wrong.”
Miriel Thomas has written more about this here: http://humanepursuits.com/2011/07/20/more-on-live-action-and-lying-janet-smith-on-the-immorality-of-false-signification/
Smith does not purport to determine one way or the other whether the specific practices of Live Action fall within that category. The scope of her argument is limited to suggesting “that a strong case can be made, using natural law principles and affirming the absolute condemnation of lying, that not all false signification is wrong.”
Miriel Thomas has written more about this here: http://humanepursuits.com/2011/07/20/more-on-live-action-and-lying-janet-smith-on-the-immorality-of-false-signification/
9.22.2011 | 8:14am
AB says:
I just don't know. If I had been in Nollie ten Boom's place, and the Jewish girl had not been rescued, I don't know how I would have been able to live with myself afterwards.
9.22.2011 | 9:13am
Dave Eden says:
I just can't see how it could be permissible to kill under certain circumstances, but not to lie under analogous circumstances.
9.22.2011 | 9:15am
Brandon says:
With regard to Humane Pursuit's comment it should be pointed out that the prelapsarian/postlapsarian distinction, if modeled on the relation between the universal destination of goods and private property as understood by Aquinas, makes no sense whatsoever in this context. The postlapsarian situation introduces new circumstances; it does not change fundamental principles. The universal destination of goods remains as clearly a fundamental principle as it ever was; private property is merely a means of fulfilling it in particular kinds of circumstances. If private property customs and conventions are ever inconsistent with the universal destination of goods, they are unjust and illegitimate on Aquinas's account, which is why starving people can take what is another's without morally having stolen anything. To maintain the parallel in this case, we would have to say that truth remains an ineliminable and overriding end of rational communication, and we are right back where we started. And similar things can be said with regard to self-defense. There is simply no foundation in Aquinas for imposing a prelapsarian/postlapsarian distinction with regard to moral principles as opposed to circumstances to which they have to be applied; it's a completely foreign imposition. Likewise, it seems strangely unmotivated in general, suggesting as it does that the fall wasn't just a fall with respect to moral standards but a complete disruption of those standards. It is a strange and apparently arbitrary way of gerrymandering moral principles; whatever one might think wrong with Aquinas's account, it just doesn't make much sense to say that this is it.
9.22.2011 | 9:27am
Kevin says:
False assertion is not always wrong. In a war a soldier can wear camouflage to hide is presence. An army can use false manuavers to trick an enemy.
A spy collecting information may use a false passport or false name.
Are you saying all of these situations are wrong?
A spy collecting information may use a false passport or false name.
Are you saying all of these situations are wrong?
9.22.2011 | 10:00am
JDD says:
It's worth a reference to the Catechism on this:
http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s2c2a8.htm#2488
First let me say that I do see both sides on this, and I'm sure I'm only 80% convinced of my own position.
I don't see how holding the position on lying that condemns Live Action's methods can result in anything else but likewise condemnation of undercover detective work. If one says that it's justified because of the authority given to the position, then it seems to undermine the objection to Live Action based on an adherence to an absolute moral principle. Can the Eighth Commandment be set aside based on the needs of peacekeeping authority?
Please don't misunderstand - I am *not* arguing the 'means justify the ends.' I simply don't see an immoral means here.
What tools to shed light on evil are left available to the individual Christian citizen?
For another analogy, take the hot button phrase 'abortion' out of it and consider this situation: I am a young man, and my brother is kidnapped by a gang. The police assure me it is not a gang and that there is no criminal activity. I am not convinced, so I jump on my bicycle and head to where I know he's being kept. I bring a tape recorder. At the entrance, I tell the leader that I want to enlist his gang's services to kidnap my sister. I record the leader saying 'sure.' What have I done wrong, again?
http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s2c2a8.htm#2488
First let me say that I do see both sides on this, and I'm sure I'm only 80% convinced of my own position.
I don't see how holding the position on lying that condemns Live Action's methods can result in anything else but likewise condemnation of undercover detective work. If one says that it's justified because of the authority given to the position, then it seems to undermine the objection to Live Action based on an adherence to an absolute moral principle. Can the Eighth Commandment be set aside based on the needs of peacekeeping authority?
Please don't misunderstand - I am *not* arguing the 'means justify the ends.' I simply don't see an immoral means here.
What tools to shed light on evil are left available to the individual Christian citizen?
For another analogy, take the hot button phrase 'abortion' out of it and consider this situation: I am a young man, and my brother is kidnapped by a gang. The police assure me it is not a gang and that there is no criminal activity. I am not convinced, so I jump on my bicycle and head to where I know he's being kept. I bring a tape recorder. At the entrance, I tell the leader that I want to enlist his gang's services to kidnap my sister. I record the leader saying 'sure.' What have I done wrong, again?
9.22.2011 | 10:01am
Jenny says:
So very helpful to the pro life movement to have time spent parsing over insignificant details such as these...is it any wonder we cannot present a more united front in the face of the greatest evil of our time?
9.22.2011 | 10:26am
JDD says:
Jenny,
This isn't *all* that we're doing today.
The sidewalk counselor needn't, (and hopefully won't,) get this involved of course, but this forum is a particularly good place to break open 'insignificant' details - perhaps in order to weed them out. And with God's grace we might come to greater consensus and better agree on how to fight. There are different fronts to this battle, and different roles, and different gifts.
St. Paul parsed quite a bit, in his letters to the churches. That doesn't mean he wasn't witnessing to his neighbors, when he wasn't at the quill.
This isn't *all* that we're doing today.
The sidewalk counselor needn't, (and hopefully won't,) get this involved of course, but this forum is a particularly good place to break open 'insignificant' details - perhaps in order to weed them out. And with God's grace we might come to greater consensus and better agree on how to fight. There are different fronts to this battle, and different roles, and different gifts.
St. Paul parsed quite a bit, in his letters to the churches. That doesn't mean he wasn't witnessing to his neighbors, when he wasn't at the quill.
9.22.2011 | 10:27am
Alexander R Pruss says:
In the following I'm speaking for myself, not for my co-author.
Kevin:
Assertion is a linguistic act. Camouflage and false maneuvers are deceptions that are not assertions. False names are a bit tricky, because we have authority over our names--I can tell my friends to call me "Fred", and then that's my name to them, whether the law recognizes it or not. So there is a sense in which there are no false names, though impersonating a particular other individual can involve lying (but need not, since not all deception is a lie). False passports are a harder case. It is not clear that by handing someone a passport I am asserting anything. Now, the false passport may make false assertions, but I am not presenting these as my assertions. (Suppose my passport has the wrong birth date in it. I tried to get it fixed, but couldn't. If I show my passport to someone, I am not thereby lying--because the assertion doesn't get attributed to me, but to the passport authority.) So I am inclined to think--cautiously--that presenting a false passport is not lying. It may, however, be a betrayal of trust that is just as bad--I don't know.
Dave Eden:
It may seem counterintuitive, but I think there is a way in which betrayal of trust is more fundamentally opposed to love than killing is--betrayal is more precisely an interpersonally relational sin, and hence falls under the subject category of love more. Observe how Scripture lays enormous stress on God's utter trustworthiness. We are told in Number 23:19 that "God is not a man that he should lie". Yet God does kill--he gives life and takes away life. Compare also the fact that while it can be morally licit for someone to kill a spouse in self-defense, it is not morally licit to commit adultery, even to save a life.
AB:
It would be really hard. But I think there are moral situations where even if you do the right thing, it's really hard to live with yourself, and you need the love of God and support of the community to make it. This is, for instance, how it is in cases where one has to choose which of one's children to rescue from death.
RR:
The maxims play different roles. Observe that you can cancel implicatures generated by Quantity, Relation or Manner. You can say things like "I know this is not a propos, but..." But you cannot cancel the sincerity called for in an assertion without making it cease to be an assertion. If you say: "I don't really mean the following, but ..." you're not asserting what comes after the "but" (or you're not really canceling it, I guess). Falling under the maxim of Quality (or something like it--the exact details are not clear to me) is constitutive of assertion in a way in which falling under the other maxims is not.
So, yes, I think the kind of trust that one actively solicits in making an assertion is trust in the quality of the assertion. There may be other kinds of trust that typically accompany that, but they are not constitutively solicited in the making of an assertion. Of course, they can be expressly solicited. Thus, Athanasius can say: "You can trust my relevance. He is not far from here." In that case, Athanasius is doing something just like lying.
We treat very differently the case where someone deliberately says something irrelevant from when someone deliberately says something false.
bill bannon:
Scripture also counts liars among the damned in the Book of Revelation at 21:8. (Of course, maybe not everyone who lies is a liar. I would say that someone who sins venially by lying is not a liar per se.)
I am inclined to think Rahab did a praiseworthy thing and a wrong. The praiseworthy thing was that she followed her conscience, motivated by defense of those who needed her hospitality. The wrong was that she lied. Her conscience was innocently mistaken. But one is to be praised for following conscience, even when conscience is mistaken, especially if one is doing so out from an excellent motive. I believe it can be one's duty to protect the innocent by means of violence in a just war. But if someone is imprisoned as a conscientious objector, even in a just war, I will admire them. For he did something right: he followed conscience. He also did something wrong--he failed to protect the innocent as he should have--but I assume he is not culpable.
I could say the same about Jehu, but I also want to note that this text is also an example of grim, ironic humor. Jehu really did make a great sacrifice for Baal: he made many die for Baal's sake.
Kevin:
Assertion is a linguistic act. Camouflage and false maneuvers are deceptions that are not assertions. False names are a bit tricky, because we have authority over our names--I can tell my friends to call me "Fred", and then that's my name to them, whether the law recognizes it or not. So there is a sense in which there are no false names, though impersonating a particular other individual can involve lying (but need not, since not all deception is a lie). False passports are a harder case. It is not clear that by handing someone a passport I am asserting anything. Now, the false passport may make false assertions, but I am not presenting these as my assertions. (Suppose my passport has the wrong birth date in it. I tried to get it fixed, but couldn't. If I show my passport to someone, I am not thereby lying--because the assertion doesn't get attributed to me, but to the passport authority.) So I am inclined to think--cautiously--that presenting a false passport is not lying. It may, however, be a betrayal of trust that is just as bad--I don't know.
Dave Eden:
It may seem counterintuitive, but I think there is a way in which betrayal of trust is more fundamentally opposed to love than killing is--betrayal is more precisely an interpersonally relational sin, and hence falls under the subject category of love more. Observe how Scripture lays enormous stress on God's utter trustworthiness. We are told in Number 23:19 that "God is not a man that he should lie". Yet God does kill--he gives life and takes away life. Compare also the fact that while it can be morally licit for someone to kill a spouse in self-defense, it is not morally licit to commit adultery, even to save a life.
AB:
It would be really hard. But I think there are moral situations where even if you do the right thing, it's really hard to live with yourself, and you need the love of God and support of the community to make it. This is, for instance, how it is in cases where one has to choose which of one's children to rescue from death.
RR:
The maxims play different roles. Observe that you can cancel implicatures generated by Quantity, Relation or Manner. You can say things like "I know this is not a propos, but..." But you cannot cancel the sincerity called for in an assertion without making it cease to be an assertion. If you say: "I don't really mean the following, but ..." you're not asserting what comes after the "but" (or you're not really canceling it, I guess). Falling under the maxim of Quality (or something like it--the exact details are not clear to me) is constitutive of assertion in a way in which falling under the other maxims is not.
So, yes, I think the kind of trust that one actively solicits in making an assertion is trust in the quality of the assertion. There may be other kinds of trust that typically accompany that, but they are not constitutively solicited in the making of an assertion. Of course, they can be expressly solicited. Thus, Athanasius can say: "You can trust my relevance. He is not far from here." In that case, Athanasius is doing something just like lying.
We treat very differently the case where someone deliberately says something irrelevant from when someone deliberately says something false.
bill bannon:
Scripture also counts liars among the damned in the Book of Revelation at 21:8. (Of course, maybe not everyone who lies is a liar. I would say that someone who sins venially by lying is not a liar per se.)
I am inclined to think Rahab did a praiseworthy thing and a wrong. The praiseworthy thing was that she followed her conscience, motivated by defense of those who needed her hospitality. The wrong was that she lied. Her conscience was innocently mistaken. But one is to be praised for following conscience, even when conscience is mistaken, especially if one is doing so out from an excellent motive. I believe it can be one's duty to protect the innocent by means of violence in a just war. But if someone is imprisoned as a conscientious objector, even in a just war, I will admire them. For he did something right: he followed conscience. He also did something wrong--he failed to protect the innocent as he should have--but I assume he is not culpable.
I could say the same about Jehu, but I also want to note that this text is also an example of grim, ironic humor. Jehu really did make a great sacrifice for Baal: he made many die for Baal's sake.
9.22.2011 | 10:39am
Alexander R Pruss says:
JDD:
I suspect a lot of undercover police work is wrong. I am actually worried less about lying than about leading others into sin. If an undercover officer ask someone to sell her drugs, she is leading them to doing something immoral--and that is surely contrary to love of neighbor.
I suppose in some cases, she may be hoping they will refuse indignantly, and she is giving them an opportunity to do that--in that case, my criticism is not applicable. But in the gang case you give, you really are trying to get the leader to sin.
Interestingly, I am not sure that case actually involves a lie. This is because "I want..." statements are typically not autobiographical descriptions of one's desires, but rather are requests. And requests, even if insincere, are not lies, since only assertions are lies. If I am asked at a restaurant "What would you like?" and I say "I want the crab", even though I don't really want the crab but the steak, but I think the crab is healthier and for social reasons it's not open to me to not eat, I am not lying. That's because the "I want..." is a request rather than an assertion.
I think some undercover work can be done by means of evasions rather than lies. But it is way more dangerous, since one might get pressed on a question, and then evasion becomes impossible.
In a fallen world, there might well be times when one needs to forgo a good because all the means to the good are wrong.
I suspect a lot of undercover police work is wrong. I am actually worried less about lying than about leading others into sin. If an undercover officer ask someone to sell her drugs, she is leading them to doing something immoral--and that is surely contrary to love of neighbor.
I suppose in some cases, she may be hoping they will refuse indignantly, and she is giving them an opportunity to do that--in that case, my criticism is not applicable. But in the gang case you give, you really are trying to get the leader to sin.
Interestingly, I am not sure that case actually involves a lie. This is because "I want..." statements are typically not autobiographical descriptions of one's desires, but rather are requests. And requests, even if insincere, are not lies, since only assertions are lies. If I am asked at a restaurant "What would you like?" and I say "I want the crab", even though I don't really want the crab but the steak, but I think the crab is healthier and for social reasons it's not open to me to not eat, I am not lying. That's because the "I want..." is a request rather than an assertion.
I think some undercover work can be done by means of evasions rather than lies. But it is way more dangerous, since one might get pressed on a question, and then evasion becomes impossible.
In a fallen world, there might well be times when one needs to forgo a good because all the means to the good are wrong.
9.22.2011 | 10:49am
Alexander R Pruss says:
It's also worth thinking whether having the sort of character that one would never lie might not be more beneficial on average and in the long run than having a character willing to lie in extreme circumstances. I explore that line of thought here: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2011/09/alibis-and-lies.html
9.22.2011 | 11:09am
Vincent Torley says:
Dr. Tollefsen,
I'd like to focus on your central argument regarding the Nazi case:
"However, despite the limits of the Nazi’s general right to the truth, the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it. To do that is contrary to the love that we owe to all. It is not that the Nazi is somehow worthy of the truth (are we?), but that by making an assertion we have chosen to falsely offer ourselves as trustworthy."
This argument presupposes that we have volunteered ourselves as sources of trustworthy information. But the reality is different. There is a knock at the door, and a Nazi general barks out a question, which you are compelled to answer, to avoid being deported or shot: "Are there any Jews in this house?" In answering "No", one is certainly not offering oneself as trustworthy, and there is no "soliciting" going on. Rather, the intention is simply to give an answer which will: (a) cause the Nazi general to leave promptly and (b) save the lives of any Jews hiding in the house.
I'd like to focus on your central argument regarding the Nazi case:
"However, despite the limits of the Nazi’s general right to the truth, the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it. To do that is contrary to the love that we owe to all. It is not that the Nazi is somehow worthy of the truth (are we?), but that by making an assertion we have chosen to falsely offer ourselves as trustworthy."
This argument presupposes that we have volunteered ourselves as sources of trustworthy information. But the reality is different. There is a knock at the door, and a Nazi general barks out a question, which you are compelled to answer, to avoid being deported or shot: "Are there any Jews in this house?" In answering "No", one is certainly not offering oneself as trustworthy, and there is no "soliciting" going on. Rather, the intention is simply to give an answer which will: (a) cause the Nazi general to leave promptly and (b) save the lives of any Jews hiding in the house.
9.22.2011 | 11:17am
David Nickol says:
While I don't have time to write at length, I would just like to note that I think Bill Bannon's approach to scripture is very misguided. Hebrew Scripture is full of incidents of people behaving either downright badly, or acting in ways that may have been defensible in their times but are objectionable in ours. To take stories and make up little morals that validate what you already think is, in my humble opinion, a gross misuse of scripture. One could, for example, make arguments on behalf of incest based on Abraham marrying his half sister Sarah, or Lot's daughters getting him drunk and conceiving children by him.
9.22.2011 | 11:26am
JDD says:
Alexander,
Thanks for your response.
"I suppose in some cases, she may be hoping they will refuse indignantly, and she is giving them an opportunity to do that--in that case, my criticism is not applicable. But in the gang case you give, you really are trying to get the leader to sin."
I think this might be getting to the heart of the disagreement. Was Lila Rose hoping she was wrong? And does the morality of her methods hinge upon this?
I don't mean wrong about abortions taking place - she wasn't out to expose abortions; no one disputes that abortions were taking place. I mean wrong about corrupt practices taking place which put young girls in much danger, violated their dignity and in fact broke laws. Yes, she was and is hoping to end abortion, but she was not, I think we can expect, "hoping" that the staff was corrupt. She suspected that many were. That's a big difference in the intent of the questioning, and of the intent of the means used to engage the attention of the staff member.
Although I just barely see the distinction you've made between saying, "I want you to..." vs. "Would you?", I'd respond by saying then that, in the case I gave, I am trying to get the leader to confess that he has *already sinned* and is *already sinning.* I'm not trying to *lead him* into anything, and I will be very happy to find out that I am wrong.
Thanks for your response.
"I suppose in some cases, she may be hoping they will refuse indignantly, and she is giving them an opportunity to do that--in that case, my criticism is not applicable. But in the gang case you give, you really are trying to get the leader to sin."
I think this might be getting to the heart of the disagreement. Was Lila Rose hoping she was wrong? And does the morality of her methods hinge upon this?
I don't mean wrong about abortions taking place - she wasn't out to expose abortions; no one disputes that abortions were taking place. I mean wrong about corrupt practices taking place which put young girls in much danger, violated their dignity and in fact broke laws. Yes, she was and is hoping to end abortion, but she was not, I think we can expect, "hoping" that the staff was corrupt. She suspected that many were. That's a big difference in the intent of the questioning, and of the intent of the means used to engage the attention of the staff member.
Although I just barely see the distinction you've made between saying, "I want you to..." vs. "Would you?", I'd respond by saying then that, in the case I gave, I am trying to get the leader to confess that he has *already sinned* and is *already sinning.* I'm not trying to *lead him* into anything, and I will be very happy to find out that I am wrong.
9.22.2011 | 11:28am
Randy says:
God asked Adam and Eve, "where are you?" Was it "lying" to imply that He didn't know where they were? He knew exactly where they were. He was letting them describe why they were hiding, and what they'd done. Was that "entrapment?" Maybe so.
9.22.2011 | 11:36am
Ethan C. says:
I would argue further again Dr. Tolefsen's position: Deliberately deceiving the Nazi, even when you are presenting yourself as trustworthy, is an act of love toward the Nazi.
The Nazi is a man bent on committing an evil act. By lying to him, you are preventing him from performing that act. Therefore, your lie is beneficial to his moral state. The lied-to Nazi is better off than the not-lied-to Nazi, because the former is only an attempted murderer while the latter is a full-fledged murderer. Hence, the lie is an act of love toward the Nazi, a greater act of love than telling him the truth and thus facilitating his sin.
In the same way, killing a man who is in the act of murdering someone else is an act of love toward the murderer, as you prevent his completion of the sinful act.
I agree with Dave Eden that it is preposterous to think that we could be justified in killing someone in some circumstances, but not in lying to someone in some circumstances.
The Nazi is a man bent on committing an evil act. By lying to him, you are preventing him from performing that act. Therefore, your lie is beneficial to his moral state. The lied-to Nazi is better off than the not-lied-to Nazi, because the former is only an attempted murderer while the latter is a full-fledged murderer. Hence, the lie is an act of love toward the Nazi, a greater act of love than telling him the truth and thus facilitating his sin.
In the same way, killing a man who is in the act of murdering someone else is an act of love toward the murderer, as you prevent his completion of the sinful act.
I agree with Dave Eden that it is preposterous to think that we could be justified in killing someone in some circumstances, but not in lying to someone in some circumstances.
9.22.2011 | 11:37am
Tony Esolen says:
The case of the Nazi asking me where the Jewish person is hiding is different in kind from what Live Action was doing:
1. The Nazi is in the position of a threatener and aggressor, and he knows it. His question, "Is there a Jew in there?" is implicitly the utterance of a threat, such as, "You had better tell me if there is a Jew in there, if you know what is good for you." Therefore he is not eliciting cooperation from his interlocutor, but rather complicity or capitulation. The person who then utters the fact, "Yes, there is a Jew in there," may then be doing so in order to lighten the penalty he will suffer.
2. Therefore the Nazi has no right to the truth, not because he is a Nazi, generally speaking, but because his question is not a simple request for information, but an act of aggression, against which it may be licit to resist -- and it may take more fortitude to resist it than to yield to it.
3. Professor Tollefsen addressed the issue of deceptive maneuvers in warfare. This is, of course, a practice accepted on all sides.
4. The deep moral problem with Live Action is the active eliciting of trust on the part of the "detectives." Formally considered, they did what the young man from Brown did, who "infiltrated" Liberty University, pretended to be an evangelical Christian, and then wrote -- thankfully, with great and somewhat abashed appreciation -- about the experience.
5. In That Hideous Strength, Ransom refuses to engage in deliberate deception, saying that there is a limit to how "prudent" he is allowed to be.
6. I too remain open to persuasion from the other side ...
1. The Nazi is in the position of a threatener and aggressor, and he knows it. His question, "Is there a Jew in there?" is implicitly the utterance of a threat, such as, "You had better tell me if there is a Jew in there, if you know what is good for you." Therefore he is not eliciting cooperation from his interlocutor, but rather complicity or capitulation. The person who then utters the fact, "Yes, there is a Jew in there," may then be doing so in order to lighten the penalty he will suffer.
2. Therefore the Nazi has no right to the truth, not because he is a Nazi, generally speaking, but because his question is not a simple request for information, but an act of aggression, against which it may be licit to resist -- and it may take more fortitude to resist it than to yield to it.
3. Professor Tollefsen addressed the issue of deceptive maneuvers in warfare. This is, of course, a practice accepted on all sides.
4. The deep moral problem with Live Action is the active eliciting of trust on the part of the "detectives." Formally considered, they did what the young man from Brown did, who "infiltrated" Liberty University, pretended to be an evangelical Christian, and then wrote -- thankfully, with great and somewhat abashed appreciation -- about the experience.
5. In That Hideous Strength, Ransom refuses to engage in deliberate deception, saying that there is a limit to how "prudent" he is allowed to be.
6. I too remain open to persuasion from the other side ...
9.22.2011 | 12:02pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Good grief--here we go again! Mr. Tollefsen and Mr. Pruss, PLEASE first educate yourselves regarding the purpose--and proper limits--of Catechisms.
Second, if your *theological opinion* on this issue is actually found in a teaching of the *MAGISTERIUM* then please quote *that* teaching, not the text of the Catechism. Sufficient research on your part will allow you to see the difference I'm suggesting.
It's as simple as that. I can easily cite chapter and verse regarding the meaning and purpose of *Catechisms* which make it clear that the teaching contained therein is NOT (I repeat--and you should too--NOT) intended to resolve existing theological debates.
Further, I can easily cite Cardinal Ratzinger making it clear that the "weight" of *each* teaching going "into" the CCC is exactly the same "weight" that the teaching possesses coming "out" of the CCC.
So, please quit trying to make it seem that the CCC teaches only one of two *theological opinions* on an issue loooong debated by theologians. It can't and doesn't.
Sincerely,
Deacon Jim Russell
Second, if your *theological opinion* on this issue is actually found in a teaching of the *MAGISTERIUM* then please quote *that* teaching, not the text of the Catechism. Sufficient research on your part will allow you to see the difference I'm suggesting.
It's as simple as that. I can easily cite chapter and verse regarding the meaning and purpose of *Catechisms* which make it clear that the teaching contained therein is NOT (I repeat--and you should too--NOT) intended to resolve existing theological debates.
Further, I can easily cite Cardinal Ratzinger making it clear that the "weight" of *each* teaching going "into" the CCC is exactly the same "weight" that the teaching possesses coming "out" of the CCC.
So, please quit trying to make it seem that the CCC teaches only one of two *theological opinions* on an issue loooong debated by theologians. It can't and doesn't.
Sincerely,
Deacon Jim Russell
9.22.2011 | 12:07pm
Anthony says:
Hmmm. Mexico. 1920's. A government official asks "Are you a Christian?" Apparently, the majority of folks reading this piece and commenting would say that it would be morally acceptable to say, "No."
9.22.2011 | 12:53pm
Nordic Breed says:
One thing I have noticed in all the commentary on this subject at various blogs is that no one is suggesting an alternative strategy for exacting the kind of information elicited by the deception. If Live Action's approach was sinful, what is a non-sinful way of getting the same information? Surely we don't have an either/or situation here. The end never justifies the means. So what other effective means are possible to expose the lies and deceptions of PP?
9.22.2011 | 1:25pm
Charlie Collier says:
One way to gloss the doctrine of the incarnation is that God spoke the truth about himself in the flesh of Christ Jesus. The Son is the Word of the Father, after all. Now, whatever good reasons we might have to lie, our good reasons could never approach the good reasons God has and had—the sin and evil of a fallen and rebellious creation.
To legitimate lying, then, is to say goodbye to the doctrine of the incarnation. For why should we trust that Jesus makes God known? Perhaps God wasn't telling us the truth in the Word he spoke in Jesus. Lord knows he would have had the best of reasons for deceiving us.
At its heart, lying is a theological problem, and debates about the relative effectiveness of lying when it comes to resisting really evil people are beside the point. We are creatures made in the image of the Trinity, and to legitimate lying is to embrace the distortion of that image, not its restitution.
To legitimate lying, then, is to say goodbye to the doctrine of the incarnation. For why should we trust that Jesus makes God known? Perhaps God wasn't telling us the truth in the Word he spoke in Jesus. Lord knows he would have had the best of reasons for deceiving us.
At its heart, lying is a theological problem, and debates about the relative effectiveness of lying when it comes to resisting really evil people are beside the point. We are creatures made in the image of the Trinity, and to legitimate lying is to embrace the distortion of that image, not its restitution.
9.22.2011 | 1:28pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Accept whichever theological opinion one wishes on the special cases of "speaking falsehood" and lying, but it's high time that certain individual voices in the chorus stop pretending to have a *magisterial* "high ground" on this issue by appealing to the language of the CCC and stating that, after 2000 years of debate, the *CCC* (of all things) has somehow "settled" the debate.
That's not only preposterous but it's ridiculously bad theology.
It yields ugly results, too--for example, I've been labelled a magisterial "dissenter" by some because I don't believe the CCC even *addresses* the special cases of lying that have been debated for centuries...
It's time to say it like it is--the Magisterium has not resolved the issue (neither has the CCC), and different consciences may well act differently on this unless and until the Magisterium *does* resolve the issue.
HINT: When the Magisterium *does* resolve the issue, the resolution *won't* come in the form of a "catechism"......
Deacon Jim Russell
That's not only preposterous but it's ridiculously bad theology.
It yields ugly results, too--for example, I've been labelled a magisterial "dissenter" by some because I don't believe the CCC even *addresses* the special cases of lying that have been debated for centuries...
It's time to say it like it is--the Magisterium has not resolved the issue (neither has the CCC), and different consciences may well act differently on this unless and until the Magisterium *does* resolve the issue.
HINT: When the Magisterium *does* resolve the issue, the resolution *won't* come in the form of a "catechism"......
Deacon Jim Russell
9.22.2011 | 2:00pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
JDD:
"in the case I gave, I am trying to get the leader to confess that he has *already sinned* and is *already sinning.*"
I don't think so. You're asking the leader to commit another sin, the sin of agreeing to kidnap another person. If he agrees to your request, he now has two sins to repent of: performing the first kidnapping and agreeing to a new kidnapping.
Nordic Breed:
There are times when there is no morally licit way of getting the information one needs. That's life in a fallen world.
At the same time, there may well be creative ways of getting information that do not involve lying. Perhaps evasions would suffice in some cases. One could offer a significant sum of money to persons who can *truthfully* say certain things and to record the responses. If one is in a jurisdiction which has some loophole to laws prohibiting the recording of in-person conversations without consent, one could exploit that loophole. In all of these cases, one would still have to beware of the dangers of somehow leading someone to further sin.
"in the case I gave, I am trying to get the leader to confess that he has *already sinned* and is *already sinning.*"
I don't think so. You're asking the leader to commit another sin, the sin of agreeing to kidnap another person. If he agrees to your request, he now has two sins to repent of: performing the first kidnapping and agreeing to a new kidnapping.
Nordic Breed:
There are times when there is no morally licit way of getting the information one needs. That's life in a fallen world.
At the same time, there may well be creative ways of getting information that do not involve lying. Perhaps evasions would suffice in some cases. One could offer a significant sum of money to persons who can *truthfully* say certain things and to record the responses. If one is in a jurisdiction which has some loophole to laws prohibiting the recording of in-person conversations without consent, one could exploit that loophole. In all of these cases, one would still have to beware of the dangers of somehow leading someone to further sin.
9.22.2011 | 2:07pm
Chris Tollefsen says:
Vincent:
“Volunteer” is a bit ambiguous; however, when you endeavor to answer a question, you do “volunteer” in the sense we identify, as can be seen by the contrast: the Nazi asks, and I refuse to answer. Saying “no” is unlike this, and like a different case, in which I tell the Nazi that I have no intention of giving him any information, in that in these latter two cases there is an effort to communicate an assertion to the Nazi, and this effort involves an attempt to get him to understand me to be doing just that – to trust that I am doing that.
JDD:
Speaking for myself only, I think that the Live Action actors were encouraging wrongdoing that otherwise would not have taken place in order to help bring about an end to the wrongdoing that already was taking place. But this seems like a bad means to a good end to me.
Randy:
God asked a question; he did not make an assertion. No lie there. And like any good parent asking a child about their wrongdoing, God was, I expect, hoping for an honest answer (side note: in Lewis’s books, Aslan asks these sorts of questions of the children more than once and then says “well done” when his interlocutor answers honestly, or growls, when the child waffles).
Ethan:
The Nazi already has murder in his heart; morally he will not be better off simply by being thwarted. For him to be better off would require repentance and conversion, and lying to him does not offer him that at all. But some forms of truth telling, and some displays of integrity and uprightness do offer just that.
“Preposterous” does no more in this context than signal strong disagreement.
In any event, force can be used without the intention to kill; but false assertion already involves an intention that is directed against both the possibility of the good of sociality, and against personal integrity. So double effect is available in the case of the use of force, but not in the case of lying; hence so much of the casuistry about lying depends on the very difficult question of whether a particular bit of verbal or non-verbal behavior is lying or not.
And I am dubious, though I doubt many will agree with this, that God ever intentionally kills anyone. So His relationship to life, as Lord of Life, is similar to His relationship to truth, as Lord of Truth: No killing and no lying.
Deacon Jim Russell:
The Apostolic Constitution at the beginning of the Catechism makes clear that John Paul II intended the Catechism to be a “statement of the Church's faith and of Catholic doctrine, attested to or illumined by Sacred Scripture, Apostolic Tradition and the Church's Magisterium,” and to be “a valid and legitimate instrument for ecclesial communion and a sure norm for teaching the faith.” So it is reasonable, to say the least, to start in the Catechism – the authoritative edition – to see what the Church takes the verdict of Sacred Scripture, the Apostolic tradition, and the Magisterium to be the question of the morality of lying. The answer to that inquiry is clear enough.
Is there really a “looong” debate on the morality of lying? Yes and no; from Augustine until the 16th century there was an almost unbroken tradition of thought in the Roman Catholic tradition that assertion contra mentem is always wrong. That tradition includes several Popes, such as Gregory the Great, Gregory the VII, and Alexander III all of whom explicitly denied that is was permissible to lie “even in order to save the life of another”. Things get murky over the issue of equivocation from, let us say, the 16th century, though there is again pretty much unanimity over the core claim about the absolute impermissibility of lying. It is not until after Grotius, a Protestant, that Catholics start to argue that a lie is false assertion to one with the right to the truth. That looks to me like a looong lack of debate about the morality of lying, followed by a period in which some theologians tried to call the core teaching into question. I think we’ve seen that particular narrative before.
In any event, it looks to me like the Catechism teaches as a sure norm of faith a view about lying that is faithful to the tradition, including the statements of several popes; it does not propose this as infallibly taught, nor do I say that the teaching has been so proposed; but I think, as we wrote in our piece, that it calls for religious assent. Moreover, while the Catechism does not settle disagreement, the change in the Catechism might be an indication that its drafters, and the Pope, became convinced that the controversy had been settled; and the Catechims might teach that.
Correction: Michael Bergmann has emailed to ask whether it was not Betsie ten Boom who was praised by Corrie for loving the Nazis; that is correct, and the error was mine – my apologies. It was, however, Nollie who refused to lie to the Nazis, and all the ten Boom’s are noteworthy for their extraordinarily loving character, including Corrie, whose description of her reunion with her Nazi guard, and her moment of forgiveness of him, is exceptionally moving.
“Volunteer” is a bit ambiguous; however, when you endeavor to answer a question, you do “volunteer” in the sense we identify, as can be seen by the contrast: the Nazi asks, and I refuse to answer. Saying “no” is unlike this, and like a different case, in which I tell the Nazi that I have no intention of giving him any information, in that in these latter two cases there is an effort to communicate an assertion to the Nazi, and this effort involves an attempt to get him to understand me to be doing just that – to trust that I am doing that.
JDD:
Speaking for myself only, I think that the Live Action actors were encouraging wrongdoing that otherwise would not have taken place in order to help bring about an end to the wrongdoing that already was taking place. But this seems like a bad means to a good end to me.
Randy:
God asked a question; he did not make an assertion. No lie there. And like any good parent asking a child about their wrongdoing, God was, I expect, hoping for an honest answer (side note: in Lewis’s books, Aslan asks these sorts of questions of the children more than once and then says “well done” when his interlocutor answers honestly, or growls, when the child waffles).
Ethan:
The Nazi already has murder in his heart; morally he will not be better off simply by being thwarted. For him to be better off would require repentance and conversion, and lying to him does not offer him that at all. But some forms of truth telling, and some displays of integrity and uprightness do offer just that.
“Preposterous” does no more in this context than signal strong disagreement.
In any event, force can be used without the intention to kill; but false assertion already involves an intention that is directed against both the possibility of the good of sociality, and against personal integrity. So double effect is available in the case of the use of force, but not in the case of lying; hence so much of the casuistry about lying depends on the very difficult question of whether a particular bit of verbal or non-verbal behavior is lying or not.
And I am dubious, though I doubt many will agree with this, that God ever intentionally kills anyone. So His relationship to life, as Lord of Life, is similar to His relationship to truth, as Lord of Truth: No killing and no lying.
Deacon Jim Russell:
The Apostolic Constitution at the beginning of the Catechism makes clear that John Paul II intended the Catechism to be a “statement of the Church's faith and of Catholic doctrine, attested to or illumined by Sacred Scripture, Apostolic Tradition and the Church's Magisterium,” and to be “a valid and legitimate instrument for ecclesial communion and a sure norm for teaching the faith.” So it is reasonable, to say the least, to start in the Catechism – the authoritative edition – to see what the Church takes the verdict of Sacred Scripture, the Apostolic tradition, and the Magisterium to be the question of the morality of lying. The answer to that inquiry is clear enough.
Is there really a “looong” debate on the morality of lying? Yes and no; from Augustine until the 16th century there was an almost unbroken tradition of thought in the Roman Catholic tradition that assertion contra mentem is always wrong. That tradition includes several Popes, such as Gregory the Great, Gregory the VII, and Alexander III all of whom explicitly denied that is was permissible to lie “even in order to save the life of another”. Things get murky over the issue of equivocation from, let us say, the 16th century, though there is again pretty much unanimity over the core claim about the absolute impermissibility of lying. It is not until after Grotius, a Protestant, that Catholics start to argue that a lie is false assertion to one with the right to the truth. That looks to me like a looong lack of debate about the morality of lying, followed by a period in which some theologians tried to call the core teaching into question. I think we’ve seen that particular narrative before.
In any event, it looks to me like the Catechism teaches as a sure norm of faith a view about lying that is faithful to the tradition, including the statements of several popes; it does not propose this as infallibly taught, nor do I say that the teaching has been so proposed; but I think, as we wrote in our piece, that it calls for religious assent. Moreover, while the Catechism does not settle disagreement, the change in the Catechism might be an indication that its drafters, and the Pope, became convinced that the controversy had been settled; and the Catechims might teach that.
Correction: Michael Bergmann has emailed to ask whether it was not Betsie ten Boom who was praised by Corrie for loving the Nazis; that is correct, and the error was mine – my apologies. It was, however, Nollie who refused to lie to the Nazis, and all the ten Boom’s are noteworthy for their extraordinarily loving character, including Corrie, whose description of her reunion with her Nazi guard, and her moment of forgiveness of him, is exceptionally moving.
9.22.2011 | 2:23pm
bill bannon says:
David Nickol and Alexander R. Pruss,
David wrote: " One could, for example, make arguments on behalf of incest based on Abraham marrying his half sister Sarah, or Lot's daughters getting him drunk and conceiving children by him..."
Alexander gave the example of Rahab perhaps having a sincere erroneous conscience about deceiving.
But these examples fail due to time and place. David thus gave examples of people who lived prior to the giving of the ten commandments of which lying is the 8th and Alexander gave the example of a woman who never heard the commandments due to spatial and ethnic considerations.
On the contrary, Judith and Jehu and all the people who praised them knew the 8th commandment and none step forward...including God in a vision to Jehu....and warn that lying in grave not venial matters lead to the pool of fire. So this serious sin is lost in everyone's consciousness due to military victories....and even God forgets about it during a locution to Jehu because He is so pleased with the destruction of Ahab's House.
No sirs....highly improbable. There was an extant Ten Commandments in the cases of Judith and Jehu and no one including God feels that number 8 was broken.
David wrote: " One could, for example, make arguments on behalf of incest based on Abraham marrying his half sister Sarah, or Lot's daughters getting him drunk and conceiving children by him..."
Alexander gave the example of Rahab perhaps having a sincere erroneous conscience about deceiving.
But these examples fail due to time and place. David thus gave examples of people who lived prior to the giving of the ten commandments of which lying is the 8th and Alexander gave the example of a woman who never heard the commandments due to spatial and ethnic considerations.
On the contrary, Judith and Jehu and all the people who praised them knew the 8th commandment and none step forward...including God in a vision to Jehu....and warn that lying in grave not venial matters lead to the pool of fire. So this serious sin is lost in everyone's consciousness due to military victories....and even God forgets about it during a locution to Jehu because He is so pleased with the destruction of Ahab's House.
No sirs....highly improbable. There was an extant Ten Commandments in the cases of Judith and Jehu and no one including God feels that number 8 was broken.
9.22.2011 | 2:36pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Mr. Tollefsen--have you *not* yet read the documentation pertaining to the development and promulgation of the CCC, not to mention the General Catechetical Directory, which defines what a Catechism is and is *not*???
Have you not seen the Schonborn/Ratzinger work titled "Introduction to the Catechism", in which it's made clear that the "authority" or "weight" of a teaching in the CCC remains the same "in" and "out" of the CCC???
Have you *not* noted that the "debate" we're talking about was alive and well even into the time of Newman, since he comments on the same in his work on "lying and equivocation"???
So, the answer is quite simple: Produce the *magisterial* document that "settles" what has been debated from the beginning until at least the time of Newman. Produce the *magisterial* document upon which the teaching of the CCC that's supposed to apply to *special cases* of lying is actually based.
Then please explain why the CCC fails to footnote that teaching.
Or just read the part in the General Catechetical Directory that explicitly states that catechisms are NOT in the business of settling thelogical debate.
We've *got* to quit trying to claim magisterial high ground based *entirely* on NON-magisterial work, common teaching, and theological opinion....
Sincerely,
Deacon Jim Russell
Have you not seen the Schonborn/Ratzinger work titled "Introduction to the Catechism", in which it's made clear that the "authority" or "weight" of a teaching in the CCC remains the same "in" and "out" of the CCC???
Have you *not* noted that the "debate" we're talking about was alive and well even into the time of Newman, since he comments on the same in his work on "lying and equivocation"???
So, the answer is quite simple: Produce the *magisterial* document that "settles" what has been debated from the beginning until at least the time of Newman. Produce the *magisterial* document upon which the teaching of the CCC that's supposed to apply to *special cases* of lying is actually based.
Then please explain why the CCC fails to footnote that teaching.
Or just read the part in the General Catechetical Directory that explicitly states that catechisms are NOT in the business of settling thelogical debate.
We've *got* to quit trying to claim magisterial high ground based *entirely* on NON-magisterial work, common teaching, and theological opinion....
Sincerely,
Deacon Jim Russell
9.22.2011 | 2:50pm
JDC says:
The thesis advanced in this article is correct. We who would defend the sanctity of life must do all we can to be above reproach--to defend sanctity generally.
It is not insignificant hair-splitting. It is very real, very practical.
It is never permitted to kill just to kill, but only to stop a threat to others or oneself, and there your intention ought to be to protect others or yourself, not to harm the agressor. This is not really hairsplitting either; it matters.
The morality of these cases is forced upon us. We must examine it, not ignore it.
It is not insignificant hair-splitting. It is very real, very practical.
It is never permitted to kill just to kill, but only to stop a threat to others or oneself, and there your intention ought to be to protect others or yourself, not to harm the agressor. This is not really hairsplitting either; it matters.
The morality of these cases is forced upon us. We must examine it, not ignore it.
9.22.2011 | 2:59pm
David Nickol says:
Adam and Eve do not die when they eat the forbidden fruit, as God told them they would, but they do become like God, knowing good and evil, as the serpent told them they would. I would not want to make anything out of this in an argument about the morality of lying, but it is a clearer case of God possibly not telling the truth than when he asks a question to which he already knows the answer.
Yes, there is quibbling about the proper translation of "you will die," and there is the argument that Adam and Eve would have been made immortal (although they clearly weren't already) had they not eaten the forbidden fruit, but those two arguments are debatable.
Yes, there is quibbling about the proper translation of "you will die," and there is the argument that Adam and Eve would have been made immortal (although they clearly weren't already) had they not eaten the forbidden fruit, but those two arguments are debatable.
9.22.2011 | 2:59pm
Quester says:
Interesting discussion. I have mixed feelings at this moment about some of these lines of thought.
I do think that what Live Action is doing is different than lying to Nazis who are knocking on your door. What LA does is perhaps more like pretending to be a potential Nazi recruit in order to get info from them that will help defeat them in the end. In other words, like being spies. That's a whole topic in itself.
One thing, though: Isn't it true that during WWII the Pope issued (or directed others to issue) false baptismal certificates for Jews, so that their lives would be saved? What does that mean for the discussion?
I too was much impressed by the example of Nollie Ten Boom when I read it in Corrie ten Boom's book. I have to believe that the Lord regularly rewards that kind of trust and courage. After all, she was dooming herself by that statement, not just risking their lives.
As far what one says if someone asks you if you are a Christian: I think we Christians are obligated to say yes, or else we are denying Jesus, which He clearly says means He will deny us (and thus we lose heaven).
And I don't think having family depending on us is an excuse for saying no. (That's the usual concern we have, aside from our own fears of death.)
Truly, would we want to buy mere earthly life for yourself or others at the risk of losing heaven for yourself or them? It's a horrible situation to find oneself in, but, really, do we believe in heaven or not? That's the challenge. One can only pray for the grace to say yes if tested.
And honestly in the world as things are going today, I think we better decide now and prepare ourselves. Some of us might come to that challenge in our lifetimes. In other countries, some already are!
I do think that what Live Action is doing is different than lying to Nazis who are knocking on your door. What LA does is perhaps more like pretending to be a potential Nazi recruit in order to get info from them that will help defeat them in the end. In other words, like being spies. That's a whole topic in itself.
One thing, though: Isn't it true that during WWII the Pope issued (or directed others to issue) false baptismal certificates for Jews, so that their lives would be saved? What does that mean for the discussion?
I too was much impressed by the example of Nollie Ten Boom when I read it in Corrie ten Boom's book. I have to believe that the Lord regularly rewards that kind of trust and courage. After all, she was dooming herself by that statement, not just risking their lives.
As far what one says if someone asks you if you are a Christian: I think we Christians are obligated to say yes, or else we are denying Jesus, which He clearly says means He will deny us (and thus we lose heaven).
And I don't think having family depending on us is an excuse for saying no. (That's the usual concern we have, aside from our own fears of death.)
Truly, would we want to buy mere earthly life for yourself or others at the risk of losing heaven for yourself or them? It's a horrible situation to find oneself in, but, really, do we believe in heaven or not? That's the challenge. One can only pray for the grace to say yes if tested.
And honestly in the world as things are going today, I think we better decide now and prepare ourselves. Some of us might come to that challenge in our lifetimes. In other countries, some already are!
9.22.2011 | 3:28pm
Dave Eden says:
Alexander R Pruss: I agree with your example RE adultery, and indeed I was wondering if my (very briefly stated) position could be interpreted as utilitarian in that sort of way. Definitely not. If someone is given the choice by an armed gang to either commit adultery or else they kill your child, for example, it would be immoral to comply with their order, however horrific the presumed consequences. I accept the distinction but admit I don't understand exactly why "defensive killing" is okay but "defensive adultery" is not. I would guess it's something to do with the nature of the act. With killing in self defence or defence of others, killing is still not the objective of the action. Stopping the threat is the objective and if the threat could be stopped, without additional risk, by non-lethal force, that is what one must do. With the adultery example, I accept that the act is intrinsically wrong. This must be something to do with the profound nature of the marital act, what it expresses and what its end is. Perhaps there is a connection to the very truth of the act, and perhaps that is why you put lying in a similar category. I'm more sympathetic to your view, but I still don't agree.
9.22.2011 | 3:49pm
Peter Ford says:
There is a Western Christian saint who countenances the view that telling a falsehood to someone without a "right to know" is not actually lying and is tehrefore acceptable: St. Alphonsus Liguori. The argument in general for this position is that truth-telling falls under the virtue of justice, giving what is due. I would not be required to give a weapon back to someone from whom I had borrowed it if that person had become murderous and mad; similarly, I am not required to hand over information to someone who is murderously mad just because he has phrased his request in such a form that it's impossible for me to use evasion rather than a falsehood. Speech acts are not per se priveleged unless one is following Kant; but we all know that Kant does not have a virtue ethics in the first place.
9.22.2011 | 3:51pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Mr. Tollefsen:
You wrote:
****Moreover, while the Catechism does not settle disagreement, the change in the Catechism might be an indication that its drafters, and the Pope, became convinced that the controversy had been settled; and the Catechims might teach that.****
The problem with this assessment is that *both* editions of the CCC were called "sure norm"--the more logical conclusion is that *both* editions were attempting to express the *same* common teaching on lying. That is, the authors were *seeking* a more refined "neutrality" in the expressed teaching in the CCC precisely *because* the CCC was not supposed to be in the business of "resolving" theological debate. ...
This is why it's also impossible for your supposition to be correct--the Pope and crafters of the CCC are the very ones who *asserted* the CCC was not in the business of expressing or resolving theological debate/opinion.
You wrote:
****Moreover, while the Catechism does not settle disagreement, the change in the Catechism might be an indication that its drafters, and the Pope, became convinced that the controversy had been settled; and the Catechims might teach that.****
The problem with this assessment is that *both* editions of the CCC were called "sure norm"--the more logical conclusion is that *both* editions were attempting to express the *same* common teaching on lying. That is, the authors were *seeking* a more refined "neutrality" in the expressed teaching in the CCC precisely *because* the CCC was not supposed to be in the business of "resolving" theological debate. ...
This is why it's also impossible for your supposition to be correct--the Pope and crafters of the CCC are the very ones who *asserted* the CCC was not in the business of expressing or resolving theological debate/opinion.
9.22.2011 | 3:55pm
Zachary Foreman says:
"And absent significant evidence to the contrary, we should assume that the words of Jesus, of Scripture, and of the Church condemn all false assertion as lying."
But this is not true, if by false assertion you simply mean "assertion contrary to what one believes". Examples include fiction, humor, irony, hyperbole, counterfactual examples, dramatic entertainment, etc. If I say "Juliet is the sun" I do not actually believe her to be an incandescent mass of gaseous hydrogen. And if it is in the context of a play, I do not even believe that the people I am interacting with on stage have the names I call them, the motivations I refer nor the actions I describe.
It seems that lying cannot be adequately defined without including hearer expectations as well as speaker intent. To illustrate this, is it possible to lie when alone? It seems clear that I can assert something contrary to what I believe in an empty room, but It also seems clear that this is not lying, or at least, it is not what most would consider so. If I am singing "You make me feel like a natural woman" in the shower, I am clearly asserting something contrary to what I believe, but I am not lying. In a drama, the audience willingly participates in a fictional relationship. Their expectation of the truth value of the propositions they hear is eliminated. Therefore, the speakers are not lying, though they are asserting facts contrary to their perception of reality.
This is even more common in non-literal speech. If I were to say "I'm so hungry, I could eat a horse," the hearers are not to take it literally. Again, hearer expectation is integral to understanding the role that the speech plays in the verbal exchange. And this leads to the interesting case where one can be lying and telling the truth at the same time. If two hearers have different expectations, then one could understand the same sentence in the wrong way and the other not. If I begin a story with "Once upon a time" and one hearer changes her expectations by suspending belief because that is the traditional signal for a fairy tale but another hearer is from another culture where this is not known (or enters the discussion later), the same story, say a trip into a dark woods, would be believed as true by one but as a fairy tale by the other.
I don't actually think that this materially alters the immorality of undercover work (especially by private parties), but it shows that lying is far less straight forward that most think, because language is far more complex, ambiguous and multivalent than most think.
But this is not true, if by false assertion you simply mean "assertion contrary to what one believes". Examples include fiction, humor, irony, hyperbole, counterfactual examples, dramatic entertainment, etc. If I say "Juliet is the sun" I do not actually believe her to be an incandescent mass of gaseous hydrogen. And if it is in the context of a play, I do not even believe that the people I am interacting with on stage have the names I call them, the motivations I refer nor the actions I describe.
It seems that lying cannot be adequately defined without including hearer expectations as well as speaker intent. To illustrate this, is it possible to lie when alone? It seems clear that I can assert something contrary to what I believe in an empty room, but It also seems clear that this is not lying, or at least, it is not what most would consider so. If I am singing "You make me feel like a natural woman" in the shower, I am clearly asserting something contrary to what I believe, but I am not lying. In a drama, the audience willingly participates in a fictional relationship. Their expectation of the truth value of the propositions they hear is eliminated. Therefore, the speakers are not lying, though they are asserting facts contrary to their perception of reality.
This is even more common in non-literal speech. If I were to say "I'm so hungry, I could eat a horse," the hearers are not to take it literally. Again, hearer expectation is integral to understanding the role that the speech plays in the verbal exchange. And this leads to the interesting case where one can be lying and telling the truth at the same time. If two hearers have different expectations, then one could understand the same sentence in the wrong way and the other not. If I begin a story with "Once upon a time" and one hearer changes her expectations by suspending belief because that is the traditional signal for a fairy tale but another hearer is from another culture where this is not known (or enters the discussion later), the same story, say a trip into a dark woods, would be believed as true by one but as a fairy tale by the other.
I don't actually think that this materially alters the immorality of undercover work (especially by private parties), but it shows that lying is far less straight forward that most think, because language is far more complex, ambiguous and multivalent than most think.
9.22.2011 | 4:08pm
Zachary Foreman says:
I never liked the Nazi example because if someone had such a strong morality against lying, he would never agree to hide Jews in the first place, or at least would warn those Jews. "Yes, you can hide in my attic, but if someone, say a Nazi, knocks on the door and asks where you are, I will have to tell them, because I don't lie." If that were the case, the situation would never arise. Or, of course, one could simply not answer the door. Or kill the Nazi in self-defense (assuming you were certain that the Jews would be killed if they were to be discovered). Or tell them to run out the back door.
One could in fact argue on consequentialist grounds that Live Action is acting immorally. If we approve if their actions then we are approving of any and all acts in which someone misrepresents who they are to us and records the subsequent conversation and then posts it on the internet. There are many things that are said in private because they could be damaging if made known publicly in any organization, even the Church. One may counter that alls fair in the fight for the unborn. But if this is true, then why not kidnap abortionists? Or slash their tires? Or maliciously edit the Live Action footage so that it appears more damning? The odd thing is that the Live Action footage relies on an aura of veracity to be effective, an aura that is obviously damaged by a "by any means necessary" motivation. Why should we believe that they are telling *us* the truth with unedited tapes when they feel no compunction to give false names and backgrounds to others?
One could in fact argue on consequentialist grounds that Live Action is acting immorally. If we approve if their actions then we are approving of any and all acts in which someone misrepresents who they are to us and records the subsequent conversation and then posts it on the internet. There are many things that are said in private because they could be damaging if made known publicly in any organization, even the Church. One may counter that alls fair in the fight for the unborn. But if this is true, then why not kidnap abortionists? Or slash their tires? Or maliciously edit the Live Action footage so that it appears more damning? The odd thing is that the Live Action footage relies on an aura of veracity to be effective, an aura that is obviously damaged by a "by any means necessary" motivation. Why should we believe that they are telling *us* the truth with unedited tapes when they feel no compunction to give false names and backgrounds to others?
9.22.2011 | 4:19pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Mr. Tollefsen--It is also *really* important to note that, in promulgating the Editio Typica of the Catechism, Pope John Paul II clearly says that the Second Edition “faithfully repeats the doctrinal content which I officially presented to the Church and to the world in December 1992.” So how could anyone say that tweaking the phrasing on lying from first to second edition constitutes a “settling” of Church teaching?
According to the Holy Father, the Second Edition is a *repeat* performance....
This from the 1971 General Catechetical Directory:
“119 The greatest importance must be attached in catechisms published by ecclesiastical authority. Their purpose is to provide, under a form that is condensed and practical, the witnesses of revelation and of Christian tradition as well as the chief principles which ought to be useful for catechefical activity, that is, for personal education in faith. The witnesses of tradition should be held in due esteem, and very great care must be taken to avoid presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school. "
This from the General Directory for Catechesis (1997), which cites and echoes the 1971 text:
“In virtue of being a catechism, the Catechism of the Catholic Church collects all that is fundamental and common to the Christian life without ‘presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school’.”
According to the Holy Father, the Second Edition is a *repeat* performance....
This from the 1971 General Catechetical Directory:
“119 The greatest importance must be attached in catechisms published by ecclesiastical authority. Their purpose is to provide, under a form that is condensed and practical, the witnesses of revelation and of Christian tradition as well as the chief principles which ought to be useful for catechefical activity, that is, for personal education in faith. The witnesses of tradition should be held in due esteem, and very great care must be taken to avoid presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school. "
This from the General Directory for Catechesis (1997), which cites and echoes the 1971 text:
“In virtue of being a catechism, the Catechism of the Catholic Church collects all that is fundamental and common to the Christian life without ‘presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school’.”
9.22.2011 | 4:23pm
bill bannon says:
Anyone,
How do you solve this apparent lie by Christ to his unbelieving relatives whom He did not wish to travel with since they might get Him arrested too early by calling attention to Him... in John 7:
8 "You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, because my time has not yet been fulfilled." 9 After he had said this, he stayed on in Galilee. 10 But when his brothers had gone up to the feast, he himself also went up, not openly but (as it were) in secret.
How do you solve this apparent lie by Christ to his unbelieving relatives whom He did not wish to travel with since they might get Him arrested too early by calling attention to Him... in John 7:
8 "You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, because my time has not yet been fulfilled." 9 After he had said this, he stayed on in Galilee. 10 But when his brothers had gone up to the feast, he himself also went up, not openly but (as it were) in secret.
9.22.2011 | 4:27pm
Jim says:
Seems to me that what Miss Rose and crew are doing is simply a form of law enforcement.
They are running undercover sting operations on suspected illegal activities. Since the government, local and state, are not providing routine inspection procedures of their own it is up to the private citizen to provide what the public governance does not.
That is the secular understanding that I have. The Theological understanding is this: The Commandment states that Thou shalt not kill, yet it is interpreted in a way where a head of household has the natural right and the obligation to bear arms against intruders into their household. Civil law says the same thing as the Church.
I say until the Feds begin to get off their rear-ends and start enforcing the laws they pass. Let zeal for her Father's house consume her.
They are running undercover sting operations on suspected illegal activities. Since the government, local and state, are not providing routine inspection procedures of their own it is up to the private citizen to provide what the public governance does not.
That is the secular understanding that I have. The Theological understanding is this: The Commandment states that Thou shalt not kill, yet it is interpreted in a way where a head of household has the natural right and the obligation to bear arms against intruders into their household. Civil law says the same thing as the Church.
I say until the Feds begin to get off their rear-ends and start enforcing the laws they pass. Let zeal for her Father's house consume her.
9.22.2011 | 4:42pm
JB in CA says:
"it is not morally licit to commit adultery, even to save a life."
So a victim of rape is guilty of immoral behavior if she allows the rapist to rape her rather than having him blow her brains out?
So a victim of rape is guilty of immoral behavior if she allows the rapist to rape her rather than having him blow her brains out?
9.22.2011 | 4:53pm
AB says:
Alasdair MacIntyre has an article on this subject called "Truthfulness, Lies and Moral Philosophers" (available online from the Univ. of Utah, though there are lots of typos in the text). I wonder what Janet Smith's and Tollefsen and Pruss's responses to it would be.
9.22.2011 | 5:44pm
rfmoo says:
JB,
Absolutely not. A rape victim does not consent to rape and therefore cannot commit adultery (which must be chosen with an unconstrained will). She is under no obligation to be murdered rather than submit to a lesser violence, though some women have made that choice.
Best,
Richard
Absolutely not. A rape victim does not consent to rape and therefore cannot commit adultery (which must be chosen with an unconstrained will). She is under no obligation to be murdered rather than submit to a lesser violence, though some women have made that choice.
Best,
Richard
9.22.2011 | 6:39pm
bill bannon says:
Christ fibs to the disciples who urge Him toward the pleading Canaanite woman whose daughter is possessed...He says, " I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel."
Yet when a non Jewish centurion approaches Him, Christ immediately helps him as He immediately helps the Samaritan woman at the well by fraternal correction about her being with too many men. Therefore Christ's statement to the disciples about being sent only to the House of Israel as a strict principle rather than a looser one was some type of verbal deception to them and to the woman; as was His misleading His relatives about His not going up to Jerusalem yet as though He would go much later.
It is western culture and our classically derived philosophy that is more rigorist in this area than the Bible is (reminiscent of how the Stoics were more strict on sex only for procreation...than the Church turned out to be later...allowing the infertile times).
Whether it is Judith or Christ or Jehu, there is a relaxed not exact approach to this area which is not really different than how we sometimes answer children who ask if Santa Claus is coming to bring them toys.
We relax there but not where Christ relaxed when verbally pretending that He was only sent to the House of Israel.
Yet when a non Jewish centurion approaches Him, Christ immediately helps him as He immediately helps the Samaritan woman at the well by fraternal correction about her being with too many men. Therefore Christ's statement to the disciples about being sent only to the House of Israel as a strict principle rather than a looser one was some type of verbal deception to them and to the woman; as was His misleading His relatives about His not going up to Jerusalem yet as though He would go much later.
It is western culture and our classically derived philosophy that is more rigorist in this area than the Bible is (reminiscent of how the Stoics were more strict on sex only for procreation...than the Church turned out to be later...allowing the infertile times).
Whether it is Judith or Christ or Jehu, there is a relaxed not exact approach to this area which is not really different than how we sometimes answer children who ask if Santa Claus is coming to bring them toys.
We relax there but not where Christ relaxed when verbally pretending that He was only sent to the House of Israel.
9.22.2011 | 7:51pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
Deacon Russell:
It is quite reasonable to take the prohibition of lying to be a part of the teaching of the ordinary magisterium (non-definitively confirmed by several popes, as noted by Chris Tollefsen in one of the comments), much as the teaching on contraception was prior to the more formal definitions of the last century or so. It's also worth remembering that the teaching was in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which expressly prohibits officious lies, and hence would have been an ordinary part of the catechesis of the faithful.
It is also worth noting that there is nothing logically incompatible about the teaching of the two editions of the catechism.
Version 1: It is always wrong to deceitfully assert a falsehood to someone who has a right to the truth.
Version 2: It is always wrong to deceitfully assert a falsehood.
In fact, the second claim logically implies the first: if it is wrong to deceitfully assert a falsehood, it is wrong to do so to someone who has a right to the truth. So we can say that both catechisms are sure norms of the faith--one just makes a logically stronger claim.
(You might argue that they differ on the definition of lying. But we can take that to be a mere disagreement about words. Or we can say that everyone has a right not to be lied to, and that that is what the right to truth is.)
While the Catechism does not settle a disagreement, it shows us that in the minds of the writers and approvers, the disagreement has *already* been settled.
bill bannon:
Well, these readings of Scripture contradicts Scripture which assures us that God does not lie.
Jesus says he isn't going up to the feast. He stays a while. And then some time later he goes. Well, he didn't say he'd *never* go. He doesn't go when he says he doesn't go.
And of course Adam and Eve do die, just as God says so. God didn't say they'd die right away. They were destined for eternal life, and threw that away.
Dave Eden:
In private self-defense, indeed Thomas Aquinas says that we are not permitted to intend death. However, on the most reasonable readings (here I disagree with some new natural law people who think that killing in war can be handled by double effect), it can be permissible for officers of the state to intentionally kill in defense of the innocent. So bringing in intention doesn't fully resolve the tension.
One part of the story here might be divine authority. God gives us a finite length of life, and he has the right for that grant to terminate when he so chooses. He does no wrong if he gives infinite life and he does no wrong if he gives only a second of life. Having a right to decide how long the gift will be, he likewise has a right to authorize civil authorities to bear the sword on his behalf.
But God does not lie. If he did, how could we trust anything he said? For all we'd know, it might be a lie that's good for us to believe. God's plan has many aspects beyond our ken, after all.
Maybe thinking of perversion helps, too. Death is but the cessation of life. But a lie is not just the absence of truth--it is silence that is the mere absence of truth--but it is a perversion of truth. It is a parody of the good. I
There is something almost sacramental about the revelation of truth to another, which is what assertion is. After all, all truth is in some way about God. To pervert that is kind of like celebrating a pretend baptism (though in typical cases nowhere near it in gravity of wrong).
Zachary Foreman:
"Or maliciously edit the Live Action footage so that it appears more damning?"
I really want to highlight this great comment. For if it is always right to lie to save an innocent life, and if the Live Action footage saves innocent lives, then it should be equally right to falsify the footage, to pay people large sums of money to give false witness, etc. But that is surely wrong.
We can go further in the absurdity. Jesus's "Let your yes be yes, and let your no be no" is a command that our ordinary speech be no less truthful than speech under oath is supposed to be. So if it is permissible to lie to save an innocent life, it is permissible to lie under oath to save an innocent life. And here we surely have reached something absurd.
It is quite reasonable to take the prohibition of lying to be a part of the teaching of the ordinary magisterium (non-definitively confirmed by several popes, as noted by Chris Tollefsen in one of the comments), much as the teaching on contraception was prior to the more formal definitions of the last century or so. It's also worth remembering that the teaching was in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which expressly prohibits officious lies, and hence would have been an ordinary part of the catechesis of the faithful.
It is also worth noting that there is nothing logically incompatible about the teaching of the two editions of the catechism.
Version 1: It is always wrong to deceitfully assert a falsehood to someone who has a right to the truth.
Version 2: It is always wrong to deceitfully assert a falsehood.
In fact, the second claim logically implies the first: if it is wrong to deceitfully assert a falsehood, it is wrong to do so to someone who has a right to the truth. So we can say that both catechisms are sure norms of the faith--one just makes a logically stronger claim.
(You might argue that they differ on the definition of lying. But we can take that to be a mere disagreement about words. Or we can say that everyone has a right not to be lied to, and that that is what the right to truth is.)
While the Catechism does not settle a disagreement, it shows us that in the minds of the writers and approvers, the disagreement has *already* been settled.
bill bannon:
Well, these readings of Scripture contradicts Scripture which assures us that God does not lie.
Jesus says he isn't going up to the feast. He stays a while. And then some time later he goes. Well, he didn't say he'd *never* go. He doesn't go when he says he doesn't go.
And of course Adam and Eve do die, just as God says so. God didn't say they'd die right away. They were destined for eternal life, and threw that away.
Dave Eden:
In private self-defense, indeed Thomas Aquinas says that we are not permitted to intend death. However, on the most reasonable readings (here I disagree with some new natural law people who think that killing in war can be handled by double effect), it can be permissible for officers of the state to intentionally kill in defense of the innocent. So bringing in intention doesn't fully resolve the tension.
One part of the story here might be divine authority. God gives us a finite length of life, and he has the right for that grant to terminate when he so chooses. He does no wrong if he gives infinite life and he does no wrong if he gives only a second of life. Having a right to decide how long the gift will be, he likewise has a right to authorize civil authorities to bear the sword on his behalf.
But God does not lie. If he did, how could we trust anything he said? For all we'd know, it might be a lie that's good for us to believe. God's plan has many aspects beyond our ken, after all.
Maybe thinking of perversion helps, too. Death is but the cessation of life. But a lie is not just the absence of truth--it is silence that is the mere absence of truth--but it is a perversion of truth. It is a parody of the good. I
There is something almost sacramental about the revelation of truth to another, which is what assertion is. After all, all truth is in some way about God. To pervert that is kind of like celebrating a pretend baptism (though in typical cases nowhere near it in gravity of wrong).
Zachary Foreman:
"Or maliciously edit the Live Action footage so that it appears more damning?"
I really want to highlight this great comment. For if it is always right to lie to save an innocent life, and if the Live Action footage saves innocent lives, then it should be equally right to falsify the footage, to pay people large sums of money to give false witness, etc. But that is surely wrong.
We can go further in the absurdity. Jesus's "Let your yes be yes, and let your no be no" is a command that our ordinary speech be no less truthful than speech under oath is supposed to be. So if it is permissible to lie to save an innocent life, it is permissible to lie under oath to save an innocent life. And here we surely have reached something absurd.
9.22.2011 | 8:09pm
Alexander R. Pruss says:
Zachary Foreman:
'But this is not true, if by false assertion you simply mean "assertion contrary to what one believes". Examples include fiction, humor, irony, hyperbole, counterfactual examples, dramatic entertainment, etc. If I say "Juliet is the sun" I do not actually believe her to be an incandescent mass of gaseous hydrogen.'
That's all taken care of by our use of the word "assertion". When you say that Juliet is the sun, you're not asserting any proposition that would imply that she is undergoing nuclear fusion. You're asserting a proposition about her beauty, or about her centrality, or something like that--one can't really tell what proposition you're asserting without a context.
When one writes a work of fiction, the declarative sentences in that work are not assertions by the author.
If I say ironically of a nerdy young man that he is a real Don Juan, I am asserting that he is in fact quite restrained in his romantic life.
Likewise, normally the declarative sentences uttered on stage by the actors in the course of a performance are no more assertions than Monopoly money is money. (I say "normally", because an actor might whisper an assertion to another in such a way that the audience not hear, etc.) But if the play is interrupted, and an actor announces: "Please remain calm. The manager has informed me that the theater is on fire", the second sentence is an assertion.
Everybody:
If lying is sometimes permissible, then surely God can lie. But if God can lie, then how can one infer that Scripture is true from the fact that Scripture is divinely inspired?
'But this is not true, if by false assertion you simply mean "assertion contrary to what one believes". Examples include fiction, humor, irony, hyperbole, counterfactual examples, dramatic entertainment, etc. If I say "Juliet is the sun" I do not actually believe her to be an incandescent mass of gaseous hydrogen.'
That's all taken care of by our use of the word "assertion". When you say that Juliet is the sun, you're not asserting any proposition that would imply that she is undergoing nuclear fusion. You're asserting a proposition about her beauty, or about her centrality, or something like that--one can't really tell what proposition you're asserting without a context.
When one writes a work of fiction, the declarative sentences in that work are not assertions by the author.
If I say ironically of a nerdy young man that he is a real Don Juan, I am asserting that he is in fact quite restrained in his romantic life.
Likewise, normally the declarative sentences uttered on stage by the actors in the course of a performance are no more assertions than Monopoly money is money. (I say "normally", because an actor might whisper an assertion to another in such a way that the audience not hear, etc.) But if the play is interrupted, and an actor announces: "Please remain calm. The manager has informed me that the theater is on fire", the second sentence is an assertion.
Everybody:
If lying is sometimes permissible, then surely God can lie. But if God can lie, then how can one infer that Scripture is true from the fact that Scripture is divinely inspired?
9.22.2011 | 9:30pm
I hope we all get this right. Matthew 25:31-46 (NIV below) implies that taking great risks to help Jews in need will be something for which the world's final generation will be held accountable.
“When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, he will sit on his glorious throne. All the nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate the people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats. He will put the sheep on his right and the goats on his left.
“Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.’
“Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?’
“The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.’
“Then he will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not invite me in, I needed clothes and you did not clothe me, I was sick and in prison and you did not look after me.’
“They also will answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or needing clothes or sick or in prison, and did not help you?’
“He will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me.’
“Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life.”
We should all read The Hiding Place again.
“When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, he will sit on his glorious throne. All the nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate the people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats. He will put the sheep on his right and the goats on his left.
“Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.’
“Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?’
“The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.’
“Then he will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not invite me in, I needed clothes and you did not clothe me, I was sick and in prison and you did not look after me.’
“They also will answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or needing clothes or sick or in prison, and did not help you?’
“He will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me.’
“Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life.”
We should all read The Hiding Place again.
9.22.2011 | 9:41pm
JDD says:
Chris Tollefsen:
"Speaking for myself only, I think that the Live Action actors were encouraging wrongdoing that otherwise would not have taken place in order to help bring about an end to the wrongdoing that already was taking place."
That word 'encouraging' is crucial to the discussion. In point of fact, they posed as clients, claimed to be in a line of work that should have been reported as criminal, and asked for advice. The Planned Parenthood staff had a clear set of choices in front of them and choose a criminal path. You're going to have to explain how Lila Rose 'encouraged' them to give the advice they did. She showed up in character to see what would happen next. The staff chose what happened next. They didn't need any encouragement.
"Speaking for myself only, I think that the Live Action actors were encouraging wrongdoing that otherwise would not have taken place in order to help bring about an end to the wrongdoing that already was taking place."
That word 'encouraging' is crucial to the discussion. In point of fact, they posed as clients, claimed to be in a line of work that should have been reported as criminal, and asked for advice. The Planned Parenthood staff had a clear set of choices in front of them and choose a criminal path. You're going to have to explain how Lila Rose 'encouraged' them to give the advice they did. She showed up in character to see what would happen next. The staff chose what happened next. They didn't need any encouragement.
9.22.2011 | 9:41pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Mr. Pruss wrote:
****It is quite reasonable to take the prohibition of lying to be a part of the teaching of the ordinary magisterium (non-definitively confirmed by several popes, as noted by Chris Tollefsen in one of the comments), much as the teaching on contraception was prior to the more formal definitions of the last century or so. It's also worth remembering that the teaching was in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which expressly prohibits officious lies, and hence would have been an ordinary part of the catechesis of the faithful.****
Herein lies part of the problem--you are making no distinction between "the prohibition of lying" and the historically demonstrable difference of views and debate among theologians regarding what falls *under* that prohibition. Trent's Catechism is *much* more restrictive than the CCC in its prohibitions regarding lying, and yet much later Cardinal Newman in the 19th Century still *references* the continued theological debate regarding what should fall under the prohibition.
****It is also worth noting that there is nothing logically incompatible about the teaching of the two editions of the catechism.*****
I never said there was incompatibility--I state the opposite, in fact, because Pope John Paul II said as much when promulgating the Second Edition, stating it "repeats" the content of the First....which is an important point. *Neither* version (ed. one or ed. two) is an attempt at anything *except* to articulate the *general* teaching on lying arising from the 8th Commandment.
****While the Catechism does not settle a disagreement, it shows us that in the minds of the writers and approvers, the disagreement has *already* been settled.******
Oh, well, glad to hear it then. Then just a few questions remain:
1. What is the authoritative "weight" of the "settled" teaching?
2. Who settled it?
3. When was it settled?
4. Where can I find the text of the settled teaching and the reasons behind why it was settled?
Or is the settled teaching somehow "invisible," as it most definitely is not quoted in the CCC...?
Again, you know you cannot produce a concrete "settled" teaching from the Magisterium on this. You know it. If you could, you would have by now.
So please let's drop the charade that the CCC somehow "settles" the debate.
Drop the charade that mischaracterizes *one* theological view as magisterial....
****It is quite reasonable to take the prohibition of lying to be a part of the teaching of the ordinary magisterium (non-definitively confirmed by several popes, as noted by Chris Tollefsen in one of the comments), much as the teaching on contraception was prior to the more formal definitions of the last century or so. It's also worth remembering that the teaching was in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, which expressly prohibits officious lies, and hence would have been an ordinary part of the catechesis of the faithful.****
Herein lies part of the problem--you are making no distinction between "the prohibition of lying" and the historically demonstrable difference of views and debate among theologians regarding what falls *under* that prohibition. Trent's Catechism is *much* more restrictive than the CCC in its prohibitions regarding lying, and yet much later Cardinal Newman in the 19th Century still *references* the continued theological debate regarding what should fall under the prohibition.
****It is also worth noting that there is nothing logically incompatible about the teaching of the two editions of the catechism.*****
I never said there was incompatibility--I state the opposite, in fact, because Pope John Paul II said as much when promulgating the Second Edition, stating it "repeats" the content of the First....which is an important point. *Neither* version (ed. one or ed. two) is an attempt at anything *except* to articulate the *general* teaching on lying arising from the 8th Commandment.
****While the Catechism does not settle a disagreement, it shows us that in the minds of the writers and approvers, the disagreement has *already* been settled.******
Oh, well, glad to hear it then. Then just a few questions remain:
1. What is the authoritative "weight" of the "settled" teaching?
2. Who settled it?
3. When was it settled?
4. Where can I find the text of the settled teaching and the reasons behind why it was settled?
Or is the settled teaching somehow "invisible," as it most definitely is not quoted in the CCC...?
Again, you know you cannot produce a concrete "settled" teaching from the Magisterium on this. You know it. If you could, you would have by now.
So please let's drop the charade that the CCC somehow "settles" the debate.
Drop the charade that mischaracterizes *one* theological view as magisterial....
9.22.2011 | 10:02pm
JDD says:
JDC:
"It is never permitted to kill just to kill, but only to stop a threat to others or oneself, and there your intention ought to be to protect others or yourself, not to harm the aggressor."
I do not think we can determine that Lila Rose intended to harm the aggressor. As has been pointed out before, the real harm to the aggressor in this case is being done *by* the aggressor *to* him or herself. And as I've mentioned, the undercover Lila Rose would - we hope - be quite happy to find a staff member who refused to engage in criminal activity, and subsequently turned her 'character' over to the police.
We apparently agree that this affects the morality of the event.
"It is never permitted to kill just to kill, but only to stop a threat to others or oneself, and there your intention ought to be to protect others or yourself, not to harm the aggressor."
I do not think we can determine that Lila Rose intended to harm the aggressor. As has been pointed out before, the real harm to the aggressor in this case is being done *by* the aggressor *to* him or herself. And as I've mentioned, the undercover Lila Rose would - we hope - be quite happy to find a staff member who refused to engage in criminal activity, and subsequently turned her 'character' over to the police.
We apparently agree that this affects the morality of the event.
9.22.2011 | 10:02pm
Brandon says:
On the two versions of the Catechism question, it's worth pointing out that the original French version already says some strong things on the subject: The very first thing it says about lying is that a lie consists in saying a falsehood with the intention to deceive (2482; there are no qualifications, it just continues on from there); it says specifically that the purpose of speech is to communicate known truth to others (2485) and that deliberately intending to lead a neighbor into error by saying something contrary to truth violates justice and charity (also 2485), both of which claims occur in a paragraph explaining why lying should be condemned by its very nature, and neither of which is qualified by any reference to the right to know the truth. It says that lying violates the virtue of truthfulness (2486), which it had previously described simply as the virtue consisting in showing oneself true in deed and truthful in word (2468), and of which it had said that as a matter of justice one person owes another to manifest the truth (2469). These are all quite strong statements. The only way one can get around them is to hold that all these statements are loose, and that the original version of the Catechism is only speaking strictly in the one sentence (two if you count the later summary) in which it connects lying, somewhat vaguely, to the right to know the truth; one has to treat this single phrase as qualifying everything else that it says, much of which is otherwise unqualified. Focusing on this one phrase seems to require being rather selective about the evidence on the basis of which one interprets the original discussion.
9.22.2011 | 10:51pm
Brandon says:
Since Deacon Russell has been unnecessarily abusive on the matter from the beginning, perhaps it's worthwhile to point out that his repeated references to Newman are misguided; the debate Newman references in the Lying and Equivocation section appended to the Apologia is specifically the debate over whether equivocations were lies. Newman is facing Kingsley's accusation that Catholics in general (and Newman in particular) are loose about lying, and the Catholic allowance of legitimate occasions for equivocation is one of the reasons for the charge. Thus Newman in this section notes that, in fact, there is quite a bit of debate, both Catholic and Protestant, on the issues covered by equivocation, and that even if equivocations are considered lies, there are kinds of lies that Anglican theologians have considered permissible. (Newman's own claim on the subject of equivocation, which he qualifies by pointing out that he is not at home in matters of casuistry, is that, like any candid Englishman, he would rather sin by lying, if the case were extreme enough, than equivocate; as he says, there is a sort of truth in Luther's phrase, "Sin boldly".)
A danger of the discussion is that Newman early on makes a clear distinction between material lies and formal lies; and most of the time in his discussion when he says 'lie' it clearly in context means 'material lie' (Newman doesn't, however, make clear whether he means by this something false said without deliberate intention to mislead, or something said that is deliberately misleading but not false; his examples fall into both groups.) The debate over equivocation shows that people are not in complete agreement over the permissibility of material lies, and that there are particular kinds of material lies where there is a live debate over whether it in fact has the formal element, and thus is condemnable as lying. The point of Newman's discussion is to show (1) that there are several different Catholic positions on the subject, so Kingsley is wrong to pretend that there is one and only one Catholic doctrine of equivocation, represented by St. Alphonsus Liguori; and (2) that the same disputes and claims arise in Protestant (and especially Anglican) moral theology, so Kingsley is wrong to pretend that it is a purely Catholic matter.
Reading some kind of ongoing theological dispute about whether deceiving someone with falsehoods is always wrong is seeing ghosts between the lines.
A danger of the discussion is that Newman early on makes a clear distinction between material lies and formal lies; and most of the time in his discussion when he says 'lie' it clearly in context means 'material lie' (Newman doesn't, however, make clear whether he means by this something false said without deliberate intention to mislead, or something said that is deliberately misleading but not false; his examples fall into both groups.) The debate over equivocation shows that people are not in complete agreement over the permissibility of material lies, and that there are particular kinds of material lies where there is a live debate over whether it in fact has the formal element, and thus is condemnable as lying. The point of Newman's discussion is to show (1) that there are several different Catholic positions on the subject, so Kingsley is wrong to pretend that there is one and only one Catholic doctrine of equivocation, represented by St. Alphonsus Liguori; and (2) that the same disputes and claims arise in Protestant (and especially Anglican) moral theology, so Kingsley is wrong to pretend that it is a purely Catholic matter.
Reading some kind of ongoing theological dispute about whether deceiving someone with falsehoods is always wrong is seeing ghosts between the lines.
9.23.2011 | 3:45am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Brandon--"unnecessarily abusive" is hardly a fair assessment of my comments, but, if anyone *does* feel unnecessarily abused, you have my apology for making you feel that way.
I would propose that it is unnecessarily abusive to have been accused of magisterial dissent because I merely wish to be told the genuine *history* of who, when, where, and how a longstanding theological debate has been *resolved* by the living and genuine Teaching Authority of the Church founded by Christ, which is decidedly *not* in the business of using star chamber tactics or secrecy to "resolve" matters of faith and morals, meaning that such a resolution and teaching should be accessible to the faithful.
If you wish to make the claim that this occurred before Newman and that Newman's comments have nothing to do with the several views of Catholic theological schools on the permissibility of speaking falsehood without falling into "lying", then by all means make it. If the Magisterium spoke and resolved this issue *prior* to Newman, then cite the *pre*-Newman teaching.
While I believe the Newman essay *does* reference the long-held Christian debate, I will be happy to amend my belief once you have identified the pre-Newman teaching and it becomes clear that the Magisterium actually *has* "settled" this. ...
Brandon--this is sooooo simple, soooo basic. The Pope and bishops have been aware, since the early Church Fathers, of diverging theological views on what "lying" is and what it is not. *Saints* have held diverging views on this.
Catechisms don't add magisterial "weight" to the various teachings contained therein. If one cannot find an official act of universal teaching from the Pope and bishops on a matter, then that content is typically called "common teaching" and constitutes NON-magisterial content as it does not derive directly from the Pope and bishops.
The Church has relied upon "common teaching" regarding lying. The common teaching establishes the genuine but generic category of an intrinsically evil act associated with the eighth commandment. But this teaching necessarily leaves room for further refinement and for theological *opinion*.
When the discussion is whether it's okay to "speak falsehood" as a form of self-defense, we're squarely in the realm of theological opinion that touches upon a common teaching that we find in the various Catechisms produced by the Church (even some by the Magisterium); but the common teaching of the catechisms is not per se "magisterial", nor does a catechism address or resolve matters of theological opinion.
Hence my insistence that those who seem to claim the "magisterium" is on "their side" of this theological debate should--maybe, just maybe--actually produce a *teaching* from the Magisterium the proves the Magisterium has settled the debate....
Now is that really asking too much?
So far, no teaching has been discovered or produced. Which leaves BOTH sides of the "Live Action" question in the realm of theological opinion.....
Hope this helps.
I would propose that it is unnecessarily abusive to have been accused of magisterial dissent because I merely wish to be told the genuine *history* of who, when, where, and how a longstanding theological debate has been *resolved* by the living and genuine Teaching Authority of the Church founded by Christ, which is decidedly *not* in the business of using star chamber tactics or secrecy to "resolve" matters of faith and morals, meaning that such a resolution and teaching should be accessible to the faithful.
If you wish to make the claim that this occurred before Newman and that Newman's comments have nothing to do with the several views of Catholic theological schools on the permissibility of speaking falsehood without falling into "lying", then by all means make it. If the Magisterium spoke and resolved this issue *prior* to Newman, then cite the *pre*-Newman teaching.
While I believe the Newman essay *does* reference the long-held Christian debate, I will be happy to amend my belief once you have identified the pre-Newman teaching and it becomes clear that the Magisterium actually *has* "settled" this. ...
Brandon--this is sooooo simple, soooo basic. The Pope and bishops have been aware, since the early Church Fathers, of diverging theological views on what "lying" is and what it is not. *Saints* have held diverging views on this.
Catechisms don't add magisterial "weight" to the various teachings contained therein. If one cannot find an official act of universal teaching from the Pope and bishops on a matter, then that content is typically called "common teaching" and constitutes NON-magisterial content as it does not derive directly from the Pope and bishops.
The Church has relied upon "common teaching" regarding lying. The common teaching establishes the genuine but generic category of an intrinsically evil act associated with the eighth commandment. But this teaching necessarily leaves room for further refinement and for theological *opinion*.
When the discussion is whether it's okay to "speak falsehood" as a form of self-defense, we're squarely in the realm of theological opinion that touches upon a common teaching that we find in the various Catechisms produced by the Church (even some by the Magisterium); but the common teaching of the catechisms is not per se "magisterial", nor does a catechism address or resolve matters of theological opinion.
Hence my insistence that those who seem to claim the "magisterium" is on "their side" of this theological debate should--maybe, just maybe--actually produce a *teaching* from the Magisterium the proves the Magisterium has settled the debate....
Now is that really asking too much?
So far, no teaching has been discovered or produced. Which leaves BOTH sides of the "Live Action" question in the realm of theological opinion.....
Hope this helps.
9.23.2011 | 6:10am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Brandon:
Regarding Newman and your take versus mine on his work on lying and equivocation, I want to point out how and why Newman most definitely indicates a *plurality* of views on lying, both Protestant *and* Catholic, that existed simultaneously in his time.
His piece begins with *eight* different views on lying. He then says:
"I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this: the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a justa causa, an untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that there can be no just cause of untruth. In these later times, this doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.
Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies."
So, I'm curious as to how and why you are trying to separate the evidence in Newman from the claim that the "unsettled" discussion was still underway in Newman's time???? His focus on the issue of equivocation in no way diminishes the fact that he recognized the plurality and *continuity* of discussion on what constitutes lying among theological schools throughout the whole of Christian (Catholic) history up to the "later ages" he was living in....
Regarding Newman and your take versus mine on his work on lying and equivocation, I want to point out how and why Newman most definitely indicates a *plurality* of views on lying, both Protestant *and* Catholic, that existed simultaneously in his time.
His piece begins with *eight* different views on lying. He then says:
"I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this: the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a justa causa, an untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that there can be no just cause of untruth. In these later times, this doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.
Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies."
So, I'm curious as to how and why you are trying to separate the evidence in Newman from the claim that the "unsettled" discussion was still underway in Newman's time???? His focus on the issue of equivocation in no way diminishes the fact that he recognized the plurality and *continuity* of discussion on what constitutes lying among theological schools throughout the whole of Christian (Catholic) history up to the "later ages" he was living in....
9.23.2011 | 6:28am
Alexander R Pruss says:
I think Brandon is exactly right. In the Tradition, there are questions of detail that deal with equivocation that have not been settled, and that the Catechism does not treat as settled. But there is no significant controversy in the Tradition that (a) lying is always wrong, and (b) every case where one knows that one is unequivocally and deceitfully asserting what one knows to be a falsehood is a case of lying (note that I am not saying that these are the only cases of lying--there are some minor technical issues as below).
Now, let's think about the Grotius-inspired idea that a lie can only be made to someone with a right to the truth, which some Catholics have followed Grotius in. Remember that the Church uses language in the ordinary sense, unless this is specified implicitly or explicitly in some other way. In the ordinary sense of the word "lie", the word (and its versions in Greek and Latin) simply does not, and did not, mean anything like deceitful assertion to someone who has a right to the truth. I bet that if one asks speakers of English, Greek or Latin what it is that Rahab did, almost universally they will say: "She lied", and that this is true both of people who think Rahab acted completely rightly and of those who think she acted at least in part wrongly.
In fact, even Grotius *agrees* with me on this point. He says: "To the common notion of a lie, then, it is required that what is said, written, conveyed by signs or gestures, cannot be understood otherwise than in that sense which differs from the mind of the utterer." In other words, the common notion of a lie is that of an unambiguous assertion contrary to the mind of the utterer. Grotius then goes on: "But to this laxer notion of a lie in general, must be added some stricter proper difference, to define a lie, as unlawful by Natural Law: and this difference ... [is] a discrepancy with some existing and permanent right of the person to whom the words or signs are addressed".
So, Grotius starts with the ordinary sense, and then offers a new stricter sense, perhaps so that he can continue to say that lying is always wrong like earlier natural lawyers did. But the ordinary sense is the sense in which traditional Catholic teaching is to be understood.
Now, of course there is room for discussion of detail, and in the recent centuries much of that focused on the question of ambiguity (i.e., equivocation). There are also other issues of finer detail as to what "lying" is being currently discussed by analytic philosophers. But this discussion does not affect the Live Action stuff--those cases, as far as I can tell, include lies, and to say otherwise is to use the word "lie" in a contrived sense.
Now, let's think about the Grotius-inspired idea that a lie can only be made to someone with a right to the truth, which some Catholics have followed Grotius in. Remember that the Church uses language in the ordinary sense, unless this is specified implicitly or explicitly in some other way. In the ordinary sense of the word "lie", the word (and its versions in Greek and Latin) simply does not, and did not, mean anything like deceitful assertion to someone who has a right to the truth. I bet that if one asks speakers of English, Greek or Latin what it is that Rahab did, almost universally they will say: "She lied", and that this is true both of people who think Rahab acted completely rightly and of those who think she acted at least in part wrongly.
In fact, even Grotius *agrees* with me on this point. He says: "To the common notion of a lie, then, it is required that what is said, written, conveyed by signs or gestures, cannot be understood otherwise than in that sense which differs from the mind of the utterer." In other words, the common notion of a lie is that of an unambiguous assertion contrary to the mind of the utterer. Grotius then goes on: "But to this laxer notion of a lie in general, must be added some stricter proper difference, to define a lie, as unlawful by Natural Law: and this difference ... [is] a discrepancy with some existing and permanent right of the person to whom the words or signs are addressed".
So, Grotius starts with the ordinary sense, and then offers a new stricter sense, perhaps so that he can continue to say that lying is always wrong like earlier natural lawyers did. But the ordinary sense is the sense in which traditional Catholic teaching is to be understood.
Now, of course there is room for discussion of detail, and in the recent centuries much of that focused on the question of ambiguity (i.e., equivocation). There are also other issues of finer detail as to what "lying" is being currently discussed by analytic philosophers. But this discussion does not affect the Live Action stuff--those cases, as far as I can tell, include lies, and to say otherwise is to use the word "lie" in a contrived sense.
9.23.2011 | 6:43am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Mr. Pruss:
Newman says, "Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies."
Newman thus indicates a theological "school" of the "later age" which says that there are "untruths which are not lies."
This is the very species we are focused on re the "Live Action" issue--you refer to telling an untruth to PP as a lie, while others would categorize that action as speaking an untruth which is *not* a lie (i.e. *not* intrinsically evil, not immoral).
And thus I continue to ask for the *magisterial* statement that negates the school of thought referenced as alive and well in the "later age" that adheres to the view that there are "untruths which are not lies."
Simple as that....
Newman says, "Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies."
Newman thus indicates a theological "school" of the "later age" which says that there are "untruths which are not lies."
This is the very species we are focused on re the "Live Action" issue--you refer to telling an untruth to PP as a lie, while others would categorize that action as speaking an untruth which is *not* a lie (i.e. *not* intrinsically evil, not immoral).
And thus I continue to ask for the *magisterial* statement that negates the school of thought referenced as alive and well in the "later age" that adheres to the view that there are "untruths which are not lies."
Simple as that....
9.23.2011 | 7:34am
Michael PS says:
The following propositions have been condemned by the Magisterium
Innocent XI – From the Decree of the Holy Office, Mar. 4, 1679
26. If anyone swears, either alone or in the presence of others, whether questioned or of his own will, whether for sake of recreation or for some other purpose, that he did not do something, which in fact he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way than that by which he did it, or some other added truth, in fact does not lie and is no perjurer.
27. A just reason for using these ambiguous words exists, as often as it is necessary or useful to guard the well-being of the body, honour, property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealing of the truth is then regarded as expedient and zealous.
All condemned and prohibited, as they are here expressed, at least as scandalous and in practice pernicious.
Innocent XI – From the Decree of the Holy Office, Mar. 4, 1679
26. If anyone swears, either alone or in the presence of others, whether questioned or of his own will, whether for sake of recreation or for some other purpose, that he did not do something, which in fact he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way than that by which he did it, or some other added truth, in fact does not lie and is no perjurer.
27. A just reason for using these ambiguous words exists, as often as it is necessary or useful to guard the well-being of the body, honour, property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealing of the truth is then regarded as expedient and zealous.
All condemned and prohibited, as they are here expressed, at least as scandalous and in practice pernicious.
9.23.2011 | 8:04am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Michael PS--
Thank you for citing a couple of Pope Innocent's statements against the errors of "laxism" from 1679. Indeed, this is practically the only magisterial "moment" in which any stuff of the eighth commandment is really addressed (in this case a particularly erroneous form of and application of mental reservation). The first proposition has to do with using mental reservation under oath, and the second has to do with using mental reservation practically willy-nilly to conceal truth.
The laxists needed correction, to be sure. But, this is not a magisterial statement that resolves the loooong history of diverging theological views on whether all spoken untruths are intrinsically evil lies....
But this *is* the only magisterial document I've ever found that even really addresses 8th-commandment stuff....
Thank you for citing a couple of Pope Innocent's statements against the errors of "laxism" from 1679. Indeed, this is practically the only magisterial "moment" in which any stuff of the eighth commandment is really addressed (in this case a particularly erroneous form of and application of mental reservation). The first proposition has to do with using mental reservation under oath, and the second has to do with using mental reservation practically willy-nilly to conceal truth.
The laxists needed correction, to be sure. But, this is not a magisterial statement that resolves the loooong history of diverging theological views on whether all spoken untruths are intrinsically evil lies....
But this *is* the only magisterial document I've ever found that even really addresses 8th-commandment stuff....
9.23.2011 | 8:27am
Alexander R Pruss says:
Deacon Russell:
While I have not been able to track down a primary source, the old Catholic Encyclopedia (s.v. lying) says that a decretal of Innocent III forbade lying to save a life. It also says that from around the middle of the 18th century, there arose "a few discordant voices", including some who shifted the definition of lying.
My guess is that a little bit of discord arose a bit earlier than the Catholic Encyclopedia gives it credit for, maybe around the time of Grotius, but that it only became particularly noticeable around the 18th century.
Do you have quotes from anybody prior to Grotius who says that it's not a lie to assert unambiguous falsehoods?
While I have not been able to track down a primary source, the old Catholic Encyclopedia (s.v. lying) says that a decretal of Innocent III forbade lying to save a life. It also says that from around the middle of the 18th century, there arose "a few discordant voices", including some who shifted the definition of lying.
My guess is that a little bit of discord arose a bit earlier than the Catholic Encyclopedia gives it credit for, maybe around the time of Grotius, but that it only became particularly noticeable around the 18th century.
Do you have quotes from anybody prior to Grotius who says that it's not a lie to assert unambiguous falsehoods?
9.23.2011 | 8:29am
Remember Rollen says:
I appreciate the first-rate responses from the authors.
When we think about the authors' proposed basis of the moral prohibition against false assertion, we seem to find three distinct bases. First, we find the suggestion that the prohibition arises from the constitutive purpose of the act of assertion: false assertion is wrong because it violates the constitutive purpose of this particular act. Standing alone, however, this is not a plausible account. Even if it is constitutive of assault that the agent intends to harm the victim, the agent doesn't wrong anyone by virtue of lacking that intent. (One response to this would be that, in such cases, the agent is not really assaulting anyone, and, hence, no constitutive standard is violated. But then we could also say that the liar is not really engaging in the act of assertion.)
The second proposed basis of the moral prohibition has a less formal character (relying instead upon more substantive claims about the content of morality). This second proposal is that false assertion violates the victim's rights, or that is "contrary to the love that we owe to all." Standing alone, however, these claims also do not convincingly show that Corrie's false assertion about the Jews' location would wrong the Nazi--especially given the fact that the authors concede that it wouldn't be wrong for Corrie to intentionally deceive the Nazi concerning this matter. Since the authors agree that it isn't deception per se that violates the Nazi's rights (or is "contrary to the love that we owe to all"), we're forced back to find our guidance from the first, and more formal, proposal. But have we now gained anything to supplement that first proposal? If so, I don't see it.
The third proposed basis concerns the agent's "integrity." Here we find the following claim: "If false assertion violates this integrity, and this integrity is always good, then false assertion is always wrong, even when done for good purposes." This is not a convincing argument. We might plausibly think that integrity is either sometimes compatible with false assertion, or that (the attempt to preserve) integrity is not always good. In precisely those situations with which we are concerned (hiding the Jews from the Nazi), the proposed incompatibility of false assertion and integrity makes integrity's preservation seem suspiciously self-involved, having very little to do with the rights of others or "the love that we owe to all."
Perhaps there is a way to unify these three proposed bases into a more satisfying defense. As they stand, however, not one of these bases is very convincing, and their collection together seems ad hoc.
When we think about the authors' proposed basis of the moral prohibition against false assertion, we seem to find three distinct bases. First, we find the suggestion that the prohibition arises from the constitutive purpose of the act of assertion: false assertion is wrong because it violates the constitutive purpose of this particular act. Standing alone, however, this is not a plausible account. Even if it is constitutive of assault that the agent intends to harm the victim, the agent doesn't wrong anyone by virtue of lacking that intent. (One response to this would be that, in such cases, the agent is not really assaulting anyone, and, hence, no constitutive standard is violated. But then we could also say that the liar is not really engaging in the act of assertion.)
The second proposed basis of the moral prohibition has a less formal character (relying instead upon more substantive claims about the content of morality). This second proposal is that false assertion violates the victim's rights, or that is "contrary to the love that we owe to all." Standing alone, however, these claims also do not convincingly show that Corrie's false assertion about the Jews' location would wrong the Nazi--especially given the fact that the authors concede that it wouldn't be wrong for Corrie to intentionally deceive the Nazi concerning this matter. Since the authors agree that it isn't deception per se that violates the Nazi's rights (or is "contrary to the love that we owe to all"), we're forced back to find our guidance from the first, and more formal, proposal. But have we now gained anything to supplement that first proposal? If so, I don't see it.
The third proposed basis concerns the agent's "integrity." Here we find the following claim: "If false assertion violates this integrity, and this integrity is always good, then false assertion is always wrong, even when done for good purposes." This is not a convincing argument. We might plausibly think that integrity is either sometimes compatible with false assertion, or that (the attempt to preserve) integrity is not always good. In precisely those situations with which we are concerned (hiding the Jews from the Nazi), the proposed incompatibility of false assertion and integrity makes integrity's preservation seem suspiciously self-involved, having very little to do with the rights of others or "the love that we owe to all."
Perhaps there is a way to unify these three proposed bases into a more satisfying defense. As they stand, however, not one of these bases is very convincing, and their collection together seems ad hoc.
9.23.2011 | 8:47am
Chris Tollefsen says:
What is this loooong history? In the West, to repeat, for at least 1200 years, Augustine's teaching was repeated by just about everybody, saints, popes, you name it -- it has a very strong claim to be the teaching of the Church's ordinary magisterium. It was assumed to be true by the defenders of equivocation; it seems presupposed by Innocent's condemnation; it was what Roman Catholics believed. Yes there were early saints who had different views; but (a) their work is conceptually not on par with Augustine's or Aquinas's as regards what they are talking about, so (b) it is not always easy to tell whether they are defending what Augustine is condemning; and (c) again, the Roman Church overwhelmingly followed Augustine.
Perhaps more to the point, though: The drafters of the Catechism, and JPII who approved it, desired that it express the teaching of the Church (not limiting itself to those teachings that had been authoritatively declared). If there is no teaching, or the teaching is unsettled (something different from its being the case that the teaching might not in fact be true) then it would be very odd for the Catechism to present X as the teaching. And the Catechism *does* present X -- that lying, understood as false assertion with intent to deceive -- as always wrong. Is the Catechism in error in presenting this as the Church's teaching? The same could be said for the Catechism of the Council of Trent: was it presenting something as the teaching when there is no such thing?
Perhaps more to the point, though: The drafters of the Catechism, and JPII who approved it, desired that it express the teaching of the Church (not limiting itself to those teachings that had been authoritatively declared). If there is no teaching, or the teaching is unsettled (something different from its being the case that the teaching might not in fact be true) then it would be very odd for the Catechism to present X as the teaching. And the Catechism *does* present X -- that lying, understood as false assertion with intent to deceive -- as always wrong. Is the Catechism in error in presenting this as the Church's teaching? The same could be said for the Catechism of the Council of Trent: was it presenting something as the teaching when there is no such thing?
9.23.2011 | 9:03am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Should I refer to you as Alexander, Mr. Pruss, or Dr. Pruss? I'm not sure which is correct or preferred...but, you wrote:
***Do you have quotes from anybody prior to Grotius who says that it's not a lie to assert unambiguous falsehoods?****
The same "lying" article you referenced states: "There is some difference of opinion among the Fathers of the Christian Church. Origen quotes Plato and approves of his doctrine on this point (Stromata, VI). He says that a man who is under the necessity of lying should diligently consider the matter so as not to exceed. He should gulp the lie as a sick man does his medicine. He should be guided by the example of Judith, Esther, and Jacob. If he exceed, he will be judged the enemy of Him who said, "I am the Truth." St. John Chrysostom held that it is lawful to deceive others for their benefit, and Cassian taught that we may sometimes lie as we take medicine, driven to it by sheer necessity. "
Among the Ancient Greeks and in both Judaism and Christianity, the issue of permissibility of speaking falsehood has been debated and disagreed upon.
***Do you have quotes from anybody prior to Grotius who says that it's not a lie to assert unambiguous falsehoods?****
The same "lying" article you referenced states: "There is some difference of opinion among the Fathers of the Christian Church. Origen quotes Plato and approves of his doctrine on this point (Stromata, VI). He says that a man who is under the necessity of lying should diligently consider the matter so as not to exceed. He should gulp the lie as a sick man does his medicine. He should be guided by the example of Judith, Esther, and Jacob. If he exceed, he will be judged the enemy of Him who said, "I am the Truth." St. John Chrysostom held that it is lawful to deceive others for their benefit, and Cassian taught that we may sometimes lie as we take medicine, driven to it by sheer necessity. "
Among the Ancient Greeks and in both Judaism and Christianity, the issue of permissibility of speaking falsehood has been debated and disagreed upon.
9.23.2011 | 9:18am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
@Chris Tollefsen:
Yes, it's quite true that Augustine is at the heart of the *common teaching* on lying found in the Catholic Church and the CCC (not to mention Trent). If you are making the claim that this teaching is part of the ordinary universal *magisterium*, then you should be able to determine when it moved from common teaching to "magisterial" teaching, especially given that theological schools had the freedom to propose alternatives to the common teaching throughout Christian history--and I claim they still do.
Regarding the Catechism, the presence of the common teaching on lying *in* the CCC does not "elevate" that teaching from common teaching to something magisterial. Common teaching may be the prevailing theological opinion on a subject, but it is by defintion not emanating from the magisterium. Common teaching can also change and develop beyond its stated formulas from one era to another.
The common teaching expresses the core truth and meaning of what it is to lie. We *need* the fundamental expression that defines lying. But we cannot dismiss the other voices in the theological chorus or somehow claim that what was "common teaching" is now magisterial just because it's in the CCC. What's in *any* catechism is no more or less authoritative that it original *source*.
The original source for the teaching on lying in the CCC is not magisterial--it's common teaching.
Yes, it's quite true that Augustine is at the heart of the *common teaching* on lying found in the Catholic Church and the CCC (not to mention Trent). If you are making the claim that this teaching is part of the ordinary universal *magisterium*, then you should be able to determine when it moved from common teaching to "magisterial" teaching, especially given that theological schools had the freedom to propose alternatives to the common teaching throughout Christian history--and I claim they still do.
Regarding the Catechism, the presence of the common teaching on lying *in* the CCC does not "elevate" that teaching from common teaching to something magisterial. Common teaching may be the prevailing theological opinion on a subject, but it is by defintion not emanating from the magisterium. Common teaching can also change and develop beyond its stated formulas from one era to another.
The common teaching expresses the core truth and meaning of what it is to lie. We *need* the fundamental expression that defines lying. But we cannot dismiss the other voices in the theological chorus or somehow claim that what was "common teaching" is now magisterial just because it's in the CCC. What's in *any* catechism is no more or less authoritative that it original *source*.
The original source for the teaching on lying in the CCC is not magisterial--it's common teaching.
9.23.2011 | 10:24am
Alexander R Pruss says:
Deacon Russell:
I am not sure why it matters whether it is the teaching of the ordinary magisterium or non-infallible magisterial teaching. The teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium is authoritative and binding. For those of us further bound by Canon 833.5-8 (e.g., Catholics who teach morals at a university), we are required to profess "With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgement or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed."
As for the Origen quote, it does not give an example of what I asked for. I asked for someone "prior to Grotius who says that it's not a lie to assert unambiguous falsehoods". Origen is not an example of that. He is, instead, an example of someone who says that sometimes it is OK to lie.
We need to separate the following two questions:
1. What does the word "lie" mean in the ordinary language in which Church teachings are phrased?
2. When, if ever, is it permissible to lie?
Given the statements from popes like Innocent III, the answer to #2 is negative. So the question is now about #1. And here I think the answer is quite clear, at least as to broad outlines that don't affect the Live Action case.
I am not sure why it matters whether it is the teaching of the ordinary magisterium or non-infallible magisterial teaching. The teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium is authoritative and binding. For those of us further bound by Canon 833.5-8 (e.g., Catholics who teach morals at a university), we are required to profess "With firm faith, I also believe everything contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down in Tradition, which the Church, either by a solemn judgement or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium, sets forth to be believed as divinely revealed."
As for the Origen quote, it does not give an example of what I asked for. I asked for someone "prior to Grotius who says that it's not a lie to assert unambiguous falsehoods". Origen is not an example of that. He is, instead, an example of someone who says that sometimes it is OK to lie.
We need to separate the following two questions:
1. What does the word "lie" mean in the ordinary language in which Church teachings are phrased?
2. When, if ever, is it permissible to lie?
Given the statements from popes like Innocent III, the answer to #2 is negative. So the question is now about #1. And here I think the answer is quite clear, at least as to broad outlines that don't affect the Live Action case.
9.23.2011 | 12:12pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
@Alexander Pruss:
You wrote:
****"I am not sure why it matters whether it is the teaching of the ordinary magisterium or non-infallible magisterial teaching. The teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium is authoritative and binding."*****
I didn't distinguish between ordinary magisterium and "non-infallible magisterial teaching" in what I was saying. I've stated that the teaching on lying is *common teaching* (Cf. Ludwig Ott's classifications) arising from theological opinion that pertains to the *eighth commandment* and *not* from magisterial sources. This ultimately means that, of *course* we have an authoritative and binding teaching (from Scripture in this case) on the intrinsic evil of an act we call "lying." The *articulation* of that teaching arises from theological opinion, *not* the Magisterium itself. Even a statement from a pope (e.g., Innocent III) needs to be evaluated to determine whether it's "magisterial"[--e.g., "Jesus of Nazareth" is an entire book of "non-magisterial" teaching from Pope Benedict....]
Ott states: "Common teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally."
I'm saying that the teaching on lying in the CCC is common teaching.
I'm also saying that, according to Ott's schema of theological grades of certainty, the opinions of John Chrysostom, Origen and other saints and Church Fathers who disagreed with Augustine/Aquinas (as well as I daresay the opinions of Janet Smith, Peter Kreeft, and others) are *not* opinions of dissent against "magisterial teaching", but rather are at *least* "opinio tolerata", which according to Ott is the "least" degree of theological certainty but is an opinion "tolerated" by the Church.
You wrote:
****"I am not sure why it matters whether it is the teaching of the ordinary magisterium or non-infallible magisterial teaching. The teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium is authoritative and binding."*****
I didn't distinguish between ordinary magisterium and "non-infallible magisterial teaching" in what I was saying. I've stated that the teaching on lying is *common teaching* (Cf. Ludwig Ott's classifications) arising from theological opinion that pertains to the *eighth commandment* and *not* from magisterial sources. This ultimately means that, of *course* we have an authoritative and binding teaching (from Scripture in this case) on the intrinsic evil of an act we call "lying." The *articulation* of that teaching arises from theological opinion, *not* the Magisterium itself. Even a statement from a pope (e.g., Innocent III) needs to be evaluated to determine whether it's "magisterial"[--e.g., "Jesus of Nazareth" is an entire book of "non-magisterial" teaching from Pope Benedict....]
Ott states: "Common teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally."
I'm saying that the teaching on lying in the CCC is common teaching.
I'm also saying that, according to Ott's schema of theological grades of certainty, the opinions of John Chrysostom, Origen and other saints and Church Fathers who disagreed with Augustine/Aquinas (as well as I daresay the opinions of Janet Smith, Peter Kreeft, and others) are *not* opinions of dissent against "magisterial teaching", but rather are at *least* "opinio tolerata", which according to Ott is the "least" degree of theological certainty but is an opinion "tolerated" by the Church.
9.23.2011 | 12:26pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
One more thing (for Alexander Pruss):
You wrote: "Given the statements from popes like Innocent III, the answer to #2 is negative."
Can you actually cite for me statements (plural) from popes (plural) like Innocent III, or do you actually mean Given the statement *from* Pope Innocent III (singular)?
BIG difference, since the Innocent III "statement" is from a papal "decretal", and we both know a "decretal" is not a universal teaching statement of the Pope but rather is a papal response to a specific question/case that renders a decision for that specific case. Right?
You wrote: "Given the statements from popes like Innocent III, the answer to #2 is negative."
Can you actually cite for me statements (plural) from popes (plural) like Innocent III, or do you actually mean Given the statement *from* Pope Innocent III (singular)?
BIG difference, since the Innocent III "statement" is from a papal "decretal", and we both know a "decretal" is not a universal teaching statement of the Pope but rather is a papal response to a specific question/case that renders a decision for that specific case. Right?
9.23.2011 | 5:16pm
Robert Hagedorn says:
But is Saint Augustine's exegesis of the 2nd and 3rd chapters of Genesis correct? No one seems able to answer this question. Too difficult for modern minds I guess. Do a search: First Scandal.
9.24.2011 | 5:02am
bill bannon says:
Alexander R. Pruss,
The profession you are required to affirm says "the ordinary and universal magisterium". The ordinary magisterium is wider than that...."ordinary AND universal" subset. That is to say that which is universal in the ordinary magisterium is smaller in scope than that which is simply ordinary. There can be mistakes in the larger ordinary magisterium but there are no mistakes in the smaller area which is "ordinary" and "universal".
Hence in 1521 after Exsurge Domine by Pope Leo X (vis a vis proposition 33 of Luther's objection to burning heretics... condemned as against the Catholic Faith), your interpretation would have had you bound to defend burning heretics which would later be implicitly condemned by Vatican II's non coercion mandates for religion. Burning heretics seemed to Leo X to be "universal and ordinary" but in fact it was of the wider category..."ordinary" but not universal. Pope Nicholas I had condemned all torture in 866 A.D. and burning heretics was done by seculars until 1253 when a Pope made it mandatory for seculars under pain of excommunication (see old encyclopedia at New Advent: Inquisition).
Thus in the wide scope of history, support for burning heretics was "ordinary magisterium" (the wider category) not "universal and ordinary" (the smaller subset
that you affirmed in your oath). If you defend everything in the catechism as "universal", you are going too far...especially in the unfortunate case of the death penalty section which inappropriately includes an unsupported sociological estimation of the effectiveness of life sentences which protect society in some small Euro nations but which surely are not working in Mexico which has no death penalty and incredible murder numbers.
Forbidding interest on personal non business loans seemed to be both "ordinary" and "universal" until the 1830's when the Vatican in a series of answers to dubia, granted that moderate interest could be charged. In retrospect the usury position seemed universal but was not....it was simply "ordinary" and widespread spatially but not timewise.
Your oath looked at carefully as to that word "AND"...universal and ordinary....
does not require you to treat the entire catechism as the equivalent of de fide.
Otherwise Catholicism is a massive conformity that must support burning heretics in previous centuries...until it does an about face and condemns it in section 80 of Splendor of the Truth and in Vatican II. Our teachers then become incapable of the integrity whereby they could have objected to burning heretics much earlier than they did.
The profession you are required to affirm says "the ordinary and universal magisterium". The ordinary magisterium is wider than that...."ordinary AND universal" subset. That is to say that which is universal in the ordinary magisterium is smaller in scope than that which is simply ordinary. There can be mistakes in the larger ordinary magisterium but there are no mistakes in the smaller area which is "ordinary" and "universal".
Hence in 1521 after Exsurge Domine by Pope Leo X (vis a vis proposition 33 of Luther's objection to burning heretics... condemned as against the Catholic Faith), your interpretation would have had you bound to defend burning heretics which would later be implicitly condemned by Vatican II's non coercion mandates for religion. Burning heretics seemed to Leo X to be "universal and ordinary" but in fact it was of the wider category..."ordinary" but not universal. Pope Nicholas I had condemned all torture in 866 A.D. and burning heretics was done by seculars until 1253 when a Pope made it mandatory for seculars under pain of excommunication (see old encyclopedia at New Advent: Inquisition).
Thus in the wide scope of history, support for burning heretics was "ordinary magisterium" (the wider category) not "universal and ordinary" (the smaller subset
that you affirmed in your oath). If you defend everything in the catechism as "universal", you are going too far...especially in the unfortunate case of the death penalty section which inappropriately includes an unsupported sociological estimation of the effectiveness of life sentences which protect society in some small Euro nations but which surely are not working in Mexico which has no death penalty and incredible murder numbers.
Forbidding interest on personal non business loans seemed to be both "ordinary" and "universal" until the 1830's when the Vatican in a series of answers to dubia, granted that moderate interest could be charged. In retrospect the usury position seemed universal but was not....it was simply "ordinary" and widespread spatially but not timewise.
Your oath looked at carefully as to that word "AND"...universal and ordinary....
does not require you to treat the entire catechism as the equivalent of de fide.
Otherwise Catholicism is a massive conformity that must support burning heretics in previous centuries...until it does an about face and condemns it in section 80 of Splendor of the Truth and in Vatican II. Our teachers then become incapable of the integrity whereby they could have objected to burning heretics much earlier than they did.
9.24.2011 | 10:12am
Chris Tollefsen says:
The following points seem important in light of Deacon Russell's questions.
Deacon Russell has characterized the Catechism's claims about lying as the Church's "common teaching". If this means "the teaching of the ordinary magisterium" we would have no problem with that; the teaching would command religious assent, which is what we claimed in our essay.
If, however, it means merely the "common theological opinion", then we disagree. It seems on its face odd to think that the Catechism would include merely theological opinions, presented as apparently normative or moral claims for the acceptance of the faithful and use in catechesis.
Deacon Russell has made a claim that is true about such normative claims as are found in the Catechism -- claims such as those made about suicide: that is is contrary to the just love of self, the love of neighbor, and love of God. The Catechism's inclusion of these claims does not of itself give these claims more authority than they had "going in".
Nevertheless, the promulgation of the Catechism is a magisterial act. What kind of act? The act of teaching with magisterial, but not necessarily infallible, authority what claims, including moral claims, are in fact taught by the Church.
If a moral norm is taught by the Church, then, unlike what is merely the common opinion of theologians, it is to be received with religious assent. So if the Catechism is doing what we say it is doing, then both its clam about what is taught, and the claim itself, should be received with religious assent.
Is the claim that the Catechism teaches with authority "what it is that the Church teaches" true? Well, it would appear that in the Apostolic Constitution, Pope John Paul II, by an act of Papal, though not necessarily infallible, authority, makes precisely this claim about the Catechism:
"The Catechism of the Catholic Church...is a statement of the Church's faith and of Catholic doctrine, attested to or illumined by Sacred Scripture, the Apostolic Tradition, and the Church's Magisterium. I declare it to be a sure norm for teaching the faith and thus a valid and legitimate instrument for ecclesial communion."
Bishop John Meyers made similar points in a 1993 address, which are worth quoting:
"If a correct pastoral stance demands that one stand with the Church, then any doctrine or discipline which is truly normative is significant for that stance. The Catechism of the Catholic Church is clearly normative, in my judgement, from several points of view.
First of all, the Apostolic Constitution Fidei Depositum by which the Holy Father promulgated the Catechism, has binding force. Also, the various elements of the Catechism retain the force which they hold from other magisterial sources. Then, too, the effects of the Apostolic Constitution of October 11, 1992, are lasting, The Pope acted "by virtue of his apostolic authority." He termed the Catechism "...a statement of the Church's faith and of Catholic Teaching." In his talk of December 7, 1992, celebrating the gift of the Catechism, he termed it "an authentic text" containing "revealed truth, genuine and entire.
Consider Canon 754 of the Code of Canon Law:
All of Christ's faithful are obliged to observe the constitutions and decrees which lawful ecclesiastical authority issues for the purpose of proposing doctrine or of prescribing erroneous opinions; this holds particularly for those published by the Roman Pontiff or the College of Bishops.
Second, the Catechism is an act of the Magisterium. It is a practical catechetical norm for everyone engaged in catechetical activity in the Church.
Certain doctrines may require the assent of "divine and Catholic faith" if they have been proclaimed as divinely revealed by the solemn magisterium or the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church (see Canon 750). All are bound to shun any contrary doctrines. Other teachings, not proposed as divinely revealed, require "a religious assent of intellect and will." (Lumen Gentium 25; Canon 752) Moreover, "Christ's faithful are therefore to insure that they avoid whatever does not accord with that doctrine.""
Accordingly, we think that the Catechism teaches that a particular teaching about lying -- that it is always wrong -- is the Church's teaching. We believe both teachings should be accepted with religious assent of intellect and will. Bishop Meyers does not suggest that there is some third category of claims to be found in the Catechism -- common theological opinions, and this seems correct.
This still leaves many questions unresolved -- what, for example, are the specific obligations of someone resolved to give religious assent to a teaching of the Church? What sorts of questions may one raise about that teaching, and about the Catechism's teaching about that teaching (and about the Pope's teaching about the Catechism's teaching..)? On what grounds did the drafters and promulgators of the Catechism believe that what they presented as the Church's teaching on lying really was the Church's teaching? Were those grounds sound? And so on. But we think the claim we made in our essay, about the teaching demanding religious assent, is sound.
Deacon Russell has characterized the Catechism's claims about lying as the Church's "common teaching". If this means "the teaching of the ordinary magisterium" we would have no problem with that; the teaching would command religious assent, which is what we claimed in our essay.
If, however, it means merely the "common theological opinion", then we disagree. It seems on its face odd to think that the Catechism would include merely theological opinions, presented as apparently normative or moral claims for the acceptance of the faithful and use in catechesis.
Deacon Russell has made a claim that is true about such normative claims as are found in the Catechism -- claims such as those made about suicide: that is is contrary to the just love of self, the love of neighbor, and love of God. The Catechism's inclusion of these claims does not of itself give these claims more authority than they had "going in".
Nevertheless, the promulgation of the Catechism is a magisterial act. What kind of act? The act of teaching with magisterial, but not necessarily infallible, authority what claims, including moral claims, are in fact taught by the Church.
If a moral norm is taught by the Church, then, unlike what is merely the common opinion of theologians, it is to be received with religious assent. So if the Catechism is doing what we say it is doing, then both its clam about what is taught, and the claim itself, should be received with religious assent.
Is the claim that the Catechism teaches with authority "what it is that the Church teaches" true? Well, it would appear that in the Apostolic Constitution, Pope John Paul II, by an act of Papal, though not necessarily infallible, authority, makes precisely this claim about the Catechism:
"The Catechism of the Catholic Church...is a statement of the Church's faith and of Catholic doctrine, attested to or illumined by Sacred Scripture, the Apostolic Tradition, and the Church's Magisterium. I declare it to be a sure norm for teaching the faith and thus a valid and legitimate instrument for ecclesial communion."
Bishop John Meyers made similar points in a 1993 address, which are worth quoting:
"If a correct pastoral stance demands that one stand with the Church, then any doctrine or discipline which is truly normative is significant for that stance. The Catechism of the Catholic Church is clearly normative, in my judgement, from several points of view.
First of all, the Apostolic Constitution Fidei Depositum by which the Holy Father promulgated the Catechism, has binding force. Also, the various elements of the Catechism retain the force which they hold from other magisterial sources. Then, too, the effects of the Apostolic Constitution of October 11, 1992, are lasting, The Pope acted "by virtue of his apostolic authority." He termed the Catechism "...a statement of the Church's faith and of Catholic Teaching." In his talk of December 7, 1992, celebrating the gift of the Catechism, he termed it "an authentic text" containing "revealed truth, genuine and entire.
Consider Canon 754 of the Code of Canon Law:
All of Christ's faithful are obliged to observe the constitutions and decrees which lawful ecclesiastical authority issues for the purpose of proposing doctrine or of prescribing erroneous opinions; this holds particularly for those published by the Roman Pontiff or the College of Bishops.
Second, the Catechism is an act of the Magisterium. It is a practical catechetical norm for everyone engaged in catechetical activity in the Church.
Certain doctrines may require the assent of "divine and Catholic faith" if they have been proclaimed as divinely revealed by the solemn magisterium or the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church (see Canon 750). All are bound to shun any contrary doctrines. Other teachings, not proposed as divinely revealed, require "a religious assent of intellect and will." (Lumen Gentium 25; Canon 752) Moreover, "Christ's faithful are therefore to insure that they avoid whatever does not accord with that doctrine.""
Accordingly, we think that the Catechism teaches that a particular teaching about lying -- that it is always wrong -- is the Church's teaching. We believe both teachings should be accepted with religious assent of intellect and will. Bishop Meyers does not suggest that there is some third category of claims to be found in the Catechism -- common theological opinions, and this seems correct.
This still leaves many questions unresolved -- what, for example, are the specific obligations of someone resolved to give religious assent to a teaching of the Church? What sorts of questions may one raise about that teaching, and about the Catechism's teaching about that teaching (and about the Pope's teaching about the Catechism's teaching..)? On what grounds did the drafters and promulgators of the Catechism believe that what they presented as the Church's teaching on lying really was the Church's teaching? Were those grounds sound? And so on. But we think the claim we made in our essay, about the teaching demanding religious assent, is sound.
9.24.2011 | 12:55pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Dear Mr. Tollefsen--this is first class. Thank you for approaching this so conscientiously.
I think we might be able to bridge a gap here, especially regarding the perceived disagreement on "common" versus "magisterial" teaching.
The gap may arise because I've not aptly stated the kind of "both/and" I perceive at work here in the CCC teaching on lying.
In one sense, what I'm trying to say about the CCC teaching on lying is that it's not "just" "magisterial". It's *hyper*-magisterial if you will, because the teaching on lying comes not from magisterial teaching directly, but from *Scripture* directly--the 8th Commandment.
We can't dispute or disagree with the CCC on lying because it articulates the *constant* teaching of the Church that there *is* an intrinsic evil called "lying", defined as best we could in the terms found in the CCC. This is ironclad.
Now for the "both/and" part.
However, alongside this reality is the question that theologians have debated for centuries: "We *know* there is lying. We *know* it's intrinsically evil. But, are there conditions under which "speaking falsehood" is permissible and possibly even laudable???"
The *history* of this debate is clear. Equally clear is the silence of the Magisterium in addressing the debate. Furthermore, as you rightly point out above, the CCC is *not* supposed to teach "theological opinion".
The questions then become: "Absent any other evidence from the Magisterium, does the teaching on lying found in the CCC actually touch upon the realm of 'theological opinion' in which the centuries of theological discussion and theorizing has occurred? If it touches on the realm of theological opinion, then does it *resolve* or 'settle' the issue?"
My response is that, based upon the written evidence found in the General Catechetical Directory (1997) and in the Ratzinger/Schonborn book "Introduction to the Catechism of the Catholic Church," it is clear that catechisms are *not* supposed to resolve or settle theological disputes or teach theological opinion.
The "both/and" is that the CCC does teach what I'm calling a "hyper-magisterial" truth--the doctrine that establishes an intrinsically evil species of moral act called lying. AND, the CCC steers clear of the as-yet-unresolved content of "theological opinion" in which the lying "debate" has existed for centuries.
The CCC *is* magisterial--according to the Ratzinger/Schonborn work, its magisterial identity is found in its integral unity (which is one reason they opted *not* to have the CCC contain info on "degrees" of theological certitude for each teaching). But this doesn't mean that every teaching therein arises *from* the Magisterium directly.
My focus on that issue, I think, has caused me to conflate the essential points I've tried to make--and it may have come out sounding like I'm trying to dispense with the CCC teaching altogether.
But I'm not. I've been trying to get folks away from making the claim that the "Magisterium" is on "their" side of the lying debate, because it's not.
In saying so, I still obey the teaching on lying in the CCC, derived as it is from the "hyper-magisterial" source of Scripture. And I still claim that all the debating on what lying is and is not *remains* the stuff of theological opinion, which the CCC cannot really directly touch upon, in virtue of its purpose as defined in the General Catechetical Directory and the CCC's foundational documents.
Maybe this will move us closer to consensus?
Once again, thank you and God bless you for carefully and charitably considering all this.
I think we might be able to bridge a gap here, especially regarding the perceived disagreement on "common" versus "magisterial" teaching.
The gap may arise because I've not aptly stated the kind of "both/and" I perceive at work here in the CCC teaching on lying.
In one sense, what I'm trying to say about the CCC teaching on lying is that it's not "just" "magisterial". It's *hyper*-magisterial if you will, because the teaching on lying comes not from magisterial teaching directly, but from *Scripture* directly--the 8th Commandment.
We can't dispute or disagree with the CCC on lying because it articulates the *constant* teaching of the Church that there *is* an intrinsic evil called "lying", defined as best we could in the terms found in the CCC. This is ironclad.
Now for the "both/and" part.
However, alongside this reality is the question that theologians have debated for centuries: "We *know* there is lying. We *know* it's intrinsically evil. But, are there conditions under which "speaking falsehood" is permissible and possibly even laudable???"
The *history* of this debate is clear. Equally clear is the silence of the Magisterium in addressing the debate. Furthermore, as you rightly point out above, the CCC is *not* supposed to teach "theological opinion".
The questions then become: "Absent any other evidence from the Magisterium, does the teaching on lying found in the CCC actually touch upon the realm of 'theological opinion' in which the centuries of theological discussion and theorizing has occurred? If it touches on the realm of theological opinion, then does it *resolve* or 'settle' the issue?"
My response is that, based upon the written evidence found in the General Catechetical Directory (1997) and in the Ratzinger/Schonborn book "Introduction to the Catechism of the Catholic Church," it is clear that catechisms are *not* supposed to resolve or settle theological disputes or teach theological opinion.
The "both/and" is that the CCC does teach what I'm calling a "hyper-magisterial" truth--the doctrine that establishes an intrinsically evil species of moral act called lying. AND, the CCC steers clear of the as-yet-unresolved content of "theological opinion" in which the lying "debate" has existed for centuries.
The CCC *is* magisterial--according to the Ratzinger/Schonborn work, its magisterial identity is found in its integral unity (which is one reason they opted *not* to have the CCC contain info on "degrees" of theological certitude for each teaching). But this doesn't mean that every teaching therein arises *from* the Magisterium directly.
My focus on that issue, I think, has caused me to conflate the essential points I've tried to make--and it may have come out sounding like I'm trying to dispense with the CCC teaching altogether.
But I'm not. I've been trying to get folks away from making the claim that the "Magisterium" is on "their" side of the lying debate, because it's not.
In saying so, I still obey the teaching on lying in the CCC, derived as it is from the "hyper-magisterial" source of Scripture. And I still claim that all the debating on what lying is and is not *remains* the stuff of theological opinion, which the CCC cannot really directly touch upon, in virtue of its purpose as defined in the General Catechetical Directory and the CCC's foundational documents.
Maybe this will move us closer to consensus?
Once again, thank you and God bless you for carefully and charitably considering all this.
9.24.2011 | 4:18pm
bill bannon says:
Alexander R. Pruss,
The profession you are required to affirm says "the ordinary and universal magisterium". The ordinary magisterium is wider than that....wider than the "ordinary AND universal" subset. That is to say that which is universal in the ordinary magisterium is smaller in scope than that which is simply ordinary. There can be mistakes in the larger ordinary magisterium but there are no mistakes in the smaller area which is "ordinary" and "universal". But even Popes have erred in thinking their issue was "of the Faith" when it was not.
Hence in 1521 after Exsurge Domine by Pope Leo X (vis a vis proposition 33 of Luther's objection to burning heretics... condemned as "against the Catholic Faith"), your interpretation would have had you bound at that time to defend burning heretics because a Pope said so in stern words...a position which would later be implicitly condemned by Vatican II's non coercion mandates for religion. Burning heretics seemed to Leo X to be "universal and ordinary" but in fact it was of the wider category..."ordinary" but not universal. Pope Nicholas I long before him had condemned all torture in 866 A.D. and burning heretics, a torturous death, was done by seculars until 1253 when Pope Innocent IV made it mandatory for seculars under pain of excommunication (see old encyclopedia at New Advent: Inquisition).
Thus in the wide scope of history, support for burning heretics was "ordinary magisterium" (the wider category) not "universal and ordinary" (the smaller, higher level subset that you affirmed in your oath). If you defend everything in the catechism as "universal", you are going too far...especially in the unfortunate case of the death penalty section which inappropriately includes an unsupported sociological estimation of the effectiveness of life sentences ("modern penology") which protect society in some small Euro nations perhaps but which surely are not working in Mexico and much of Latin America where no death penalty is the norm along with incredible murder rate numbers (wiki has Catholic (79%) El Salvador and Catholic (97%) Honduras as the two worst countries in the world for murder...no death penalty in either).
Forbidding interest on personal non business loans seemed to be both "ordinary" and "universal" until the 1830's when the Vatican in a series of answers to dubia, granted that moderate interest could be charged as Calvin had averred three years prior against both Luther and Catholicism. In retrospect the usury position seemed universal but was not....it was simply "ordinary" and widespread spatially but not timewise.
Your oath looked at carefully as to that word "AND"...universal and ordinary....
does not require you to treat the entire catechism as the equivalent of de fide.
Otherwise Catholicism is a massive conformity wherein professors must support burning heretics in previous centuries ( from 1253 til late 18th century)...until Rome does an about face and condemns torture in section 80 of Splendor of the Truth and in Vatican II. Our teachers then become incapable of the integrity whereby they could have objected to burning heretics much earlier than they did.
The profession you are required to affirm says "the ordinary and universal magisterium". The ordinary magisterium is wider than that....wider than the "ordinary AND universal" subset. That is to say that which is universal in the ordinary magisterium is smaller in scope than that which is simply ordinary. There can be mistakes in the larger ordinary magisterium but there are no mistakes in the smaller area which is "ordinary" and "universal". But even Popes have erred in thinking their issue was "of the Faith" when it was not.
Hence in 1521 after Exsurge Domine by Pope Leo X (vis a vis proposition 33 of Luther's objection to burning heretics... condemned as "against the Catholic Faith"), your interpretation would have had you bound at that time to defend burning heretics because a Pope said so in stern words...a position which would later be implicitly condemned by Vatican II's non coercion mandates for religion. Burning heretics seemed to Leo X to be "universal and ordinary" but in fact it was of the wider category..."ordinary" but not universal. Pope Nicholas I long before him had condemned all torture in 866 A.D. and burning heretics, a torturous death, was done by seculars until 1253 when Pope Innocent IV made it mandatory for seculars under pain of excommunication (see old encyclopedia at New Advent: Inquisition).
Thus in the wide scope of history, support for burning heretics was "ordinary magisterium" (the wider category) not "universal and ordinary" (the smaller, higher level subset that you affirmed in your oath). If you defend everything in the catechism as "universal", you are going too far...especially in the unfortunate case of the death penalty section which inappropriately includes an unsupported sociological estimation of the effectiveness of life sentences ("modern penology") which protect society in some small Euro nations perhaps but which surely are not working in Mexico and much of Latin America where no death penalty is the norm along with incredible murder rate numbers (wiki has Catholic (79%) El Salvador and Catholic (97%) Honduras as the two worst countries in the world for murder...no death penalty in either).
Forbidding interest on personal non business loans seemed to be both "ordinary" and "universal" until the 1830's when the Vatican in a series of answers to dubia, granted that moderate interest could be charged as Calvin had averred three years prior against both Luther and Catholicism. In retrospect the usury position seemed universal but was not....it was simply "ordinary" and widespread spatially but not timewise.
Your oath looked at carefully as to that word "AND"...universal and ordinary....
does not require you to treat the entire catechism as the equivalent of de fide.
Otherwise Catholicism is a massive conformity wherein professors must support burning heretics in previous centuries ( from 1253 til late 18th century)...until Rome does an about face and condemns torture in section 80 of Splendor of the Truth and in Vatican II. Our teachers then become incapable of the integrity whereby they could have objected to burning heretics much earlier than they did.
9.24.2011 | 7:49pm
MG says:
re: remarks by Deacon Jim Russell at 12:55 p.m.
I take it you are saying, among other things, (a) that the Church does indeed teach that all lying is wicked, and (b) that there is a legitimate theological debate about which forms of evasive speech are not wicked.
Concerning (b), it seems pretty safe to say that *some* forms of evasive speech are, at least sometimes, not wicked. E.g., you ask me a question that's too personal, so I just smoothly change the subject. But that's clearly not lying in the first place--it's not an exception to the prohibition against lying, because it's not lying at all. And there's no doubt about this--it's not a vexed question whether changing the subject is lying. It just isn't.
Now, you seem to be saying that even if things like changing the subject are obviously not cases of lying, nonetheless there is still a legitimate debate over what counts as lying (and hence as wicked). Thinking along such lines, it might be thought promising to defend someone who says "There are no Jews in my basement" on the grounds that it's not really a lie to say this.
This strikes me as wrong. Here I'm echoing some of Alex Pruss's remarks earlier. Unless we have reasons to think otherwise, the Church uses "lying" in the ordinary sense, and it seems that when you believe yourself to have Jews in your basement, and yet you assert that you don't, that you are lying. (There's no question about when asserting something one doesn't believe is a lie, because it always is--that's just what "lying" means.)
I sympathize with those who want to allow statements like "There are no Jews in my basement." But it seems to me that someone--like you--who agrees that all lying is condemned by the Church can't allow such statements. Certain kinds of evasions or tricky expressions might be such that it's hard to decide whether they are lies or not, but a straightforward statement of the sort being discussed here is, it seems to me, just clearly a lie. If it's allowable, that will have to be because lying is sometimes OK; if lying is never OK, then such straightforward assertions will have to be always wrong.
Michael Gorman
School of Philosophy
The Catholic University of America
I take it you are saying, among other things, (a) that the Church does indeed teach that all lying is wicked, and (b) that there is a legitimate theological debate about which forms of evasive speech are not wicked.
Concerning (b), it seems pretty safe to say that *some* forms of evasive speech are, at least sometimes, not wicked. E.g., you ask me a question that's too personal, so I just smoothly change the subject. But that's clearly not lying in the first place--it's not an exception to the prohibition against lying, because it's not lying at all. And there's no doubt about this--it's not a vexed question whether changing the subject is lying. It just isn't.
Now, you seem to be saying that even if things like changing the subject are obviously not cases of lying, nonetheless there is still a legitimate debate over what counts as lying (and hence as wicked). Thinking along such lines, it might be thought promising to defend someone who says "There are no Jews in my basement" on the grounds that it's not really a lie to say this.
This strikes me as wrong. Here I'm echoing some of Alex Pruss's remarks earlier. Unless we have reasons to think otherwise, the Church uses "lying" in the ordinary sense, and it seems that when you believe yourself to have Jews in your basement, and yet you assert that you don't, that you are lying. (There's no question about when asserting something one doesn't believe is a lie, because it always is--that's just what "lying" means.)
I sympathize with those who want to allow statements like "There are no Jews in my basement." But it seems to me that someone--like you--who agrees that all lying is condemned by the Church can't allow such statements. Certain kinds of evasions or tricky expressions might be such that it's hard to decide whether they are lies or not, but a straightforward statement of the sort being discussed here is, it seems to me, just clearly a lie. If it's allowable, that will have to be because lying is sometimes OK; if lying is never OK, then such straightforward assertions will have to be always wrong.
Michael Gorman
School of Philosophy
The Catholic University of America
9.25.2011 | 12:35am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Dear Dr. Tollefsen:
I think I can shed a bit more light on a topic you raise above when you wrote:
***If, however, it means merely the "common theological opinion", then we disagree. It seems on its face odd to think that the Catechism would include merely theological opinions, presented as apparently normative or moral claims for the acceptance of the faithful and use in catechesis.***
Again using the Ludwig Ott definition of "common teaching," [Ott states: "Common teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally."], we can ask, "Is it fitting--or possible--for a universal catechism such as either Trent or the CCC to contain some elements of 'common teaching' which still belong to the 'field of the free opinions'"?
In reference to the teaching on lying, then we would be asking, "Is what I'm calling a "hyper-magisterial" truth (the intrinsically evil category of lying arising from the 8th Commandment) expressed in Trent and the CCC not in authoritative "magisterial" language arising from the teaching of pope and bishops but rather in the language arising from the 'common teaching' 'accepted by theologians generally'?"
My proposed answer would be "yes", based on an example each from Trent and from the CCC.
First, let's establish with one example that the dominant "Augustine/Aquinas" approach and definition of lying *is* viewed as "common teaching" by the Church. Exhibit A would be the Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Lying", which reads in part:
"But if the common teaching of Catholic theology on this point be admitted, and we grant that lying is always wrong, it follows that we are never justified in telling a lie, for we may not do evil that good may come: the end does not justify the means."
So, the early-20th-Century resource equates a standard Augustine/Aquinas expression as being "the common teaching of Catholic theology."
This view then matches what Ott calls "common teaching" as well--basically a "majority view" among theologians.
Basically, this *is* the core teaching found both in Trent and the CCC.
BUT, there *are* some obvious distinctions also to be found in the teachings on lying found in those two sources. For example, Trent is pretty explicit when it comes to prohibiting "jocose lies" (a "lie" told for amusement--you say a falsehood to a friend; the friend believes it, you say "no, I'm just kidding"--you both laugh about it). The CCC does not even address this category. Why the difference?
Another perhaps "obvious" aspect of the CCC's use of "common teaching" on lying is the fact that it practically takes the Augustine definition of lying verbatim and references Augustine's work in a footnote. Augustine's work on lying would seem to be a non-magisterial text authored by him as a "private theologian" (as opposed to being a teaching document of a bishop in his diocese). This, too, would seem to be a form of the "common teaching" on lying being relied upon by a universal catechism trying to teach the faithful about lying.
If the "common teaching" on lying is relied upon to teach a "hyper-magisterial" truth, it would only be because the Pope and bishops have *not* taught very directly themselves on this truth. This doesn't mean the "truth" is not "true" in this case. It is, but it's expressed in the language of "common teaching" and therefore has at least one foot firmly planted in the "field of the free opinions."
This would be because, as you and I agree, being "in" the CCC does not add any additional "weight" to the teaching. The teaching *remains* "common teaching."
This would explain the variations from Trent to the CCC. It would also mean that the Magisterium isn't quite "finished" on this one and is relying on the expressions of theologians which are themselves...potentially "adjustable," let's say. I mean, a "universal catechism" has to say *something* about lying, even if the Magisterium itself has said little.
This effectively would mean that today there *is* a freedom for theologians to continue discussion/debate on what constitutes lying *despite* the fact that the CCC adheres most closely to an Augustine/Aquinas perspective.
Common teaching in, common teaching out. The expression of that teaching is clearly different from the universal catechism of Trent to today's CCC.
This would mean that *neither* side in the "Live Action sting" issue can really claim the "magisterial" high ground. The Augustine/Aquinas approach *can* claim to be the dominant view of theologians, but the less dominant view is *still* a view tolerated by the Magisterium.
Hope this is helpful. And thanks once more for such an illuminating exchange of ideas.
I think I can shed a bit more light on a topic you raise above when you wrote:
***If, however, it means merely the "common theological opinion", then we disagree. It seems on its face odd to think that the Catechism would include merely theological opinions, presented as apparently normative or moral claims for the acceptance of the faithful and use in catechesis.***
Again using the Ludwig Ott definition of "common teaching," [Ott states: "Common teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally."], we can ask, "Is it fitting--or possible--for a universal catechism such as either Trent or the CCC to contain some elements of 'common teaching' which still belong to the 'field of the free opinions'"?
In reference to the teaching on lying, then we would be asking, "Is what I'm calling a "hyper-magisterial" truth (the intrinsically evil category of lying arising from the 8th Commandment) expressed in Trent and the CCC not in authoritative "magisterial" language arising from the teaching of pope and bishops but rather in the language arising from the 'common teaching' 'accepted by theologians generally'?"
My proposed answer would be "yes", based on an example each from Trent and from the CCC.
First, let's establish with one example that the dominant "Augustine/Aquinas" approach and definition of lying *is* viewed as "common teaching" by the Church. Exhibit A would be the Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Lying", which reads in part:
"But if the common teaching of Catholic theology on this point be admitted, and we grant that lying is always wrong, it follows that we are never justified in telling a lie, for we may not do evil that good may come: the end does not justify the means."
So, the early-20th-Century resource equates a standard Augustine/Aquinas expression as being "the common teaching of Catholic theology."
This view then matches what Ott calls "common teaching" as well--basically a "majority view" among theologians.
Basically, this *is* the core teaching found both in Trent and the CCC.
BUT, there *are* some obvious distinctions also to be found in the teachings on lying found in those two sources. For example, Trent is pretty explicit when it comes to prohibiting "jocose lies" (a "lie" told for amusement--you say a falsehood to a friend; the friend believes it, you say "no, I'm just kidding"--you both laugh about it). The CCC does not even address this category. Why the difference?
Another perhaps "obvious" aspect of the CCC's use of "common teaching" on lying is the fact that it practically takes the Augustine definition of lying verbatim and references Augustine's work in a footnote. Augustine's work on lying would seem to be a non-magisterial text authored by him as a "private theologian" (as opposed to being a teaching document of a bishop in his diocese). This, too, would seem to be a form of the "common teaching" on lying being relied upon by a universal catechism trying to teach the faithful about lying.
If the "common teaching" on lying is relied upon to teach a "hyper-magisterial" truth, it would only be because the Pope and bishops have *not* taught very directly themselves on this truth. This doesn't mean the "truth" is not "true" in this case. It is, but it's expressed in the language of "common teaching" and therefore has at least one foot firmly planted in the "field of the free opinions."
This would be because, as you and I agree, being "in" the CCC does not add any additional "weight" to the teaching. The teaching *remains* "common teaching."
This would explain the variations from Trent to the CCC. It would also mean that the Magisterium isn't quite "finished" on this one and is relying on the expressions of theologians which are themselves...potentially "adjustable," let's say. I mean, a "universal catechism" has to say *something* about lying, even if the Magisterium itself has said little.
This effectively would mean that today there *is* a freedom for theologians to continue discussion/debate on what constitutes lying *despite* the fact that the CCC adheres most closely to an Augustine/Aquinas perspective.
Common teaching in, common teaching out. The expression of that teaching is clearly different from the universal catechism of Trent to today's CCC.
This would mean that *neither* side in the "Live Action sting" issue can really claim the "magisterial" high ground. The Augustine/Aquinas approach *can* claim to be the dominant view of theologians, but the less dominant view is *still* a view tolerated by the Magisterium.
Hope this is helpful. And thanks once more for such an illuminating exchange of ideas.
9.25.2011 | 6:43am
bill bannon says:
Michael Gorman
What then is Christ doing when the apostles plead with Him to succor the Canaanite woman and He announces, "I have been sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Israel". Yet moments later He answers her request because she perseveres. And in another incident with a gentile centurion, Christ does not even mention being restricted to helping Jews but helps the centurion straightway. His original statement then about being so restricted to Israel was a ploy....not a joke...but a serious sentence that was untrue as to stricture level whose goal as Abbot Thomas Keating has pointed was to stretch her faith from point A to point B.
Ergo there is a range of serious misrepresentations that are not lies in Scripture's view....Jehu and Judith demonstrate others.
What then is Christ doing when the apostles plead with Him to succor the Canaanite woman and He announces, "I have been sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Israel". Yet moments later He answers her request because she perseveres. And in another incident with a gentile centurion, Christ does not even mention being restricted to helping Jews but helps the centurion straightway. His original statement then about being so restricted to Israel was a ploy....not a joke...but a serious sentence that was untrue as to stricture level whose goal as Abbot Thomas Keating has pointed was to stretch her faith from point A to point B.
Ergo there is a range of serious misrepresentations that are not lies in Scripture's view....Jehu and Judith demonstrate others.
9.25.2011 | 10:05am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
This is for both Michael Gorman and Dr. Tollefsen's consideration:
I think this runs deeper than just evasions and mental reservation and the like. I think it does run into the issue of deliberately seeking to speak falsehood but without malice.
The difficult question that remains is, in my view, that something labelled "common teaching" and defined (at least by Ott) as being in the "field of free opinions" appears in the CCC to explain the Divinely revealed commandment against one form of false witness--lying. The CCC is supposed to collect "all that is fundamental and common to the Christian life without ‘presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school’.” (1997 General Directory for Catechesis).
The difficulty *might* be resolved by the fact that "common teaching" represents not just "some" theological school but actually a "number" of theological schools all agreeing on an approach. Perhaps this is why common teaching can be used in the CCC--it's not just a proposed opinion of one group, but is agreed upon by many.
And, in the case of lying, what else is available to use to express something concrete on what lying is? Since no pre-existing official universal teaching directly from the pope and bishops explicates the meaning of lying, when you're putting together a universal catechism (either prior to the Trent Catechism or the current CCC), you have to use whatever the "next best" level of certitude might be. In this case it's "common teaching" generally accepted by at least a plural group of theological "schools."
Doing this (putting common teaching in a catechism) doesn't "settle" a debate or "elevate" common teaching to something else. But it gives the faithful the best the Church can offer to bridge the gap between something divinely revealed and our own attempt to understand that divine revelation without yet having something more definitive from the Magisterium.
One thing we *don't* want to do is "elevate" a teaching just because it's in the CCC. The document titled “Informative Dossier of the Editorial Commission of the Catechism of the Catholic Church” (June 15, 1992), drives home the same point by saying: “Its [The Catechism’s] style, rather than being apologetic, is declarative. It aims at proclaiming the Christian truth with the certainty proper to the Church, endeavouring on the one hand to respect the different levels of certainty which the Church has of the several themes, and, on the other hand, to avoid theological opinions.”
As we've learned, doing that is quite a tightrope walk when it comes to understanding what is taught about lying.
"The individual doctrines which the Catechism presents receive no other weight than that which they already possess. The weight of the Catechism itself lies in the whole. Since it transmits what the Church teaches, whoever rejects it as a whole separates himself beyond question from the faith and teaching of the Church." --Ratzinger/Schonborn, Introduction to the Catechism of the Catholic Church
I think this runs deeper than just evasions and mental reservation and the like. I think it does run into the issue of deliberately seeking to speak falsehood but without malice.
The difficult question that remains is, in my view, that something labelled "common teaching" and defined (at least by Ott) as being in the "field of free opinions" appears in the CCC to explain the Divinely revealed commandment against one form of false witness--lying. The CCC is supposed to collect "all that is fundamental and common to the Christian life without ‘presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school’.” (1997 General Directory for Catechesis).
The difficulty *might* be resolved by the fact that "common teaching" represents not just "some" theological school but actually a "number" of theological schools all agreeing on an approach. Perhaps this is why common teaching can be used in the CCC--it's not just a proposed opinion of one group, but is agreed upon by many.
And, in the case of lying, what else is available to use to express something concrete on what lying is? Since no pre-existing official universal teaching directly from the pope and bishops explicates the meaning of lying, when you're putting together a universal catechism (either prior to the Trent Catechism or the current CCC), you have to use whatever the "next best" level of certitude might be. In this case it's "common teaching" generally accepted by at least a plural group of theological "schools."
Doing this (putting common teaching in a catechism) doesn't "settle" a debate or "elevate" common teaching to something else. But it gives the faithful the best the Church can offer to bridge the gap between something divinely revealed and our own attempt to understand that divine revelation without yet having something more definitive from the Magisterium.
One thing we *don't* want to do is "elevate" a teaching just because it's in the CCC. The document titled “Informative Dossier of the Editorial Commission of the Catechism of the Catholic Church” (June 15, 1992), drives home the same point by saying: “Its [The Catechism’s] style, rather than being apologetic, is declarative. It aims at proclaiming the Christian truth with the certainty proper to the Church, endeavouring on the one hand to respect the different levels of certainty which the Church has of the several themes, and, on the other hand, to avoid theological opinions.”
As we've learned, doing that is quite a tightrope walk when it comes to understanding what is taught about lying.
"The individual doctrines which the Catechism presents receive no other weight than that which they already possess. The weight of the Catechism itself lies in the whole. Since it transmits what the Church teaches, whoever rejects it as a whole separates himself beyond question from the faith and teaching of the Church." --Ratzinger/Schonborn, Introduction to the Catechism of the Catholic Church
9.25.2011 | 11:01am
Michael PS says:
Deacon Russell
Whilst the condemned proposition No 26 is dealing explicitly with false swearing, it contains the added assertion "in fact does not lie and is no perjurer." So the condemned proposition asserts (and the condemnation must be taken to deny) that such mental reservations do not involve either lying or perjury.
This is, at least, a fair reading of what you rightly describe as the only modern Magisterial pronouncement on the subject. The actual occasion of it was the Jansenist-Jesuit controversy over casuistry generally. They are all of a piece with Alexander VII’s decrees of 24 September 1665 and 18 March 1666, targeting the same authors, rendered infamous infamous by Pascal's Les Provinciales
Whilst the condemned proposition No 26 is dealing explicitly with false swearing, it contains the added assertion "in fact does not lie and is no perjurer." So the condemned proposition asserts (and the condemnation must be taken to deny) that such mental reservations do not involve either lying or perjury.
This is, at least, a fair reading of what you rightly describe as the only modern Magisterial pronouncement on the subject. The actual occasion of it was the Jansenist-Jesuit controversy over casuistry generally. They are all of a piece with Alexander VII’s decrees of 24 September 1665 and 18 March 1666, targeting the same authors, rendered infamous infamous by Pascal's Les Provinciales
9.25.2011 | 1:22pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Hi, Michael--
I think I totally agree with your observation on the "No 26" statement.
Basically, I see it as saying that, if someone is under oath or otherwise is professing (in my words) to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth and then proceeds to use mental reservation, they've ipso facto committed a lie, because mental reservation is used to avoid stating the whole truth.
In this sense, I think it's accurate to say a magisterial document *does* in fact make clear that one cannot use mental reservation after swearing to tell the whole truth....
I think I totally agree with your observation on the "No 26" statement.
Basically, I see it as saying that, if someone is under oath or otherwise is professing (in my words) to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth and then proceeds to use mental reservation, they've ipso facto committed a lie, because mental reservation is used to avoid stating the whole truth.
In this sense, I think it's accurate to say a magisterial document *does* in fact make clear that one cannot use mental reservation after swearing to tell the whole truth....
9.25.2011 | 3:20pm
MG says:
@bill bannon
Concerning the Canaanite woman: it's a difficult text for sure!
Aquinas (In Matt 15, lect. 2) says that the meaning is that Christ is sent *first* to the Jews. This seems like a serious stretch on Aquinas's part, but it's worth considering.
Chrysostom (52nd homily on Matthew) seems to be saying that Jesus resists the woman in the full knowledge that she will persist, with the result that her great faith would be revealed to the onlookers. This suggests, I suppose, that when Jesus says things like "I'm sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Israel," he's not actually asserting this--it's more like he's putting it out there to provoke her into reacting.
Augustine (sermon 77 in Benedictine edition--not sure how to cite this, I'm working from vol. 6 of NPNF) seems to be saying that Jesus just was sent only to the Jews *in his bodily presence*--going bodily to the gentiles was the task of the apostles. Perhaps the point that gets revealed in Jesus' exchange with her is that in this or that particular case, bodily interaction with Jesus will result in some Gentile's being saved, even though he isn't (bodily) sent to that Gentile.
It's a difficult text! I won't try to comment on the others you mention.
I don't think the way through is easy, but it seems to me that the best solution will involve finding a way to do all three of the following: (a) preserve the absolute prohibition on lying; (b) deny that the Bible praises lying; (c) avoid using a problematic definition of lying.
I'll say more about a problematic definition of lying in a subsequent comment.
Michael Gorman
Concerning the Canaanite woman: it's a difficult text for sure!
Aquinas (In Matt 15, lect. 2) says that the meaning is that Christ is sent *first* to the Jews. This seems like a serious stretch on Aquinas's part, but it's worth considering.
Chrysostom (52nd homily on Matthew) seems to be saying that Jesus resists the woman in the full knowledge that she will persist, with the result that her great faith would be revealed to the onlookers. This suggests, I suppose, that when Jesus says things like "I'm sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Israel," he's not actually asserting this--it's more like he's putting it out there to provoke her into reacting.
Augustine (sermon 77 in Benedictine edition--not sure how to cite this, I'm working from vol. 6 of NPNF) seems to be saying that Jesus just was sent only to the Jews *in his bodily presence*--going bodily to the gentiles was the task of the apostles. Perhaps the point that gets revealed in Jesus' exchange with her is that in this or that particular case, bodily interaction with Jesus will result in some Gentile's being saved, even though he isn't (bodily) sent to that Gentile.
It's a difficult text! I won't try to comment on the others you mention.
I don't think the way through is easy, but it seems to me that the best solution will involve finding a way to do all three of the following: (a) preserve the absolute prohibition on lying; (b) deny that the Bible praises lying; (c) avoid using a problematic definition of lying.
I'll say more about a problematic definition of lying in a subsequent comment.
Michael Gorman
9.25.2011 | 3:34pm
MG says:
@Deacon Jim Russell
You said, "I think this runs deeper than just evasions and mental reservation and the like. I think it does run into the issue of deliberately seeking to speak falsehood but without malice."
Most of your remarks go to the question of whether the Church has taught that deliberate assertion against one's own mind is always lying--you seem to be suggesting that the Church hasn't ruled out the possibility that deliberate assertion against one's own mind is lying only when some further condition is met, e.g., "with malice."
I won't comment at the moment on how much the Church might have taught about this. I just want to raise the following point about lying itself. It's difficult--I don't mean impossible--to find an extra condition that doesn't make the prohibition on lying trivial. For example, some people define lying as deliberate assertion against one's mind *in an unjust manner." Well, if that's what lying is, then the teaching that lying is always wrong is trivial, because the wrongness of it is built into the definition! That can't be what the Church is teaching.
Now it might be difficult to say what "with malice" means without the prohibition of lying turning out to be trivial. Does "with malice" mean "with evil intent"? Then let X stand for any kind of action whatever, and consider the following: "It's always wrong to X with malice." That's true, even thought we have no idea what X is, because it's automatically wrong to do *anything* with evil intent.
So we need to find out what "with malice" means, and it can't be "with evil intent."
Michael Gorman
You said, "I think this runs deeper than just evasions and mental reservation and the like. I think it does run into the issue of deliberately seeking to speak falsehood but without malice."
Most of your remarks go to the question of whether the Church has taught that deliberate assertion against one's own mind is always lying--you seem to be suggesting that the Church hasn't ruled out the possibility that deliberate assertion against one's own mind is lying only when some further condition is met, e.g., "with malice."
I won't comment at the moment on how much the Church might have taught about this. I just want to raise the following point about lying itself. It's difficult--I don't mean impossible--to find an extra condition that doesn't make the prohibition on lying trivial. For example, some people define lying as deliberate assertion against one's mind *in an unjust manner." Well, if that's what lying is, then the teaching that lying is always wrong is trivial, because the wrongness of it is built into the definition! That can't be what the Church is teaching.
Now it might be difficult to say what "with malice" means without the prohibition of lying turning out to be trivial. Does "with malice" mean "with evil intent"? Then let X stand for any kind of action whatever, and consider the following: "It's always wrong to X with malice." That's true, even thought we have no idea what X is, because it's automatically wrong to do *anything* with evil intent.
So we need to find out what "with malice" means, and it can't be "with evil intent."
Michael Gorman
9.25.2011 | 3:53pm
MG says:
The status of the above-cited condemnation of strict mental reservation is very important. If using a strict mental reservation is wrong, then it seems that a flat-out insincere assertion is also wrong. Coming at it the other way, if a flat-out insincere assertion is sometimes OK, then it would seem to follow that Innocent XI ought not to have condemned strict mental reservations--unless Innocent's condemnation is actually pretty narrow. Condemned Error 26 mentions swearing, but it's hard to tell (without knowing the context of the condemnation, which I don't) how relevant that fact is; Condemned Error 27 doesn't, and while I don't quite agree that it condemns a defense of *trivial* use of strict mental reservation, it does mention a number of uses in a way that seems to me to limit its force somewhat. How much is hard to say.
It may be that the Church teaches clearly what lying is, but it isn't clear that it teaches it clearly! I'll definitely grant that!
However, and then I'll shut up, it seems to me that even if some kinds of insincere assertion are OK, the acts of Live Action wouldn't qualify. This isn't like lying to save a Jew in your basement from near-certain death at the hands of a Nazi who is right on your doorstep. The success of Live Action's operations comes only at the end of a long, long causal chain, one that involves many other people's actions, and the success would only amount to something like "increasing the chances that some bad people will get less funding" -- there's no immanent murder that gets averted. So even if Tollefsen & Pruss are wrong, it doesn't mean Live Action is in the clear.
It may be that the Church teaches clearly what lying is, but it isn't clear that it teaches it clearly! I'll definitely grant that!
However, and then I'll shut up, it seems to me that even if some kinds of insincere assertion are OK, the acts of Live Action wouldn't qualify. This isn't like lying to save a Jew in your basement from near-certain death at the hands of a Nazi who is right on your doorstep. The success of Live Action's operations comes only at the end of a long, long causal chain, one that involves many other people's actions, and the success would only amount to something like "increasing the chances that some bad people will get less funding" -- there's no immanent murder that gets averted. So even if Tollefsen & Pruss are wrong, it doesn't mean Live Action is in the clear.
9.25.2011 | 4:11pm
Paul Connors says:
Deacon Russell: "This view then matches what Ott calls 'common teaching' as well--basically a 'majority view' among theologians."
Deacon Russell: In this case it's 'common teaching' generally accepted by at least a plural group of theological schools.
Majority? Plural? Where do you get your proposed definition for sententia communis? After doing some research on it, I think it seems very much more accurate to take it as meaning the 'common consensus of orthodox theologians'. I.e. if there were a single orthodox school with theological weight behind it, and against a particular teaching, then that teaching could not be held as sententia communis.
And while to disagree with the sententia communis does indeed belong to the field of free opinion, this is freedom in the sense that no-one will be judged as being definitely in error if they disagree with some sententia communis. Nevertheless something that goes against the sententia communis is liable to be judged as the theological error of being "rash" and "reckless".
So, hypothetically, one could go against the sententia communis, if one did do in a very thorough, careful and respectful way. Occasionally, article writers and bloggers do this.
(The word 'consensus' has undergone some development in meaning over time. Originally it meant "Agreement in opinion; the collective unanimous opinion of a number of persons", and this is still the definition given in the latest Oxford English Dictionary. But also, it can be taken in the different meaning of "majority of opinion". Given the time-scale relevant to the current discussion, it is the former meaning which is the appropriate one. A majority theological opinion would be called a sententia communior, i.e. the more common opinion, and one level below sententia communis.)
Deacon Russell: In this case it's 'common teaching' generally accepted by at least a plural group of theological schools.
Majority? Plural? Where do you get your proposed definition for sententia communis? After doing some research on it, I think it seems very much more accurate to take it as meaning the 'common consensus of orthodox theologians'. I.e. if there were a single orthodox school with theological weight behind it, and against a particular teaching, then that teaching could not be held as sententia communis.
And while to disagree with the sententia communis does indeed belong to the field of free opinion, this is freedom in the sense that no-one will be judged as being definitely in error if they disagree with some sententia communis. Nevertheless something that goes against the sententia communis is liable to be judged as the theological error of being "rash" and "reckless".
So, hypothetically, one could go against the sententia communis, if one did do in a very thorough, careful and respectful way. Occasionally, article writers and bloggers do this.
(The word 'consensus' has undergone some development in meaning over time. Originally it meant "Agreement in opinion; the collective unanimous opinion of a number of persons", and this is still the definition given in the latest Oxford English Dictionary. But also, it can be taken in the different meaning of "majority of opinion". Given the time-scale relevant to the current discussion, it is the former meaning which is the appropriate one. A majority theological opinion would be called a sententia communior, i.e. the more common opinion, and one level below sententia communis.)
9.25.2011 | 6:13pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Hi, Paul--you wrote:
***Majority? Plural? Where do you get your proposed definition for sententia communis? ****
Ludwig Ott, "Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma." [Ott states: "Common teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally."]
Ott refers to "theologians". The 1997 GDC mentions "theological school."
I think you've helped me distinguish this more clearly. Thank you. I think when the GDC says "....without ‘presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school’," this really *can't* refer to a potential *exclusion* of "common teaching" from the CCC, since the definition of the "common teaching" *is* more broad than "only private opinion" and more broad than "some [singular] "theological school".
Rather, "common teaching," according to Ott, involves "theologians [not 'schools'] generally."
I'm not sure that I addressed your point, but your comment has certainly helped me clarify in my mind the meaning behind the GDC 1997 quote. My earlier comment theorizing "plural schools" is really unnecessary, as the GDC quote can't really be said to exclude common teaching.
And, according to the Catholic Encyclopedia, what we see in the CCC as the teaching on lying is referred in the CE article on lying as "common teaching of Catholic theology". I think it's safe to say that common teaching on lying *is* in the CCC.
BTW, others might be able to access a copy of this resource (I have not, so I don't know its quality): Fr. Boniface Ramsey's "Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient Church" in The Thomist, vol. 49, no. 4 (1985): 504-533. I cite the title here only to demonstrate the historical existence of "two traditions" in the time of the Church Fathers (I'm assuming Augustine and Chrysostom are probably the "lead" proponents of each).
***Majority? Plural? Where do you get your proposed definition for sententia communis? ****
Ludwig Ott, "Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma." [Ott states: "Common teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of the free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally."]
Ott refers to "theologians". The 1997 GDC mentions "theological school."
I think you've helped me distinguish this more clearly. Thank you. I think when the GDC says "....without ‘presenting as doctrines of the faith special interpretations which are only private opinions or the views of some theological school’," this really *can't* refer to a potential *exclusion* of "common teaching" from the CCC, since the definition of the "common teaching" *is* more broad than "only private opinion" and more broad than "some [singular] "theological school".
Rather, "common teaching," according to Ott, involves "theologians [not 'schools'] generally."
I'm not sure that I addressed your point, but your comment has certainly helped me clarify in my mind the meaning behind the GDC 1997 quote. My earlier comment theorizing "plural schools" is really unnecessary, as the GDC quote can't really be said to exclude common teaching.
And, according to the Catholic Encyclopedia, what we see in the CCC as the teaching on lying is referred in the CE article on lying as "common teaching of Catholic theology". I think it's safe to say that common teaching on lying *is* in the CCC.
BTW, others might be able to access a copy of this resource (I have not, so I don't know its quality): Fr. Boniface Ramsey's "Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient Church" in The Thomist, vol. 49, no. 4 (1985): 504-533. I cite the title here only to demonstrate the historical existence of "two traditions" in the time of the Church Fathers (I'm assuming Augustine and Chrysostom are probably the "lead" proponents of each).
9.25.2011 | 6:36pm
bill bannon says:
Michael Gorman
Very excellent answer though two of your sources are the rigorists on lying...Aquinas and Augustine. See the very first post above of the all the comments (mine) for my estimation of Aquinas' weak point of skipping verses that contradict his apriori decision on lying in the Jehu case.
I think Christ was sent firstly to the Jews but He leads those around him to believe that that precludes His helping the Canaanite woman which message was not true. Yes He knows she will persist but that does not make his misrepresentation vanish. From front to start, the Scriptures contain a level of deception in wise or heroic figures where a deception leads to growth or truth. Solomon leads the two women to believe that he will cut the baby in half (which is a
lie in some of your estimations) and it leads to exposing who is the real mother
and it leads to happiness. Does a bad tree give forth good fruit? The Bible calls Solomon wise during that time period....not a liar. It says in fact after the decision that the people saw he had "the wisdom of God" (I Kgs3:28). I think we are being black and white....and Scripture is very black, white, off white, oyster white etc. because forms of deception that we use for our talk with children (Santa is coming) the mideastern adult uses for other adults at times as anyone knows who has done business deals with people from that area including India. We'd like Christ to be us....Western White people....He was not and we resist that. He was mideastern and His saying " I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" is the same thing as Jehu saying he was going to give a sacrifice for Baal (whom he knew did not exist really) and was the same as Solomon saying: " Cut the living child in two.." Are they lies or are they histrionic, therapeutic deceptions? Western language simply is too poor to encompass truth, lies and ?#3 and ? #4. Catholic debates all over the net can go on for hours with no mention of Scripture. A Baptist debate is all scripture. Somewhere is a happy medium. Vatican II hoped for a
renewal of interest by Catholics in Scripture. It hoped for a happy medium. Scripture is telling us herein that we are too black and white on this issue.
I think there are lies, truths and histrionic statements that are technically lies but truthfully are not lies and we've got to find a new name for category three or we have a catechism that disapproves if its authors are honest bout it... of Christ and Solomon in the moments cited and which disapproves implicitly of all undercover police officers who "lie" like Judith everyday and are critical with current evidentiary laws in stopping evil. We have a paucity herein in our vaunted Western language and logic regarding nuances in verbal representations. The mideast of the Bible did not have truth and lies as the only two categories. We don't either when we talk to children and tell them their doll has to sleep now...or Santa is coming. Does that mean we'll go to the pool of fire with liars? I don't think so.
Very excellent answer though two of your sources are the rigorists on lying...Aquinas and Augustine. See the very first post above of the all the comments (mine) for my estimation of Aquinas' weak point of skipping verses that contradict his apriori decision on lying in the Jehu case.
I think Christ was sent firstly to the Jews but He leads those around him to believe that that precludes His helping the Canaanite woman which message was not true. Yes He knows she will persist but that does not make his misrepresentation vanish. From front to start, the Scriptures contain a level of deception in wise or heroic figures where a deception leads to growth or truth. Solomon leads the two women to believe that he will cut the baby in half (which is a
lie in some of your estimations) and it leads to exposing who is the real mother
and it leads to happiness. Does a bad tree give forth good fruit? The Bible calls Solomon wise during that time period....not a liar. It says in fact after the decision that the people saw he had "the wisdom of God" (I Kgs3:28). I think we are being black and white....and Scripture is very black, white, off white, oyster white etc. because forms of deception that we use for our talk with children (Santa is coming) the mideastern adult uses for other adults at times as anyone knows who has done business deals with people from that area including India. We'd like Christ to be us....Western White people....He was not and we resist that. He was mideastern and His saying " I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" is the same thing as Jehu saying he was going to give a sacrifice for Baal (whom he knew did not exist really) and was the same as Solomon saying: " Cut the living child in two.." Are they lies or are they histrionic, therapeutic deceptions? Western language simply is too poor to encompass truth, lies and ?#3 and ? #4. Catholic debates all over the net can go on for hours with no mention of Scripture. A Baptist debate is all scripture. Somewhere is a happy medium. Vatican II hoped for a
renewal of interest by Catholics in Scripture. It hoped for a happy medium. Scripture is telling us herein that we are too black and white on this issue.
I think there are lies, truths and histrionic statements that are technically lies but truthfully are not lies and we've got to find a new name for category three or we have a catechism that disapproves if its authors are honest bout it... of Christ and Solomon in the moments cited and which disapproves implicitly of all undercover police officers who "lie" like Judith everyday and are critical with current evidentiary laws in stopping evil. We have a paucity herein in our vaunted Western language and logic regarding nuances in verbal representations. The mideast of the Bible did not have truth and lies as the only two categories. We don't either when we talk to children and tell them their doll has to sleep now...or Santa is coming. Does that mean we'll go to the pool of fire with liars? I don't think so.
9.25.2011 | 6:51pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
More evidence that the CCC teaching on lying is "common teaching" (as defined by Ott somewhere above)--the Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Mental Reservation," which says:
"The name applied to a doctrine which has grown out of the common Catholic teaching about lying and which is its complement.
The Catholic doctrine on lying
According to the common Catholic teaching it is never allowable to tell a lie, not even to save human life. A lie is something intrinsically evil, and as evil may not be done that good may come of it, we are never allowed to tell a lie. However, we are also under an obligation to keep secrets faithfully, and sometimes the easiest way of fulfilling that duty is to say what is false, or to tell a lie. Writers of all creeds and of none, both ancient and modern, have frankly accepted this position. They admit the doctrine of the lie of necessity, and maintain that when there is a conflict between justice and veracity it is justice that should prevail. The common Catholic teaching has formulated the theory of mental reservation as a means by which the claims of both justice and veracity can be satisfied. "
Notice the phrase "common Catholic teaching" used *three* times above.
Note also the notice that the "theory of mental reservation" arises *from* the common teaching, which is reasonable.
So, in the 20th Century, long after the universal Catechism of Trent taught the same thing, the teaching is *still* called "common teaching".
If Ott's definition of common teaching is acceptable, then it's now *crystal* clear to me that the CCC contains "common teaching" on lying, something "generally" accepted by theologians (but not *yet* taught by the Magisterium, despite being in a magisterial document that bears magisterial "weight" by virtue of its organic unity), and something that by no means *excludes* other good-faith efforts by theologians to propose alternatives to that common teaching.
And something that, unfortunately (and I mean that sincerely), wouldn't seem to require the kind of assent the authors ascribe to it in this particular article....
"The name applied to a doctrine which has grown out of the common Catholic teaching about lying and which is its complement.
The Catholic doctrine on lying
According to the common Catholic teaching it is never allowable to tell a lie, not even to save human life. A lie is something intrinsically evil, and as evil may not be done that good may come of it, we are never allowed to tell a lie. However, we are also under an obligation to keep secrets faithfully, and sometimes the easiest way of fulfilling that duty is to say what is false, or to tell a lie. Writers of all creeds and of none, both ancient and modern, have frankly accepted this position. They admit the doctrine of the lie of necessity, and maintain that when there is a conflict between justice and veracity it is justice that should prevail. The common Catholic teaching has formulated the theory of mental reservation as a means by which the claims of both justice and veracity can be satisfied. "
Notice the phrase "common Catholic teaching" used *three* times above.
Note also the notice that the "theory of mental reservation" arises *from* the common teaching, which is reasonable.
So, in the 20th Century, long after the universal Catechism of Trent taught the same thing, the teaching is *still* called "common teaching".
If Ott's definition of common teaching is acceptable, then it's now *crystal* clear to me that the CCC contains "common teaching" on lying, something "generally" accepted by theologians (but not *yet* taught by the Magisterium, despite being in a magisterial document that bears magisterial "weight" by virtue of its organic unity), and something that by no means *excludes* other good-faith efforts by theologians to propose alternatives to that common teaching.
And something that, unfortunately (and I mean that sincerely), wouldn't seem to require the kind of assent the authors ascribe to it in this particular article....
9.25.2011 | 7:00pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
I pressed "send" too soon!
I need to clarify in my last comment that my conclusion is that the "assent" owed to the common teaching on lying in the CCC is ONE HUNDRED PERCENT, relative to the divine revelation the teaching is based upon.
[see--this is why this topic is so tricky!]
We owe full assent to the divinely revealed 8th Commandment and the existence of an intrinsically evil species we're labelling "lying" and defining according to the "common teaching"
But there is no required assent to *one* (or the other) side of the theological debate over lying that started all this....
(that's what I mean!)
I need to clarify in my last comment that my conclusion is that the "assent" owed to the common teaching on lying in the CCC is ONE HUNDRED PERCENT, relative to the divine revelation the teaching is based upon.
[see--this is why this topic is so tricky!]
We owe full assent to the divinely revealed 8th Commandment and the existence of an intrinsically evil species we're labelling "lying" and defining according to the "common teaching"
But there is no required assent to *one* (or the other) side of the theological debate over lying that started all this....
(that's what I mean!)
9.25.2011 | 7:52pm
MG says:
@bill bannon
You aren't lying if you aren't asserting. An actor on the stage who says "The sun is shining" isn't asserting anything, so he's not lying even if he knows it's dark out.
When Solomon says "Cut the baby in two," he isn't asserting anything, so he can't be lying. His words are a command, not an assertion. (This doesn't settle the question of whether he did wrong or not; I'm saying only that what he did wasn't lying--it wasn't unjustified lying or justified lying, because it simply wasn't lying at all. It wasn't even asserting a falsehood.)
By the way, I don't agree that western thinkers are very simplistic about language: our philosophical tradition offers a very rich analysis of the various ways in which language can be used (and assertion is only one such way).
To be sure, this doesn't make all the problems go away. Some of the Biblical stories are really tough to handle, because they really do appear to be cases where insincere assertions are being made. Perhaps that appearance is a false appearance--my inclination is to say that it is--but I readily grant that it's sometimes very difficult to make this argument work. (There's lots in the Bible I don't understand.)
As for telling children about Santa: I hold this to be wrong, I wish my parents hadn't done it to me, and I haven't done it to my children. Of course it's not grave evil worthy of hellfire, but I don't think we should lie to our children, even in this way. (And it is a real lie, because it's a real assertion that the person making it believes to be false.) Likewise, I don't think you should say "It's time for the doll to go to sleep"; or "The baby deer is sleeping by the side of the road" when in fact it got hit by a car.
Not, of course, that we have to tell everyone the whole truth about everything. Clearly not. I just think that when it's necessary to hide some truth, we should find a way that doesn't involve lying.
You aren't lying if you aren't asserting. An actor on the stage who says "The sun is shining" isn't asserting anything, so he's not lying even if he knows it's dark out.
When Solomon says "Cut the baby in two," he isn't asserting anything, so he can't be lying. His words are a command, not an assertion. (This doesn't settle the question of whether he did wrong or not; I'm saying only that what he did wasn't lying--it wasn't unjustified lying or justified lying, because it simply wasn't lying at all. It wasn't even asserting a falsehood.)
By the way, I don't agree that western thinkers are very simplistic about language: our philosophical tradition offers a very rich analysis of the various ways in which language can be used (and assertion is only one such way).
To be sure, this doesn't make all the problems go away. Some of the Biblical stories are really tough to handle, because they really do appear to be cases where insincere assertions are being made. Perhaps that appearance is a false appearance--my inclination is to say that it is--but I readily grant that it's sometimes very difficult to make this argument work. (There's lots in the Bible I don't understand.)
As for telling children about Santa: I hold this to be wrong, I wish my parents hadn't done it to me, and I haven't done it to my children. Of course it's not grave evil worthy of hellfire, but I don't think we should lie to our children, even in this way. (And it is a real lie, because it's a real assertion that the person making it believes to be false.) Likewise, I don't think you should say "It's time for the doll to go to sleep"; or "The baby deer is sleeping by the side of the road" when in fact it got hit by a car.
Not, of course, that we have to tell everyone the whole truth about everything. Clearly not. I just think that when it's necessary to hide some truth, we should find a way that doesn't involve lying.
9.25.2011 | 7:58pm
MG says:
@ Deacon Jim Russell (7:00 pm)
Very clearly expressed. Now I wonder what you think is the issue(s) on which legitimate debate is still allowed, and what the limits of said debate(s) are.
Maybe you can't answer this question with confidence. I wouldn't hold that against you!
Michael Gorman
Very clearly expressed. Now I wonder what you think is the issue(s) on which legitimate debate is still allowed, and what the limits of said debate(s) are.
Maybe you can't answer this question with confidence. I wouldn't hold that against you!
Michael Gorman
9.26.2011 | 5:18am
bill bannon says:
Michael Gorman,
I admire your consistency with your children though I and most would not follow you in that.
Solomon is asserting that his soldier should cut the baby in half. Christ is asserting that He has been sent only to the House of Israel. Joseph in Egypt is asserting that Benjamin will be his slave for having stolen the cup which Joseph himself put in Benjamin's bag secretly. Jehu is asserting he will sacrifice to Baal who he knows does not exist. I had an Indian woman customer in a large business deal tell me she wanted half my commission and for my president to pay her tax.
When both of us denounced her and threw her out and told her never to return, she
softly said, "Put the order through....now we know you have done your best." We took her check and put the order through.
That is the mideast. Our Bible and it's heroes are mideastern. I bid you adieu. I think the philosophy departments are bound by oath to remain within a paradigm that can't explain the biblical incidents noted. We have a simplistic non nuanced language in this area and I know you disagree...but so do I. Let a Pope publically state that Catholics should not be involved ever with undercover police work because the catechism implies they are lying like the anti abortion group. No Pope
will ever say that publically...if they know their Bible and the assertions of Solomon,
Jesus, Joseph, and Jehu.
I admire your consistency with your children though I and most would not follow you in that.
Solomon is asserting that his soldier should cut the baby in half. Christ is asserting that He has been sent only to the House of Israel. Joseph in Egypt is asserting that Benjamin will be his slave for having stolen the cup which Joseph himself put in Benjamin's bag secretly. Jehu is asserting he will sacrifice to Baal who he knows does not exist. I had an Indian woman customer in a large business deal tell me she wanted half my commission and for my president to pay her tax.
When both of us denounced her and threw her out and told her never to return, she
softly said, "Put the order through....now we know you have done your best." We took her check and put the order through.
That is the mideast. Our Bible and it's heroes are mideastern. I bid you adieu. I think the philosophy departments are bound by oath to remain within a paradigm that can't explain the biblical incidents noted. We have a simplistic non nuanced language in this area and I know you disagree...but so do I. Let a Pope publically state that Catholics should not be involved ever with undercover police work because the catechism implies they are lying like the anti abortion group. No Pope
will ever say that publically...if they know their Bible and the assertions of Solomon,
Jesus, Joseph, and Jehu.
9.26.2011 | 6:00am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Hi, Michael:
Well, I think the debate is framed by the 8th Commandment on one side, and the historical evidence regarding what has been debated previously (particularly in earliest days of the Christian faith) on the other.
That's a pretty wide-open field in some sense, given that different Church Fathers have expressed at least several views, including the view that speaking falsehood with intention to "deceive" (the more restrictive definition of lying) is sometimes okay. I think the "field of free opinions" is about as wide as that early history, largely because the Magisterium (pope and bishops officially teaching) have not yet set deliberate limits on those views.
Even the 1679 condemnation of laxist errors has less to do specifically with the theory of "mental reservation" than it does the 8th commandment, because of the context that the use of mental reservation was occuring "under oath" or in a situation in which the person is "swearing" to be telling the truth and does not tell the *whole* truth.
*Any* approach that is in contrast to the common teaching on lying, however, should be taken using great respect for that common teaching, for the Catholic principles of moral theology, and for the good of the faithful.
Likewise, as other approaches are respectfully offered and considered, those who hold to the common teaching unreservedly should be free to do so, and both approaches should acknowledge that their view is not the only view permitted by the official teaching authority of the Church, the pope and bishops, the Magisterium.
On lying, we Catholics have to use and form our consciences to the best of our abilities in order to apply the 8th commandment in our moral decisions. We *have* to use what the Magisterium offers us in the CCC, but on this particular issue we should understand that this is "common teaching" and does not automatically exclude other well-intended and reasoned theological approaches.
It's been absolutely "messy" (imagine--theology is messy!) getting this far in my thinking on this--stops and starts and points needing revision etc. But it will be a great step forward if we can have the discussion without feeling as though one side is assenting and the other side is dissenting from the legitimate and official Magisterium.
Well, I think the debate is framed by the 8th Commandment on one side, and the historical evidence regarding what has been debated previously (particularly in earliest days of the Christian faith) on the other.
That's a pretty wide-open field in some sense, given that different Church Fathers have expressed at least several views, including the view that speaking falsehood with intention to "deceive" (the more restrictive definition of lying) is sometimes okay. I think the "field of free opinions" is about as wide as that early history, largely because the Magisterium (pope and bishops officially teaching) have not yet set deliberate limits on those views.
Even the 1679 condemnation of laxist errors has less to do specifically with the theory of "mental reservation" than it does the 8th commandment, because of the context that the use of mental reservation was occuring "under oath" or in a situation in which the person is "swearing" to be telling the truth and does not tell the *whole* truth.
*Any* approach that is in contrast to the common teaching on lying, however, should be taken using great respect for that common teaching, for the Catholic principles of moral theology, and for the good of the faithful.
Likewise, as other approaches are respectfully offered and considered, those who hold to the common teaching unreservedly should be free to do so, and both approaches should acknowledge that their view is not the only view permitted by the official teaching authority of the Church, the pope and bishops, the Magisterium.
On lying, we Catholics have to use and form our consciences to the best of our abilities in order to apply the 8th commandment in our moral decisions. We *have* to use what the Magisterium offers us in the CCC, but on this particular issue we should understand that this is "common teaching" and does not automatically exclude other well-intended and reasoned theological approaches.
It's been absolutely "messy" (imagine--theology is messy!) getting this far in my thinking on this--stops and starts and points needing revision etc. But it will be a great step forward if we can have the discussion without feeling as though one side is assenting and the other side is dissenting from the legitimate and official Magisterium.
9.26.2011 | 10:20am
Gabriel says:
Bill Bannon has been bringing biblical examples of lying of which God approved – or did not disapprove. To add to these, the Talmud considers God Himself to have lied – or at least ‘amended the truth’ – for the sake of keeping the peace between a husband and wife: “At the School of R. Ishmael it was taught: Great is the cause of peace. Seeing that for its sake even the Holy One, blessed be He, modified a statement; for at first it is written, ‘My lord being old’, while afterwards it is written, ‘And I am old’.” (Talmud Bavli, Yevamot 65b, trans. Soncino). The point is that in Genesis 18:12 Sarah gives as the reason why she could not possibly conceive a child: “My Lord [i.e. Abraham] is old”. But when God reports to Abraham what Sarah says, He reports her as having said of herself “And I am old”, rather than that Abraham was old! God did not want to cause strife between Abraham and Sarah – recriminations – and so he lied to Abraham about what Sarah said, for the sake of keeping peace between them. The Rabbis of the Talmud recognised that there are multiple values which – in this fallen world of ours – vie with each other, and cannot all be instantiated together. Peace and truth are often at odds – and ‘great is the cause of peace... seeing that for its sake even the Holy One... modified a statement’.
The authors of the above article write: “despite the limits of the Nazi’s general right to the truth, the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it. To do that is contrary to the love that we owe to all.” Nollie ten Book was confronted by a Nazi who asked her if the person she was with was Jewish – because if she was, he wanted to send her to her death. If Nollie’s reasoning was the kind that the authors of this article recommend, then she must have reasoned: ‘I owe this Nazi my love, and to lie to him would be to contravene the love I owe him’. I think that is madness – but fine. Even if we grant the general thrust of that reasoning, what of the love that she owed the Jew who had come to her for help, and who had put her life in Nollie’s hands?! The author’s claim that we owe love to everyone doesn’t by any means lead to the result that Nollie should not have lied to the Nazi when he asked whether her companion was a Jew. Nollie’s owing of love applied *at least* equally to the Nazi as to the Jew who had trusted her.
I find it quite astonishing that there are people who can possibly countenance the Nollie’s terrible behaviour. There is a category in the Talmud of “the stupidly pious” (chassid shoteh). It strikes me that this is such a case – it is mindless piety taken to a place of destructiveness – piety not guided by any wisdom (Hillel used to say: “A fool cannot be [truly] pious” [Avot 2:6]).
Even if one were to insist that lying in such circumstances may be wrong – and that to lie would ‘violate some deep part of one’s being’ – even so: perhaps one should be willing to make this sacrifice to save the life of another! The desire to ‘keep one’s hands clean’ can be an utterly selfish one – and sometimes doing good for others calls for some compromises on our part, some sacrifice of our own ‘purity’ (which purity is an illusion, anyway).
The authors of the above article write: “despite the limits of the Nazi’s general right to the truth, the Nazi can also be said to have a right not to have us solicit his trust with the intention of betraying it. To do that is contrary to the love that we owe to all.” Nollie ten Book was confronted by a Nazi who asked her if the person she was with was Jewish – because if she was, he wanted to send her to her death. If Nollie’s reasoning was the kind that the authors of this article recommend, then she must have reasoned: ‘I owe this Nazi my love, and to lie to him would be to contravene the love I owe him’. I think that is madness – but fine. Even if we grant the general thrust of that reasoning, what of the love that she owed the Jew who had come to her for help, and who had put her life in Nollie’s hands?! The author’s claim that we owe love to everyone doesn’t by any means lead to the result that Nollie should not have lied to the Nazi when he asked whether her companion was a Jew. Nollie’s owing of love applied *at least* equally to the Nazi as to the Jew who had trusted her.
I find it quite astonishing that there are people who can possibly countenance the Nollie’s terrible behaviour. There is a category in the Talmud of “the stupidly pious” (chassid shoteh). It strikes me that this is such a case – it is mindless piety taken to a place of destructiveness – piety not guided by any wisdom (Hillel used to say: “A fool cannot be [truly] pious” [Avot 2:6]).
Even if one were to insist that lying in such circumstances may be wrong – and that to lie would ‘violate some deep part of one’s being’ – even so: perhaps one should be willing to make this sacrifice to save the life of another! The desire to ‘keep one’s hands clean’ can be an utterly selfish one – and sometimes doing good for others calls for some compromises on our part, some sacrifice of our own ‘purity’ (which purity is an illusion, anyway).
9.26.2011 | 11:27am
Gabriel says:
Furthermore, is one really fulfilling one’s duty of love to the Nazi by telling him that this person is a Jew? By doing that is one not making it likely that the Nazi will be led to the terrible sin or murder, or complicity in murder? To truly love him would be to protect him from doing that terrible thing to others and to himself. There is a Biblical commandment that one should not “put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). To put the Nazi is the way of becoming a murder is to put the worst kind of stumbling block before him. Loving others is just not as simple as the authors of this article seem to think it is.
Another Talmudic statement seems appropriate (I think it’s from Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:36): “Having mercy on the cruel leads to being cruel to the merciful”. That is, certain forms of love, or love in certain contexts, is so warped, as not actually to be loving any more. Loving the Nazi *in his murderousness* - say, by not lying to him when he asks if this is a Jew – is not to be loving, but to be cruel – both to him, and to everyone else.
Another Talmudic statement seems appropriate (I think it’s from Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:36): “Having mercy on the cruel leads to being cruel to the merciful”. That is, certain forms of love, or love in certain contexts, is so warped, as not actually to be loving any more. Loving the Nazi *in his murderousness* - say, by not lying to him when he asks if this is a Jew – is not to be loving, but to be cruel – both to him, and to everyone else.
9.26.2011 | 4:09pm
MG says:
I think the Nollie ten Boom case is a very bad example to use if you are trying to defend an absolute prohibition on lying. The prohibition means you may not lie; it does not at all mean that you are obliged to tell the truth.
Indeed, the whole debate only becomes interesting in those cases when you are obliged to hide some truth, and lying appears to be the only way to do so. That's what the theory of mental reservation is for: it (hopefully) gives you a way to hide some truth, but without lying.
I wonder why Nollie ten Boom told them "yes." I too find that weird or worse--maybe "stupidly pious" is exactly right. Why didn't she distract them? Or kill them? I'm glad God intervened to save the person who was betrayed by Nollie ten Boom, but I'm pretty sure (I admit I've not read the book and don't know the story beyond what was reported above) that it was a betrayal of the Jew, and that it was seriously wrong to tell the Nazis "yes."
MG
Indeed, the whole debate only becomes interesting in those cases when you are obliged to hide some truth, and lying appears to be the only way to do so. That's what the theory of mental reservation is for: it (hopefully) gives you a way to hide some truth, but without lying.
I wonder why Nollie ten Boom told them "yes." I too find that weird or worse--maybe "stupidly pious" is exactly right. Why didn't she distract them? Or kill them? I'm glad God intervened to save the person who was betrayed by Nollie ten Boom, but I'm pretty sure (I admit I've not read the book and don't know the story beyond what was reported above) that it was a betrayal of the Jew, and that it was seriously wrong to tell the Nazis "yes."
MG
9.26.2011 | 10:58pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
Deacon Russell:
"And, in the case of lying, what else is available to use to express something concrete on what lying is?"
How about just an ordinary historico-philosophical investigation into what the word "mendacium" meant in the ordinary usage of the time? After all, if for every word in a Church teaching we require another Church teaching to define the word, we get a vicious regress.
Admittedly, there are some fuzzy areas around the boundaries of the application of "lie". There is an interesting controversy in the current secular philosophical literature, whether an intent to deceive is necessary for lying, and, if so, an intent to deceive about what? (About the content of the assertion? About whether one believes the content of the assertion? About anything at all?) There are some fuzzy areas as to what exactly counts as speaking contrary to mind--in a forthcoming paper I've come up with some rather odd cases. There are also fuzzy areas around the boundaries of the application of "assert" (some of the interesting ones to me deal with Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction which Swinburne has put to good use in defending the infallibility of Scripture, as well as with salience, as in my 1999 Thomist article on lying). In these fuzzy areas, there is room for genuine disagreement whether something counts as lying.
But as far as I know there is no room for any significant controversy whether it counts as a "lie" to unambiguously assert what one knows is false (when one also knows it will be false even if one asserts it), in order to deceive one's interlocutor into believing that falsehood on the testimony of this assertion.
The Grotius definition of "lie" is just stipulative--it plainly does not reflect the ordinary use of the word, and is not intended to do so. As far as I can tell, the Church Fathers who permitted lying did just that--they permitted lying. They did not hold that the cases in question aren't cases of lying.
Mike:
I actually think that it need not be an assertion of a falsehood (and hence a lie) to say to a Nazi that one is hiding no Jews, because the salient sense of "Jew" is that given to the word by Nazi propaganda--and one has no one in the house who fits that description. I defend this in my 1999 Thomist piece. I've grown less sure of that claim, but I still find the arguments fairly convincing.
"And, in the case of lying, what else is available to use to express something concrete on what lying is?"
How about just an ordinary historico-philosophical investigation into what the word "mendacium" meant in the ordinary usage of the time? After all, if for every word in a Church teaching we require another Church teaching to define the word, we get a vicious regress.
Admittedly, there are some fuzzy areas around the boundaries of the application of "lie". There is an interesting controversy in the current secular philosophical literature, whether an intent to deceive is necessary for lying, and, if so, an intent to deceive about what? (About the content of the assertion? About whether one believes the content of the assertion? About anything at all?) There are some fuzzy areas as to what exactly counts as speaking contrary to mind--in a forthcoming paper I've come up with some rather odd cases. There are also fuzzy areas around the boundaries of the application of "assert" (some of the interesting ones to me deal with Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction which Swinburne has put to good use in defending the infallibility of Scripture, as well as with salience, as in my 1999 Thomist article on lying). In these fuzzy areas, there is room for genuine disagreement whether something counts as lying.
But as far as I know there is no room for any significant controversy whether it counts as a "lie" to unambiguously assert what one knows is false (when one also knows it will be false even if one asserts it), in order to deceive one's interlocutor into believing that falsehood on the testimony of this assertion.
The Grotius definition of "lie" is just stipulative--it plainly does not reflect the ordinary use of the word, and is not intended to do so. As far as I can tell, the Church Fathers who permitted lying did just that--they permitted lying. They did not hold that the cases in question aren't cases of lying.
Mike:
I actually think that it need not be an assertion of a falsehood (and hence a lie) to say to a Nazi that one is hiding no Jews, because the salient sense of "Jew" is that given to the word by Nazi propaganda--and one has no one in the house who fits that description. I defend this in my 1999 Thomist piece. I've grown less sure of that claim, but I still find the arguments fairly convincing.
9.27.2011 | 6:37am
Chris Tollefsen says:
Michael,
I disagree about the relevance of the Nollie story or her folly. I suspect she believed strongly and rightly that lying was always wrong, but did not carefully distinguish between this and a duty to tell the truth; I wouldn't want to condemn her for that. But more importantly, I think her story makes vividly present what it is to have faith in God in the face of an awful situation where one also thinks that certain possible ways out are intrinsically wrong. Finally, given the givens, I think Nollie is an example of the Holy Spirit's inspiration being provided to those with supreme faith. Rather than being stupidly pious, perhaps she was *very attentive* to what God wanted her to say (Augustine thinks the midwives were slightly less attentive)? Some complain that the doctrine of "equivocation" favors only the clever, but Nollie shows that God favors the faithful.
I disagree about the relevance of the Nollie story or her folly. I suspect she believed strongly and rightly that lying was always wrong, but did not carefully distinguish between this and a duty to tell the truth; I wouldn't want to condemn her for that. But more importantly, I think her story makes vividly present what it is to have faith in God in the face of an awful situation where one also thinks that certain possible ways out are intrinsically wrong. Finally, given the givens, I think Nollie is an example of the Holy Spirit's inspiration being provided to those with supreme faith. Rather than being stupidly pious, perhaps she was *very attentive* to what God wanted her to say (Augustine thinks the midwives were slightly less attentive)? Some complain that the doctrine of "equivocation" favors only the clever, but Nollie shows that God favors the faithful.
9.27.2011 | 6:50am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Hi, Dr. Pruss--
You wrote:
"Admittedly, there are some fuzzy areas around the boundaries of the application of "lie". There is an interesting controversy in the current secular philosophical literature, whether an intent to deceive is necessary for lying, and, if so, an intent to deceive about what?"
This has struck me as well--the notion that when we actually utilize what we call "lying", it is almost always "attached" to some other intentionality--we "lie" to...achieve something else. So, understanding what the common teaching means by "intention to deceive" and from "where" the intrinsic evil arises is quite difficult (at least for me).
The important thing here is to acknowledge that the CCC does indeed *repeat* the "common teaching of Catholic theology" on lying: that lying is intrinsically evil. Thus, as vexing as it may seem to some, we are called to give this teaching no less and no *more* assent than this teaching requires. In this case, when the CCC is calling lying "intrinsically evil" we have to understand that this doesn't eliminate the possibility that what is defined as lying without qualification may well *admit* of qualification via further theological investigation. There is a freedom here for the faithful to withhold *complete* assent to this view, or to propose alternative ways of expressing what lying is and is not.
The CCC faithfully reproduces what the common teaching of Catholic theology is on lying--so faithfully, in fact, that the *second* edition reomoved the bit about "right to truth" from edition one. I suspect this was done because the common teaching doesn't use that language. But withholding assent from this expression does *not* constitute dissent from the Magisterium--it constitutes "disagreement" with some aspect of the common teaching of theologians.
This shouldn't make us too uncomfortable; after all, we are called to express a level of assent appropriate to *each* teaching in the CCC according to its weight. I fear that this fact has been a bit underplayed with the CCC, largely because of the CCC authors' desire to demonstrate the organic unity of all teachings contained in it. This has caused many of us to lose sight of the necessary clarity we need to maintain when assessing the kind of assent we owe to individual statements in the CCC.
So, in short, Dr. Pruss, when I said: "And, in the case of lying, what else is available to use to express something concrete on what lying is?" I was merely trying to point out that the pope and bishops (the magisterium) have *not* given us expressions to define lying--the *theologians* have. The pope and bishops have *used* those expressions in both universal catechisms, but the expressions remain common teaching and don't require the same assent as do the deliberate and official teaching of the pope and bishops.
I'd agree that the less rigorous view is proposing a view that contradicts the notion that all lying is intrinsically evil, as proposed in the common teaching. Yet the less rigorous view would readily admit that there are only modest "exceptions" to that definition.
You wrote:
"Admittedly, there are some fuzzy areas around the boundaries of the application of "lie". There is an interesting controversy in the current secular philosophical literature, whether an intent to deceive is necessary for lying, and, if so, an intent to deceive about what?"
This has struck me as well--the notion that when we actually utilize what we call "lying", it is almost always "attached" to some other intentionality--we "lie" to...achieve something else. So, understanding what the common teaching means by "intention to deceive" and from "where" the intrinsic evil arises is quite difficult (at least for me).
The important thing here is to acknowledge that the CCC does indeed *repeat* the "common teaching of Catholic theology" on lying: that lying is intrinsically evil. Thus, as vexing as it may seem to some, we are called to give this teaching no less and no *more* assent than this teaching requires. In this case, when the CCC is calling lying "intrinsically evil" we have to understand that this doesn't eliminate the possibility that what is defined as lying without qualification may well *admit* of qualification via further theological investigation. There is a freedom here for the faithful to withhold *complete* assent to this view, or to propose alternative ways of expressing what lying is and is not.
The CCC faithfully reproduces what the common teaching of Catholic theology is on lying--so faithfully, in fact, that the *second* edition reomoved the bit about "right to truth" from edition one. I suspect this was done because the common teaching doesn't use that language. But withholding assent from this expression does *not* constitute dissent from the Magisterium--it constitutes "disagreement" with some aspect of the common teaching of theologians.
This shouldn't make us too uncomfortable; after all, we are called to express a level of assent appropriate to *each* teaching in the CCC according to its weight. I fear that this fact has been a bit underplayed with the CCC, largely because of the CCC authors' desire to demonstrate the organic unity of all teachings contained in it. This has caused many of us to lose sight of the necessary clarity we need to maintain when assessing the kind of assent we owe to individual statements in the CCC.
So, in short, Dr. Pruss, when I said: "And, in the case of lying, what else is available to use to express something concrete on what lying is?" I was merely trying to point out that the pope and bishops (the magisterium) have *not* given us expressions to define lying--the *theologians* have. The pope and bishops have *used* those expressions in both universal catechisms, but the expressions remain common teaching and don't require the same assent as do the deliberate and official teaching of the pope and bishops.
I'd agree that the less rigorous view is proposing a view that contradicts the notion that all lying is intrinsically evil, as proposed in the common teaching. Yet the less rigorous view would readily admit that there are only modest "exceptions" to that definition.
9.27.2011 | 8:16am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Drs. Tollefsen and Pruss:
In contrast to the view I'm espousing above, one might ask how it is possible that a clearly "magisterial" work like the CCC could include *non-magisteral* teaching such as a "common teaching" on lying.
I think I would propose that this is somewhat analogous to our understanding of one of the Four Marks of the Church: The Church is "Holy."
How can the Church be called "Holy" when it comprises sinners?
In the case of both Trent and the CCC (universal catechisms), a universal catechism is a "work" of the Magisterium that contains a *variety* of levels of Catholic teaching, including common teaching that is non-magisterial and to an extent reformable.
Have we come to agreement on this point? If not, can you comment on what objections remain?
Thanks again for sustaining this discussion.
In contrast to the view I'm espousing above, one might ask how it is possible that a clearly "magisterial" work like the CCC could include *non-magisteral* teaching such as a "common teaching" on lying.
I think I would propose that this is somewhat analogous to our understanding of one of the Four Marks of the Church: The Church is "Holy."
How can the Church be called "Holy" when it comprises sinners?
In the case of both Trent and the CCC (universal catechisms), a universal catechism is a "work" of the Magisterium that contains a *variety* of levels of Catholic teaching, including common teaching that is non-magisterial and to an extent reformable.
Have we come to agreement on this point? If not, can you comment on what objections remain?
Thanks again for sustaining this discussion.
9.27.2011 | 8:40am
Gabriel says:
Profs Pruss & Tollefsen - seeing as you are still reading these comments, I would be very interested to know what you made of my comments, above!
Namely, about how your position - that Nollie's lying to the Nazi would have contravened the love that she owed him - does not lead quite so simply as you say, to the conclusion that she was right not to have lied to him.
For there is (a) the consideration of the love that Nollie also owed to the Jew she was protecting (why should that fare worse than her duty of love to the Nazi? In fact, Nollie voluntarily took on the job of hiding the Jew, whereas the Nazi demanded the answer from her - it seems even more wrong to volunteer protection to someone, then whisk it away without warning - perhaps the Jew would have been better off without her in the first place); and (b) there is also the consideration that tempting/allowing the Nazi to kill this Jew would not actually be loving to him at all, for it is failing to stop him from committing a terrible sin.
Realted to my point (a), is Alexander Pruss’ response to Dave Eden. Dave Eden said: “I just can't see how it could be permissible to kill under certain circumstances, but not to lie under analogous circumstances.” And Alexander Pruss responded: “It may seem counterintuitive, but I think there is a way in which betrayal of trust is more fundamentally opposed to love than killing is--betrayal is more precisely an interpersonally relational sin, and hence falls under the subject category of love more.” But it seems to me that Nollie’s response to the Nazi that Annalies was indeed Jewish could be perfectly described precisely as “a betrayal of trust”. This really hones the point: there are many ways to betray trust: sometimes we can betray trust by lying, and sometimes by telling the truth. The question is: whose trust should Nollie have prioritised in this case. And *surely*, *surely* (I feel that I should repeat this word a thousand times!) the answer is that she should have preferred to keep Annalies’ trust rather than that of the murderous Nazi who sought to kill her!
If you said that the prohibition on lying in any circumstances was a Divine edict, which is unintelligible to us, but something we must simply adhere to, in bowing to God's authority - then my above points are irrelevant. But it seems to me that you attempt to explain the prohibition - and my points are aimed at saying that your explanation (the love we owe to others) does not take us all the way to the desired result of an absolute prohibition on lying.
Then, even if we grant that there is an absolute prohibition, then is consideration (c), namely that perhaps one should be willing to become blameworthy, in order to save the life of another - be willing to sacrifice one's own purity of soul (rather than just one's bodily life, even one's spiritual life) for the sake of others. Chris Tollefsen's remark at the end of his recent comment sharpens this point: "Rather than being stupidly pious, perhaps she was *very attentive* to what God wanted her to say (Augustine thinks the midwives were slightly less attentive)? Some complain that the doctrine of 'equivocation' favors only the clever, but Nollie shows that God favours the faithful." - It seems to me that this remark puts an inappropriate stress on Nollie. You say that the story shows that 'God favours the faithful (i.e. Nollie herself)' - but the point here should not be Nollie, but the Jew who she gave up to the Nazis! It was not Nollie who needed to be favoured, but the Jew who Nollie had terrible endangered. In this case - though not in millions of others - God did favour that Jew, and she was saved, but certainly with no help from Nollie.
I have to say that I still find it a cross between surreal, scary, and depressing that people who seem actually to think that it would be better to allow a Jew to be carted off by a Nazi, taken to a concentration camp, beaten, starved, tortured, and killed – rather than tell a lie. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook said: “It is forbidden for fear of Heaven to push aside one's natural morality, for then it would no longer be pure fear of Heaven”. If ever there were a case of false fear of heaven pushing aside good and true and pure natural morality, it strikes me that this is one of them – one which, through casuistic reasoning, manages to convince that a murderous soldier is deserving of truth more than his victim is deserving of life. It is precisely because I find this so astonishing that I honestly would be grateful to hear more about what you take the deep moral foundation for this to be, given the various things that I have said; and given what seems to me to be a too-obvious-to-be-explainable preference of lying over complicity in murder... Many thanks!
Namely, about how your position - that Nollie's lying to the Nazi would have contravened the love that she owed him - does not lead quite so simply as you say, to the conclusion that she was right not to have lied to him.
For there is (a) the consideration of the love that Nollie also owed to the Jew she was protecting (why should that fare worse than her duty of love to the Nazi? In fact, Nollie voluntarily took on the job of hiding the Jew, whereas the Nazi demanded the answer from her - it seems even more wrong to volunteer protection to someone, then whisk it away without warning - perhaps the Jew would have been better off without her in the first place); and (b) there is also the consideration that tempting/allowing the Nazi to kill this Jew would not actually be loving to him at all, for it is failing to stop him from committing a terrible sin.
Realted to my point (a), is Alexander Pruss’ response to Dave Eden. Dave Eden said: “I just can't see how it could be permissible to kill under certain circumstances, but not to lie under analogous circumstances.” And Alexander Pruss responded: “It may seem counterintuitive, but I think there is a way in which betrayal of trust is more fundamentally opposed to love than killing is--betrayal is more precisely an interpersonally relational sin, and hence falls under the subject category of love more.” But it seems to me that Nollie’s response to the Nazi that Annalies was indeed Jewish could be perfectly described precisely as “a betrayal of trust”. This really hones the point: there are many ways to betray trust: sometimes we can betray trust by lying, and sometimes by telling the truth. The question is: whose trust should Nollie have prioritised in this case. And *surely*, *surely* (I feel that I should repeat this word a thousand times!) the answer is that she should have preferred to keep Annalies’ trust rather than that of the murderous Nazi who sought to kill her!
If you said that the prohibition on lying in any circumstances was a Divine edict, which is unintelligible to us, but something we must simply adhere to, in bowing to God's authority - then my above points are irrelevant. But it seems to me that you attempt to explain the prohibition - and my points are aimed at saying that your explanation (the love we owe to others) does not take us all the way to the desired result of an absolute prohibition on lying.
Then, even if we grant that there is an absolute prohibition, then is consideration (c), namely that perhaps one should be willing to become blameworthy, in order to save the life of another - be willing to sacrifice one's own purity of soul (rather than just one's bodily life, even one's spiritual life) for the sake of others. Chris Tollefsen's remark at the end of his recent comment sharpens this point: "Rather than being stupidly pious, perhaps she was *very attentive* to what God wanted her to say (Augustine thinks the midwives were slightly less attentive)? Some complain that the doctrine of 'equivocation' favors only the clever, but Nollie shows that God favours the faithful." - It seems to me that this remark puts an inappropriate stress on Nollie. You say that the story shows that 'God favours the faithful (i.e. Nollie herself)' - but the point here should not be Nollie, but the Jew who she gave up to the Nazis! It was not Nollie who needed to be favoured, but the Jew who Nollie had terrible endangered. In this case - though not in millions of others - God did favour that Jew, and she was saved, but certainly with no help from Nollie.
I have to say that I still find it a cross between surreal, scary, and depressing that people who seem actually to think that it would be better to allow a Jew to be carted off by a Nazi, taken to a concentration camp, beaten, starved, tortured, and killed – rather than tell a lie. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook said: “It is forbidden for fear of Heaven to push aside one's natural morality, for then it would no longer be pure fear of Heaven”. If ever there were a case of false fear of heaven pushing aside good and true and pure natural morality, it strikes me that this is one of them – one which, through casuistic reasoning, manages to convince that a murderous soldier is deserving of truth more than his victim is deserving of life. It is precisely because I find this so astonishing that I honestly would be grateful to hear more about what you take the deep moral foundation for this to be, given the various things that I have said; and given what seems to me to be a too-obvious-to-be-explainable preference of lying over complicity in murder... Many thanks!
9.27.2011 | 9:09am
Alexander R Pruss says:
Gabriel:
When one commits oneself absolutely to protect someone, one commits oneself to use all morally permissible means to that protection. It is no betrayal of solicited trust to refrain from using an impermissible means. So a refusal to lie is not a betrayal of trust if, in fact, lying is morally impermissible.
Now, a protectee who believes that lying is sometimes permissible may erroneously think that one has committed oneself to lying if necessary. But that is not a belief that one has solicited in the protectee.
I also think one needs to make a significant distinction between intended and unintended harm. When one lies to the Nazi one is intentionally soliciting trust and one is intentionally doing something that goes against the trust. But when one's truth-telling results in the death of the innocent, that result is unintended.
When one commits oneself absolutely to protect someone, one commits oneself to use all morally permissible means to that protection. It is no betrayal of solicited trust to refrain from using an impermissible means. So a refusal to lie is not a betrayal of trust if, in fact, lying is morally impermissible.
Now, a protectee who believes that lying is sometimes permissible may erroneously think that one has committed oneself to lying if necessary. But that is not a belief that one has solicited in the protectee.
I also think one needs to make a significant distinction between intended and unintended harm. When one lies to the Nazi one is intentionally soliciting trust and one is intentionally doing something that goes against the trust. But when one's truth-telling results in the death of the innocent, that result is unintended.
9.27.2011 | 9:25am
Remember Rollen says:
I now wish I had framed my last comment (9.23.2011 | 8:29am) as a question, rather than a series of assertions. Do the authors agree that they have offered three distinct justifications for the moral prohibition against false assertion? How do the authors suppose that these distinct justifications combine into a satisfying one, given the apparent weaknesses of each?
9.27.2011 | 10:10am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Here is another analogous example of how "common teaching" admits of other views, taken from the Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Hell" in the section on the "Impenitence of the Damned":
"The damned are confirmed in evil; every act of their will is evil and inspired by hatred of God. This is the common teaching of theology; St. Thomas sets it forth in many passages. Nevertheless, some have held the opinion that, although the damned cannot perform any supernatural action, they are still able to perform, now and then, some naturally good deed; thus far the Church has not condemned this opinion. The author of this article maintains that the common teaching is the true one; for in hell the separation from the sanctifying power of Divine love is complete. " [Catholic Encylopedia: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07207a.htm ]
Note the assertion of a "common teaching." Yet, an alternate opinion is proposed. But "...thus far the Church has not condemned this [alternate] opinion." Nonetheless the author of the CE sticks with the common teaching.
I assert that this is also exactly where things stand regarding the debate over the intrinsic evil of lying in the CCC: a common teaching, with others proposing alternate views *not* condemned by the Magisterium...
"The damned are confirmed in evil; every act of their will is evil and inspired by hatred of God. This is the common teaching of theology; St. Thomas sets it forth in many passages. Nevertheless, some have held the opinion that, although the damned cannot perform any supernatural action, they are still able to perform, now and then, some naturally good deed; thus far the Church has not condemned this opinion. The author of this article maintains that the common teaching is the true one; for in hell the separation from the sanctifying power of Divine love is complete. " [Catholic Encylopedia: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07207a.htm ]
Note the assertion of a "common teaching." Yet, an alternate opinion is proposed. But "...thus far the Church has not condemned this [alternate] opinion." Nonetheless the author of the CE sticks with the common teaching.
I assert that this is also exactly where things stand regarding the debate over the intrinsic evil of lying in the CCC: a common teaching, with others proposing alternate views *not* condemned by the Magisterium...
9.27.2011 | 10:17am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
This citation is, as well, probably helpful:
This is a snippet from the Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Tradition and Living Magisterium" [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15006b.htm]
"This multifarious work, of scientific exposition as well as of popularization and propaganda, is likewise assisted by the countless written forms of religious teaching, among which catechisms have a special character of doctrinal security, approved as they are by the teaching authority and claiming only to set forth with clearness and precision the teaching common in the Church. "
I'm noticing here a reference to catechisms as magisterially "approved" works explicating the "teaching common in the Church."
This is a snippet from the Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Tradition and Living Magisterium" [http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15006b.htm]
"This multifarious work, of scientific exposition as well as of popularization and propaganda, is likewise assisted by the countless written forms of religious teaching, among which catechisms have a special character of doctrinal security, approved as they are by the teaching authority and claiming only to set forth with clearness and precision the teaching common in the Church. "
I'm noticing here a reference to catechisms as magisterially "approved" works explicating the "teaching common in the Church."
9.27.2011 | 10:24am
Gabriel says:
Thank you, Prof Pruss, for your response! I have a few comments, in turn...
You say that “refusal to lie is not a betrayal of trust if, in fact, lying is morally impermissible”. The issue of betrayal of trust was just a way that I thought I could sharpen my main point, which was the issue of love. You said that impermissibility of lying to the Nazi was the love that Nollie owed to him – to everyone. But if Nollie owed love to everyone, then did she not owe it equally to the Jew under her protection? You response may be, even here, that she does not owe love beyond the bounds of the morally permissible. But this will not do – for your point about love was meant to be an *explanation* for the absolute impermissibility of lying, and therefore that very impermissibility cannot in turn be used to shore up the explanation. My question us: what grounds the absolute moral prohibition of lying? And I don’t see how it can be the love that we owe to those to whom we might lie – for in the relevant cases, there is equally a love that we owe to the person we would have protected by lying. And your explanation depends on the latter love being less important – or less compromised – without appeal to the impermissibility of lying which this explanation is meant to be grounding.
Perhaps you would argue, then, that when lying to the Nazi I am intentionally harming him, whereas when one gives someone up to their death, you are harming someone without intending to. And because of this distinction, you can say that the lying is a stronger contravention of our duty of love than the giving over of the person to their death. I have a number of things to say about this!
(i) It is true that to harm someone knowingly, but without wanting to do so, is less bad than harming them knowingly while wanting to do so. However, this does not mean that every harming of someone without wanting to do so is less bad than every harming of them while wanting to do so. After all, the degree of the harm inflicted is also relevant here. I would say that inflicting a very great harm on someone – knowingly – without wanting to do so, is much worse than inflicting a very minor harm on them while wanting to do so. It seems to me that someone being tortured and killed is a very great harm indeed. Whereas someone knowing whether someone is a Jew or not, is not a very great harm at all. The Nazi making the enquiry could have gone on to lead a very happy and fulfilled life whether or not he knew that that person was a Jew. Thus, it seems to me that, though intentionality is morally relevant, it is a trump card. It is worse to knowingly give someone over to torture and death without wanting to, than it is to knowingly lye to someone and give them false beliefs, wanting to do so.
(ii) More than that, I am still not at all convinced – and you haven’t said anything to this point – that telling the Nazi that the person is a Jew is a benefit to him, and that lying to him is a harm to him. If someone is about to do a terrible harm to himself, and the only way that I can stop them from doing this harm to themselves, is by lying to them – I would say this lie is a benefit to that person, rather than a harm. Imagine a terribly depressed person who can be easily treated by medication, but who has not taken their medication and is about to commit suicide. The only way that I can stop them from killing themselves in this completely unnecessary way, is by lying to them to trick them into going to a clinic where they will be given the necessary medication, and go on to live a happy and fulfilled life. Surely, to lie to this person is to benefit them, rather than to harm, them. This is all the more so when someone is bent on murdering someone else – if I can lie to stop them from doing so, I am benefiting the potential murdered rather than harming him.
(iii) More than that, I disagree with your whole description of the harm that is being done by lying: “When one lies to the Nazi one is intentionally soliciting trust and one is intentionally doing something that goes against the trust”. The Nazis burst into Nollie’s house, and asked Nollie whether the woman sitting next to her was Jewish. This was not a polite enquiry out of interest: it was demand form a soldier with power. Whatever Nollie would have replied (i.e. whether she had truthfully replied ‘yes’, or lied and replied ‘no’) she could not possibly be described as having intentionally solicited the trust of her hearers. She intentionally solicited nothing at all – unless you say that all statements intentionally solicit trust. But to say the latter is to stretch the term ‘intentionally solicit’. After all, if the soldier outs a gun to her head and threatens her death unless she gives him an answer – and there are only two answers possible (yes or no), it cannot be reasonably said that in giving either one of those answers the speaker is intentionally soliciting trust in her hearer!
(iv) My final point in response to your distinction is really the same as my point (c) above. If I have understood you correctly, you are saying that it is better that Nollie be knowingly instrumental in the torture and death of a Jew – as long as she doesn’t intend/want this to happen – than to knowingly lie to the Nazi who seeks to kill this Jew – intending/wanting the Nazi to form beliefs she knows to be false. But this implies that Nollie’s knowing and intentionally committing the wrong of lying is worse than Nollie’s knowingly being instrumental in the torture and death of someone which she doesn’t want to happen. The only way I can see that this valuing can be upheld is through some idea that the most important thing in the world is that my soul be kept pure, my moral hands be kept clean, and to hell with the dire consequences that may follow from this. Nollie doesn’t want to do a wring intentionally, so to avoid this she sends an innocent to their torture and death. Isn’t it better to dirty ones hands with a lie, to knowingly commit that wrong, than to do something which one knows full well has a large chance of leading to the torture and death of another person? I honestly cannot get my head around the opposite evaluation! This seems to be the ultimate in what could be called ‘moral selfishness’. As moral agents we cannot be wilfully blind of the consequences of our actions. Lamenting a terrible consequence of an action of ours is not a good enough shield form moral judgement, if you could have ensured that the terrible consequence not have occurred at all. When I know that a terrible and unwanted consequence will followed – or is very likely to follow – form an action of mine, I have the moral responsibility to weigh up whether the action that I am doing is valuable enough to justify that terrible and unwanted consequence. Sometimes the action will be worth the consequence, and sometimes nit will not. The mere fact that I don’t want the consequence to happen does not provide immunity! If I know that someone is likely to be tortured and killed – which I do not want to happen – but that this will likely follow form a lie, I cannot understand what could possibly lead you to say that the intentional lie is the better course than the unwanted but likely result of torture and death! – And note – you cannot appeal to the absolute impermissibility of lying, to explain this evaluation – because it is that impermissibility that you are engaged in explaining in all this. You are trying to explain why lying is a worse contravention of love than giving someone over to their death – and in doing so, you seem to be committed to the evaluation I just noted, quite independent of the absolute impermissibility of lying.
You say that “refusal to lie is not a betrayal of trust if, in fact, lying is morally impermissible”. The issue of betrayal of trust was just a way that I thought I could sharpen my main point, which was the issue of love. You said that impermissibility of lying to the Nazi was the love that Nollie owed to him – to everyone. But if Nollie owed love to everyone, then did she not owe it equally to the Jew under her protection? You response may be, even here, that she does not owe love beyond the bounds of the morally permissible. But this will not do – for your point about love was meant to be an *explanation* for the absolute impermissibility of lying, and therefore that very impermissibility cannot in turn be used to shore up the explanation. My question us: what grounds the absolute moral prohibition of lying? And I don’t see how it can be the love that we owe to those to whom we might lie – for in the relevant cases, there is equally a love that we owe to the person we would have protected by lying. And your explanation depends on the latter love being less important – or less compromised – without appeal to the impermissibility of lying which this explanation is meant to be grounding.
Perhaps you would argue, then, that when lying to the Nazi I am intentionally harming him, whereas when one gives someone up to their death, you are harming someone without intending to. And because of this distinction, you can say that the lying is a stronger contravention of our duty of love than the giving over of the person to their death. I have a number of things to say about this!
(i) It is true that to harm someone knowingly, but without wanting to do so, is less bad than harming them knowingly while wanting to do so. However, this does not mean that every harming of someone without wanting to do so is less bad than every harming of them while wanting to do so. After all, the degree of the harm inflicted is also relevant here. I would say that inflicting a very great harm on someone – knowingly – without wanting to do so, is much worse than inflicting a very minor harm on them while wanting to do so. It seems to me that someone being tortured and killed is a very great harm indeed. Whereas someone knowing whether someone is a Jew or not, is not a very great harm at all. The Nazi making the enquiry could have gone on to lead a very happy and fulfilled life whether or not he knew that that person was a Jew. Thus, it seems to me that, though intentionality is morally relevant, it is a trump card. It is worse to knowingly give someone over to torture and death without wanting to, than it is to knowingly lye to someone and give them false beliefs, wanting to do so.
(ii) More than that, I am still not at all convinced – and you haven’t said anything to this point – that telling the Nazi that the person is a Jew is a benefit to him, and that lying to him is a harm to him. If someone is about to do a terrible harm to himself, and the only way that I can stop them from doing this harm to themselves, is by lying to them – I would say this lie is a benefit to that person, rather than a harm. Imagine a terribly depressed person who can be easily treated by medication, but who has not taken their medication and is about to commit suicide. The only way that I can stop them from killing themselves in this completely unnecessary way, is by lying to them to trick them into going to a clinic where they will be given the necessary medication, and go on to live a happy and fulfilled life. Surely, to lie to this person is to benefit them, rather than to harm, them. This is all the more so when someone is bent on murdering someone else – if I can lie to stop them from doing so, I am benefiting the potential murdered rather than harming him.
(iii) More than that, I disagree with your whole description of the harm that is being done by lying: “When one lies to the Nazi one is intentionally soliciting trust and one is intentionally doing something that goes against the trust”. The Nazis burst into Nollie’s house, and asked Nollie whether the woman sitting next to her was Jewish. This was not a polite enquiry out of interest: it was demand form a soldier with power. Whatever Nollie would have replied (i.e. whether she had truthfully replied ‘yes’, or lied and replied ‘no’) she could not possibly be described as having intentionally solicited the trust of her hearers. She intentionally solicited nothing at all – unless you say that all statements intentionally solicit trust. But to say the latter is to stretch the term ‘intentionally solicit’. After all, if the soldier outs a gun to her head and threatens her death unless she gives him an answer – and there are only two answers possible (yes or no), it cannot be reasonably said that in giving either one of those answers the speaker is intentionally soliciting trust in her hearer!
(iv) My final point in response to your distinction is really the same as my point (c) above. If I have understood you correctly, you are saying that it is better that Nollie be knowingly instrumental in the torture and death of a Jew – as long as she doesn’t intend/want this to happen – than to knowingly lie to the Nazi who seeks to kill this Jew – intending/wanting the Nazi to form beliefs she knows to be false. But this implies that Nollie’s knowing and intentionally committing the wrong of lying is worse than Nollie’s knowingly being instrumental in the torture and death of someone which she doesn’t want to happen. The only way I can see that this valuing can be upheld is through some idea that the most important thing in the world is that my soul be kept pure, my moral hands be kept clean, and to hell with the dire consequences that may follow from this. Nollie doesn’t want to do a wring intentionally, so to avoid this she sends an innocent to their torture and death. Isn’t it better to dirty ones hands with a lie, to knowingly commit that wrong, than to do something which one knows full well has a large chance of leading to the torture and death of another person? I honestly cannot get my head around the opposite evaluation! This seems to be the ultimate in what could be called ‘moral selfishness’. As moral agents we cannot be wilfully blind of the consequences of our actions. Lamenting a terrible consequence of an action of ours is not a good enough shield form moral judgement, if you could have ensured that the terrible consequence not have occurred at all. When I know that a terrible and unwanted consequence will followed – or is very likely to follow – form an action of mine, I have the moral responsibility to weigh up whether the action that I am doing is valuable enough to justify that terrible and unwanted consequence. Sometimes the action will be worth the consequence, and sometimes nit will not. The mere fact that I don’t want the consequence to happen does not provide immunity! If I know that someone is likely to be tortured and killed – which I do not want to happen – but that this will likely follow form a lie, I cannot understand what could possibly lead you to say that the intentional lie is the better course than the unwanted but likely result of torture and death! – And note – you cannot appeal to the absolute impermissibility of lying, to explain this evaluation – because it is that impermissibility that you are engaged in explaining in all this. You are trying to explain why lying is a worse contravention of love than giving someone over to their death – and in doing so, you seem to be committed to the evaluation I just noted, quite independent of the absolute impermissibility of lying.
9.27.2011 | 10:43am
Michael Gorman says:
@Chris Tollefsen
I find at least plausible everything you just said about the Nollie case.
My point--which I guess I didn't make clearly enough--was a rather narrow one. Several people in this thread have fallen into thinking that because you and Alex argue that it would be wrong to lie to the Nazi, therefore you are saying that it is obligatory to tell the truth to the Nazi. But that's not what you are saying. You think that one could simply not answer the Nazi, or try to change the topic, or perhaps use a mental reservation, or whatever.
But telling the Nollie story *gives people the impression* that you think she was obliged to tell the truth to the Nazi. It gives the impression that you think that if I ask you for your social security number and credit card number, you are obliged to give me this information. But of course that's not what you're saying.
That's all I meant.
I find at least plausible everything you just said about the Nollie case.
My point--which I guess I didn't make clearly enough--was a rather narrow one. Several people in this thread have fallen into thinking that because you and Alex argue that it would be wrong to lie to the Nazi, therefore you are saying that it is obligatory to tell the truth to the Nazi. But that's not what you are saying. You think that one could simply not answer the Nazi, or try to change the topic, or perhaps use a mental reservation, or whatever.
But telling the Nollie story *gives people the impression* that you think she was obliged to tell the truth to the Nazi. It gives the impression that you think that if I ask you for your social security number and credit card number, you are obliged to give me this information. But of course that's not what you're saying.
That's all I meant.
9.27.2011 | 10:50am
Michael Gorman says:
I want to register disagreement with claims like the following, which have been made more than once above: "It's wrong to prefer one's own moral purity to helping others! It's selfish! We should be willing to get our hands dirty."
To say this is, in the end, to say the following: sometimes, one is obliged to do something wicked; i.e., sometimes, one *should* do what one *should not* do.
That's contradictory. If one *should* lie to the Nazi, then it's *good* to do so, and there's no issue of purity at all. Lying in this case would be pure and righteous and good. If, on the other hand, lying involves sullying oneself, that's because one *should not* do it -- and if you should not do something, then you just should not do it. That's what it means to say that you shouldn't do it--that you shouldn't do it!
People may hold false views about what is morally impure. That's bad. But it can never make sense to be under an obligation to do something wrong. That's a self-contradictory suggestion.
To say this is, in the end, to say the following: sometimes, one is obliged to do something wicked; i.e., sometimes, one *should* do what one *should not* do.
That's contradictory. If one *should* lie to the Nazi, then it's *good* to do so, and there's no issue of purity at all. Lying in this case would be pure and righteous and good. If, on the other hand, lying involves sullying oneself, that's because one *should not* do it -- and if you should not do something, then you just should not do it. That's what it means to say that you shouldn't do it--that you shouldn't do it!
People may hold false views about what is morally impure. That's bad. But it can never make sense to be under an obligation to do something wrong. That's a self-contradictory suggestion.
9.27.2011 | 1:22pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
Gabriel:
Good comments.
1. First let me note that I am thinking of a hypothetical case where it would be for Nollie to say that there are no Jews in her house. I actually think that in a typical case when facing the Nazi, she would be saying something *true* if she said there are no Jews in her house. But that's a controversial point--I doubt Chris agrees with me--and I am not completely sure of it myself. I defend the point here: http://tinyurl.com/prusslying
2. That said, let me focus on that I think is central: "Whatever Nollie would have replied (i.e. whether she had truthfully replied ‘yes’, or lied and replied ‘no’) she could not possibly be described as having intentionally solicited the trust of her hearers. She intentionally solicited nothing at all – unless you say that all statements intentionally solicit trust. But to say the latter is to stretch the term ‘intentionally solicit’. After all, if the soldier outs a gun to her head and threatens her death unless she gives him an answer – and there are only two answers possible (yes or no), it cannot be reasonably said that in giving either one of those answers the speaker is intentionally soliciting trust in her hearer!"
I do think that a part of what it is to assert is to solicit trust. Without the solicitation of trust, the speech act just isn't an assertion.
I actually think it's a lot easier to see a solicitation of trust in the case of a "No" answer than a "Yes" answer. If she says "No", she is striving to be trusted--to be believed. Otherwise, what's the point of saying "No"?
My claim about love is a vague general thesis that relationships of love tend to be more important than outcomes, and that to be intentionally false to a relationship of love is more directly an offense against love than to act in a way that non-intentionally results in great harms. The harm to the Nazi isn't so much the false belief (after all, the Nazi might not believe), as having his trust betrayed (whether or not he ever finds out), in the context of the relationship of love constituted by human communication. By making an assertion, one enters--or pretends to enter--such a relationship of love.
Compare this case. Your spouse will be tortured and killed unless you commit adultery. The adultery would be a direct betrayal of the relationship of love, and so you should not do it. Now, in the case of communication with the Nazi, the relationship is of course less significant than in the case of the relationship with one's spouse. But one should not underestimate one's relationship with the Nazi. The most important part of one's relationship with one's spouse is not the marriage but being neighbors, being both creatures in the image and likeness of God. (and, if applicable, a fellow adopted sons or daughters of God). And the Nazi is just as much one's neighbor (and may very well be baptized, too, albeit probably not in a state of grace, unless invincibly ignorant). Moreover, *linguistic communication* is a central and crucial human relationship.
3. "It is worse to knowingly give someone over to torture and death without wanting to, than it is to knowingly lye to someone and give them false beliefs, wanting to do so." This really isn't a matter of comparing evils, but of avoiding wrong. Compare this case. If you don't painlessly kill one innocent person, a thousand guards who have not yet committed any murders will be commanded to each torture and kill a prisoner. Past experience shows that, say, 90% of the guards are going to do what they are commanded. What should you do? The Christian tradition is very clear: you should not kill. But notice that the expected consequences of your not killing the innocent appear rather worse. About 900 people become murderers if you don't kill and about 900 innocents are tortured and killed, if you refuse to become a murderer and painlessly kill one innocent. (We can make the case more extreme. If you do the killing, the 1000 guards will be sent home and will never be asked to commit any atrocities.)
is it selfish to refuse to kill? It would be selfish if one were making this sort of computation: "I'd rather not become a murderer, even if 900 other people are going to become murderers if I don't. My own moral purity counts for me more." But that need not be how one thinks. One does not think about the moral purity for oneself. Rather, one may think about what love requires. And love requires that one not intentionally kill an innocent beloved, no matter what. Love also requires that one save lives and souls, but it does not require this unconditionally: it requires this if it be morally possible (maybe even: if it be reasonable).
Good comments.
1. First let me note that I am thinking of a hypothetical case where it would be for Nollie to say that there are no Jews in her house. I actually think that in a typical case when facing the Nazi, she would be saying something *true* if she said there are no Jews in her house. But that's a controversial point--I doubt Chris agrees with me--and I am not completely sure of it myself. I defend the point here: http://tinyurl.com/prusslying
2. That said, let me focus on that I think is central: "Whatever Nollie would have replied (i.e. whether she had truthfully replied ‘yes’, or lied and replied ‘no’) she could not possibly be described as having intentionally solicited the trust of her hearers. She intentionally solicited nothing at all – unless you say that all statements intentionally solicit trust. But to say the latter is to stretch the term ‘intentionally solicit’. After all, if the soldier outs a gun to her head and threatens her death unless she gives him an answer – and there are only two answers possible (yes or no), it cannot be reasonably said that in giving either one of those answers the speaker is intentionally soliciting trust in her hearer!"
I do think that a part of what it is to assert is to solicit trust. Without the solicitation of trust, the speech act just isn't an assertion.
I actually think it's a lot easier to see a solicitation of trust in the case of a "No" answer than a "Yes" answer. If she says "No", she is striving to be trusted--to be believed. Otherwise, what's the point of saying "No"?
My claim about love is a vague general thesis that relationships of love tend to be more important than outcomes, and that to be intentionally false to a relationship of love is more directly an offense against love than to act in a way that non-intentionally results in great harms. The harm to the Nazi isn't so much the false belief (after all, the Nazi might not believe), as having his trust betrayed (whether or not he ever finds out), in the context of the relationship of love constituted by human communication. By making an assertion, one enters--or pretends to enter--such a relationship of love.
Compare this case. Your spouse will be tortured and killed unless you commit adultery. The adultery would be a direct betrayal of the relationship of love, and so you should not do it. Now, in the case of communication with the Nazi, the relationship is of course less significant than in the case of the relationship with one's spouse. But one should not underestimate one's relationship with the Nazi. The most important part of one's relationship with one's spouse is not the marriage but being neighbors, being both creatures in the image and likeness of God. (and, if applicable, a fellow adopted sons or daughters of God). And the Nazi is just as much one's neighbor (and may very well be baptized, too, albeit probably not in a state of grace, unless invincibly ignorant). Moreover, *linguistic communication* is a central and crucial human relationship.
3. "It is worse to knowingly give someone over to torture and death without wanting to, than it is to knowingly lye to someone and give them false beliefs, wanting to do so." This really isn't a matter of comparing evils, but of avoiding wrong. Compare this case. If you don't painlessly kill one innocent person, a thousand guards who have not yet committed any murders will be commanded to each torture and kill a prisoner. Past experience shows that, say, 90% of the guards are going to do what they are commanded. What should you do? The Christian tradition is very clear: you should not kill. But notice that the expected consequences of your not killing the innocent appear rather worse. About 900 people become murderers if you don't kill and about 900 innocents are tortured and killed, if you refuse to become a murderer and painlessly kill one innocent. (We can make the case more extreme. If you do the killing, the 1000 guards will be sent home and will never be asked to commit any atrocities.)
is it selfish to refuse to kill? It would be selfish if one were making this sort of computation: "I'd rather not become a murderer, even if 900 other people are going to become murderers if I don't. My own moral purity counts for me more." But that need not be how one thinks. One does not think about the moral purity for oneself. Rather, one may think about what love requires. And love requires that one not intentionally kill an innocent beloved, no matter what. Love also requires that one save lives and souls, but it does not require this unconditionally: it requires this if it be morally possible (maybe even: if it be reasonable).
9.28.2011 | 3:00am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Dear Drs. Tollefsen and Pruss:
In my above comments I believe I have offered sufficient evidence making it clear that the CCC's teaching on lying is common teaching and as such does not require the level of assent you suggest it does in your article.
I think it would be in the best interest of the faithful for you to clarify whether you now agree with this position or whether you disagree with it and if so, what you might base that disagreement upon.
I, too, would greatly appreciate that clarification.
In my above comments I believe I have offered sufficient evidence making it clear that the CCC's teaching on lying is common teaching and as such does not require the level of assent you suggest it does in your article.
I think it would be in the best interest of the faithful for you to clarify whether you now agree with this position or whether you disagree with it and if so, what you might base that disagreement upon.
I, too, would greatly appreciate that clarification.
9.28.2011 | 2:35pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
I continue to think that the teaching of the Catechism of Trent is the teaching of the ordinary Magisterium, since this teaching has been the basis of the Church's catechesis for several centuries. It is not merely the teaching of the majority of the theological schools. Likewise, with Chris I think that by including a doctrine, the Catechism magisterially teaches the second order claim that this doctrine is a magisterial teaching. In so doing it does not change the doctrinal level of the first order claim.
Further, the words in Church teaching are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless otherwise indicated. Otherwise, one could always claim that some word in a Church teaching is to be understood differently from its ordinary sense.
Imagine someone who claimed it was permissible to use tomato wine at Mass. It would be correct to say that their view violates Church teaching that only grape wine may be used. Nor should one stop saying that their view violates Church teaching if they claimed, contrary to fact, that (a) the word "grape" means any fruit that grows on a vine and (b) the Church never specified which precise plant species count as grapes. Nor even if there were a theological school that made the silly claim (a). Such a person holds only in word to the Church's teaching that only grape wine may be used.
Likewise, the Church teaches that all lying is wrong. In the ordinary sense of the word "lie", all deceitful unambiguous assertions of what one knows to be false (with maybe a few other minor qualifiers that don't affect the case at hand) are lies.
However, a qualification needs to be made, and it's why we didn't say Janet Smith, for whose work we have great respect, was a dissenter. To be a dissenter you have to recognize that something is the Church's or at least the magisterium's teaching, and then disagree from it. Likewise, I wouldn't say that the person who has the view that tomatoes are a kind of grape is a dissenter. For although their idea that tomato wine is permissible for use at Mass is contrary to Church teaching, they do not know that it is contrary to Church teaching.
-------------------
Finally, let me pose a puzzle. When Peter denied Jesus, the people he was talking to had no right to the truth about whether Peter was a follower of Christ. Moreover, Peter may very well have been doing this to save his life. What was wrong with his action? I say that what was wrong was that he *lied*, and then the subject matter about which he lied made the matter grave.
Compare these two cases.
Case 1: A murderous regime hates Muslims and an officer comes to the door asking: "Is there anyone in this house who believes Mohammed is a prophet of God?"
Case 2: A murderous regime hates Christians and an officer comes to the door asking: "Is there anyone in this house who believes Jesus Christ is Lord?"
It is clearly wrong for a Christian to answer "No" in the second case. That's very much the kind of situation that has cost many martyrs their life. But it would be odd if it were permissible to lie about whether there are Muslims in the house (say, if you're a Christian (or Muslim?) hiding Muslims), but not permissible to lie about whether there are Christians in the house.
Maybe it makes a difference whether you're lying about yourself or another. But that doesn't sound quite right. I don't think one of the holy martyrs would be likely to lie: "I believe Jesus Christ is Lord, but my wife and children don't."
Further, the words in Church teaching are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless otherwise indicated. Otherwise, one could always claim that some word in a Church teaching is to be understood differently from its ordinary sense.
Imagine someone who claimed it was permissible to use tomato wine at Mass. It would be correct to say that their view violates Church teaching that only grape wine may be used. Nor should one stop saying that their view violates Church teaching if they claimed, contrary to fact, that (a) the word "grape" means any fruit that grows on a vine and (b) the Church never specified which precise plant species count as grapes. Nor even if there were a theological school that made the silly claim (a). Such a person holds only in word to the Church's teaching that only grape wine may be used.
Likewise, the Church teaches that all lying is wrong. In the ordinary sense of the word "lie", all deceitful unambiguous assertions of what one knows to be false (with maybe a few other minor qualifiers that don't affect the case at hand) are lies.
However, a qualification needs to be made, and it's why we didn't say Janet Smith, for whose work we have great respect, was a dissenter. To be a dissenter you have to recognize that something is the Church's or at least the magisterium's teaching, and then disagree from it. Likewise, I wouldn't say that the person who has the view that tomatoes are a kind of grape is a dissenter. For although their idea that tomato wine is permissible for use at Mass is contrary to Church teaching, they do not know that it is contrary to Church teaching.
-------------------
Finally, let me pose a puzzle. When Peter denied Jesus, the people he was talking to had no right to the truth about whether Peter was a follower of Christ. Moreover, Peter may very well have been doing this to save his life. What was wrong with his action? I say that what was wrong was that he *lied*, and then the subject matter about which he lied made the matter grave.
Compare these two cases.
Case 1: A murderous regime hates Muslims and an officer comes to the door asking: "Is there anyone in this house who believes Mohammed is a prophet of God?"
Case 2: A murderous regime hates Christians and an officer comes to the door asking: "Is there anyone in this house who believes Jesus Christ is Lord?"
It is clearly wrong for a Christian to answer "No" in the second case. That's very much the kind of situation that has cost many martyrs their life. But it would be odd if it were permissible to lie about whether there are Muslims in the house (say, if you're a Christian (or Muslim?) hiding Muslims), but not permissible to lie about whether there are Christians in the house.
Maybe it makes a difference whether you're lying about yourself or another. But that doesn't sound quite right. I don't think one of the holy martyrs would be likely to lie: "I believe Jesus Christ is Lord, but my wife and children don't."
9.28.2011 | 7:02pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Dr. Pruss, thank you for your reply. It raises, however, a multitude of questions, the first and most important of which is:
1. If the Roman Catechism of Trent marks the point at which the teaching on lying somehow became "magisterial" and not just "common teaching", why, centuries later, does a rock-solid and highly respected Catholic work of the early 20th Century--The Catholic Encyclopedia--consistently refer to that self-same teaching as *common teaching of Catholic THEOLOGY*, never indicating that this matter of lying has been *settled* already by the Pope and bishops?????
The historical evidence of the Catholic Encyclopedia that I provided should be addressed by you and Dr. Tollefsen....
1. If the Roman Catechism of Trent marks the point at which the teaching on lying somehow became "magisterial" and not just "common teaching", why, centuries later, does a rock-solid and highly respected Catholic work of the early 20th Century--The Catholic Encyclopedia--consistently refer to that self-same teaching as *common teaching of Catholic THEOLOGY*, never indicating that this matter of lying has been *settled* already by the Pope and bishops?????
The historical evidence of the Catholic Encyclopedia that I provided should be addressed by you and Dr. Tollefsen....
9.29.2011 | 6:00am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
There are *nine* occasions in which the Catholic Encyclopedia article on lying references the teaching on lying as *common* teaching, not of the pope and bishops, but of *theologians*.
Read the *whole* article. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm
And *then* try to assert that the debate on lying has somehow been "settled" by the Magisterium.....
My point has *never* been to argue which side is "right"--I have been trying make sure the faithful knows that *both* views are *permissible*.
If both views are *not* permissible, then you, Drs. Tollefsen and Pruss, are compelled to call a colleague, Dr. Janet Smith, either a deliberate or accidental "dissenter" from the Magisterium. You've opted to say she just doesn't "know" any better. That's just as unsavory as saying she dissents, in my view.
I know you are both philosophers, not historians or theologians. But I highly recommend that you revisit both the historical and theological evidence once more and correct the erroneous paragraph you've written in your article that mischaracterizes the kind of assent owed to the common teaching of theology on lying.
Sincerely,
Deacon Jim Russell
Read the *whole* article. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm
And *then* try to assert that the debate on lying has somehow been "settled" by the Magisterium.....
My point has *never* been to argue which side is "right"--I have been trying make sure the faithful knows that *both* views are *permissible*.
If both views are *not* permissible, then you, Drs. Tollefsen and Pruss, are compelled to call a colleague, Dr. Janet Smith, either a deliberate or accidental "dissenter" from the Magisterium. You've opted to say she just doesn't "know" any better. That's just as unsavory as saying she dissents, in my view.
I know you are both philosophers, not historians or theologians. But I highly recommend that you revisit both the historical and theological evidence once more and correct the erroneous paragraph you've written in your article that mischaracterizes the kind of assent owed to the common teaching of theology on lying.
Sincerely,
Deacon Jim Russell
9.29.2011 | 7:12am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
It is also worth pointing out to the faithful that the *1967* "New Catholic Encyclopedia" article on lying makes *zero* mention of a "settled" magisterial teaching on lying and instead gives a really good outline of the theological viewpoints on the subject, placing them in the context *not* of the Magisterium but in the context of "Christian tradition" and common teaching.
The article makes it clear that the Aquinas interpretation of Augustine is *the* measure by which other opinions are measured, and rightly so. But this is a far cry from claiming that all the other opinions expressed in this 1967 article are running contrary to the *magisterium* and are therefore a form of intentional or unintentional dissent....
Tollefsen and Pruss are asserting that, sometime before the Cathechism of Trent, a common teaching of Catholic theology silently "evolved" (my word, not theirs) into something magisterial.
Did the common teaching on "limbo of the infants" ever "evolve" into something magisterial? Nope. But the teaching on lying somehow has, with no acknowledgement from the magisterium itself, sometime before the Catechism of Trent?
[Just to clarify, too, I'm *not* impugning or even addressing any of your arguments *for* the more rigorous view. My lack of response to any arguments for that view is because I totally affirm your right to hold this view and see no reason to challenge this unless and until we can clear up the *historical* point regarding what the magisterium has and has not taught.]
The article makes it clear that the Aquinas interpretation of Augustine is *the* measure by which other opinions are measured, and rightly so. But this is a far cry from claiming that all the other opinions expressed in this 1967 article are running contrary to the *magisterium* and are therefore a form of intentional or unintentional dissent....
Tollefsen and Pruss are asserting that, sometime before the Cathechism of Trent, a common teaching of Catholic theology silently "evolved" (my word, not theirs) into something magisterial.
Did the common teaching on "limbo of the infants" ever "evolve" into something magisterial? Nope. But the teaching on lying somehow has, with no acknowledgement from the magisterium itself, sometime before the Catechism of Trent?
[Just to clarify, too, I'm *not* impugning or even addressing any of your arguments *for* the more rigorous view. My lack of response to any arguments for that view is because I totally affirm your right to hold this view and see no reason to challenge this unless and until we can clear up the *historical* point regarding what the magisterium has and has not taught.]
9.29.2011 | 7:26am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Wow--I mean, really, wow--here's a "smoking gun" I wish I had located before just now, but I didn't investigate the NEW Catholic Encyclopedia until this morning.
Check this out, again, from the 1967 New Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Mental Reservation":
"Not wanting to lie, a person may at the same time not want to tell the truth, because it would involve him or others in difficulty. If he accepts THE TRADITIONAL AND STILL COMMON TEACHING OF CATHOLIC MORALISTS [emphasis added], he knows that he is bound by a negative precept never to lie in any circumstances..."
Later the article says: "During the Middle Ages scholastic theologians accepted and expanded upon, but never deviated from, Augustine's definition of a lie and his teaching that to utter the opposite of what one holds to be true is intrinsically evil. In the 16th century this TRADITION [emphasis added] began to weaken among some theologians..."
Unless there was a "game-changer" between 1967 (just 44 years ago!) and now, we should in no way be presuming that holding the less rigorous view is a form of intended or unintended dissent from the magisterium.
Up until modern times, NO such accusations were made against the various theologians and *bishops* (e.g., St. John Chrysostom) who may have held views contrary to the more rigorous view, apparently all the way up until 1967...
Check this out, again, from the 1967 New Catholic Encyclopedia article on "Mental Reservation":
"Not wanting to lie, a person may at the same time not want to tell the truth, because it would involve him or others in difficulty. If he accepts THE TRADITIONAL AND STILL COMMON TEACHING OF CATHOLIC MORALISTS [emphasis added], he knows that he is bound by a negative precept never to lie in any circumstances..."
Later the article says: "During the Middle Ages scholastic theologians accepted and expanded upon, but never deviated from, Augustine's definition of a lie and his teaching that to utter the opposite of what one holds to be true is intrinsically evil. In the 16th century this TRADITION [emphasis added] began to weaken among some theologians..."
Unless there was a "game-changer" between 1967 (just 44 years ago!) and now, we should in no way be presuming that holding the less rigorous view is a form of intended or unintended dissent from the magisterium.
Up until modern times, NO such accusations were made against the various theologians and *bishops* (e.g., St. John Chrysostom) who may have held views contrary to the more rigorous view, apparently all the way up until 1967...
9.29.2011 | 7:34pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
Deacon Russell:
These are good points. I am not sure, however, whether "common teaching of Catholic theology" is the same as the sententia communis or the common teaching of Catholic theologians. Notice that the Catholic Encyclopedia not only says that the teaching is common but that in the middle ages it was the "common and universally accepted teaching of the Catholic schools".
It's also worth noting that the phrase "common teaching of Catholic theology" is rather rare in Catholic usage, and where it is used, it does not always exclude magisterial teaching.
I did a Google and Google Books search. Maritain writes "In conformity with the common teaching of Catholic theology, Father O'Connor explains that every Christian is not obliged to practice the evangelical 'counsels of of perfection'..." But surely the weight here is rather stronger than that of mere sententia communis. St Paul himself anathemizes those who say that marriage is wrong.
An author in the Dublin Review for 1923 says: "there is ample proof here that the common teaching of Catholic theology in the matter of Onanism is a part of the faith of the Church (in virtue of the Magisterium Ordinarium)."
Dowd, in a 1937 CUA-published conspectus of Catholic thought on the Eucharist writes: "Moreover, in the common teaching of Catholic theology, the use of sacerdotal power confided by Our Blessed Lord to His earthly representatives is essential to the Sacrifice of the Altar." Yet surely the need for sacerdotal power for the Sacrifice of the Altar is a part of the teaching of the ordinary magisterium if anything is.
I wonder if Vatican II hasn't led to a further development of our understanding of the ordinary magisterium and the catechetical role of the bishop, to the point that now we can say that what was universally a part of Catholic catechesis in the middle ages and after Trent is a teaching of the ordinary magisterium. That is speculative on my part, but it fits with CCC 2033 "The Magisterium of the Pastors of the Church in moral matters is ordinarily exercised in catechesis and preaching, with the help of the works of theologians and spiritual authors."
These are good points. I am not sure, however, whether "common teaching of Catholic theology" is the same as the sententia communis or the common teaching of Catholic theologians. Notice that the Catholic Encyclopedia not only says that the teaching is common but that in the middle ages it was the "common and universally accepted teaching of the Catholic schools".
It's also worth noting that the phrase "common teaching of Catholic theology" is rather rare in Catholic usage, and where it is used, it does not always exclude magisterial teaching.
I did a Google and Google Books search. Maritain writes "In conformity with the common teaching of Catholic theology, Father O'Connor explains that every Christian is not obliged to practice the evangelical 'counsels of of perfection'..." But surely the weight here is rather stronger than that of mere sententia communis. St Paul himself anathemizes those who say that marriage is wrong.
An author in the Dublin Review for 1923 says: "there is ample proof here that the common teaching of Catholic theology in the matter of Onanism is a part of the faith of the Church (in virtue of the Magisterium Ordinarium)."
Dowd, in a 1937 CUA-published conspectus of Catholic thought on the Eucharist writes: "Moreover, in the common teaching of Catholic theology, the use of sacerdotal power confided by Our Blessed Lord to His earthly representatives is essential to the Sacrifice of the Altar." Yet surely the need for sacerdotal power for the Sacrifice of the Altar is a part of the teaching of the ordinary magisterium if anything is.
I wonder if Vatican II hasn't led to a further development of our understanding of the ordinary magisterium and the catechetical role of the bishop, to the point that now we can say that what was universally a part of Catholic catechesis in the middle ages and after Trent is a teaching of the ordinary magisterium. That is speculative on my part, but it fits with CCC 2033 "The Magisterium of the Pastors of the Church in moral matters is ordinarily exercised in catechesis and preaching, with the help of the works of theologians and spiritual authors."
9.30.2011 | 4:36am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Dr. Pruss--
Thanks for the reply. Very much appreciated to have this evidence taken so seriously.
Regarding whether "sententia communis" is "common teaching of Catholic theology", this is precisely the definition of "common teaching" give to us by a greater theological mind than either of ours, I presume--Dr. Ludwig Ott, in the classic "Fundamentals of Catholci Dogma" (see above).
There is a "common teaching" I've encountered elsewhere referenced as the "common teaching of *bishops*. I think this corresponds to the ordinary universal magisterium. But, when sources like the two Catholic Encyclopedias make clear references to common teaching of *theologians*, I don't think it likely that that can be construed to mean "bishops."
You wrote:
****"It's also worth noting that the phrase "common teaching of Catholic theology" is rather rare in Catholic usage, and where it is used, it does not always exclude magisterial teaching. "****
I'm not sure that the examples you offer lend support to this proposition. The Church makes clear that what theologians do and what the *magisterium* does is collaborative, but that there is no "double magisterium" at work--theologians do not exercise "teaching authority" of any kind. THE Magisterium does rely upon the work of theologians precisely in those areas in which the Magisterium has yet to teach officially. But *until* there is official and clear magisterial teaching on an issue, then what is viewed as the "common teaching of Catholic theology" remains in the "field of the free opinions," to paraphrase Ott.
That's the trick about the ordinary universal magisterium--how do you assess what is the "common teaching of bishops" without being able to identify local episcopal teaching and see whether it "accumulates" sufficiently to be viewed as "universal"? In the case of the common teaching on lying, it can be easily show that, from the early history of Christianity, different bishops seemed to hold different views, and no amalgamation of official local episcopal teaching seems to exist (no episcopal documents teaching the faithful officially and directly on lying) Rather, the content that exists is in the realm of *theological opinion*, expressed by a variety of theologians (and the occasional bishop *as* private theologian--Augustine, Chrysostom).
So, when even *late* 20th-century catholic works describe the teaching on lying as "common teaching of Catholic theologians", we should be paying attention to the fact that the *Magisterium* has not added its own "weight" to that teaching....yet. It could in future, but as of now it has not.
Your speculation regarding Vatican II seems to go against the common (and maybe official) notion that Vatican II did *not* teach anything "new"--merely restated that which was already taught in contemporary language. Rather CCC 2033 precisely expresses the classic formula of the cooperation between magisterium and theologians (see also Veritatis Splendor and the 1990 "Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of Theologians").
I think we are getting closer and closer to "liberating" the discussion of lying from the mistaken notion that one side is merely abiding by magisterial teaching and the other is either intentionally or unintentionally dissenting or failing to recognize the "clear" teaching of the Church on this issue.
My hope would be that you and Dr. Tollefsen might more formally accept and acknowledge this by amending or clarifying the "assent" question you address in the piece at the top of the page!
You guys are awesome, btw--formidable minds wrestling with an important topic, and unafraid to follow the truth where it may lead. That is a *powerful* witness to your faith. God bless!
Thanks for the reply. Very much appreciated to have this evidence taken so seriously.
Regarding whether "sententia communis" is "common teaching of Catholic theology", this is precisely the definition of "common teaching" give to us by a greater theological mind than either of ours, I presume--Dr. Ludwig Ott, in the classic "Fundamentals of Catholci Dogma" (see above).
There is a "common teaching" I've encountered elsewhere referenced as the "common teaching of *bishops*. I think this corresponds to the ordinary universal magisterium. But, when sources like the two Catholic Encyclopedias make clear references to common teaching of *theologians*, I don't think it likely that that can be construed to mean "bishops."
You wrote:
****"It's also worth noting that the phrase "common teaching of Catholic theology" is rather rare in Catholic usage, and where it is used, it does not always exclude magisterial teaching. "****
I'm not sure that the examples you offer lend support to this proposition. The Church makes clear that what theologians do and what the *magisterium* does is collaborative, but that there is no "double magisterium" at work--theologians do not exercise "teaching authority" of any kind. THE Magisterium does rely upon the work of theologians precisely in those areas in which the Magisterium has yet to teach officially. But *until* there is official and clear magisterial teaching on an issue, then what is viewed as the "common teaching of Catholic theology" remains in the "field of the free opinions," to paraphrase Ott.
That's the trick about the ordinary universal magisterium--how do you assess what is the "common teaching of bishops" without being able to identify local episcopal teaching and see whether it "accumulates" sufficiently to be viewed as "universal"? In the case of the common teaching on lying, it can be easily show that, from the early history of Christianity, different bishops seemed to hold different views, and no amalgamation of official local episcopal teaching seems to exist (no episcopal documents teaching the faithful officially and directly on lying) Rather, the content that exists is in the realm of *theological opinion*, expressed by a variety of theologians (and the occasional bishop *as* private theologian--Augustine, Chrysostom).
So, when even *late* 20th-century catholic works describe the teaching on lying as "common teaching of Catholic theologians", we should be paying attention to the fact that the *Magisterium* has not added its own "weight" to that teaching....yet. It could in future, but as of now it has not.
Your speculation regarding Vatican II seems to go against the common (and maybe official) notion that Vatican II did *not* teach anything "new"--merely restated that which was already taught in contemporary language. Rather CCC 2033 precisely expresses the classic formula of the cooperation between magisterium and theologians (see also Veritatis Splendor and the 1990 "Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of Theologians").
I think we are getting closer and closer to "liberating" the discussion of lying from the mistaken notion that one side is merely abiding by magisterial teaching and the other is either intentionally or unintentionally dissenting or failing to recognize the "clear" teaching of the Church on this issue.
My hope would be that you and Dr. Tollefsen might more formally accept and acknowledge this by amending or clarifying the "assent" question you address in the piece at the top of the page!
You guys are awesome, btw--formidable minds wrestling with an important topic, and unafraid to follow the truth where it may lead. That is a *powerful* witness to your faith. God bless!
9.30.2011 | 5:22am
Tom R says:
I don't see how telling the truth to a Nazi doesn't make you culpable of the murders of the Jews in your care. St. Augustine just whiffs on this issue by saying the culpability would be on the part of the perpetrator alone, but I totally disagree. Letting the Nazi know the unvarnished truth makes you a material participant. It is mere sophistry to say, "Oh well, I told the truth, it's not my fault."
9.30.2011 | 3:16pm
Alexander R Pruss says:
Tom R:
Avoiding cooperation can be good reason to refrain from telling the truth (say, by remaining silent), but not a good reason to positively lie.
Deacon Russell:
Thanks for the kind words. I wasn't suggesting that Vatican II here contributed to our understanding of the role of theologians, but rather to our understanding of the centrality of ordinary catechesis, and hence derivatively of the catechisms that are normative for the catechesis.
Between, say, Aquinas and Grotius, were there any Catholic bishops who taught that lying is sometimes permissible?
That said, I am much more interested in the substantive question.
Avoiding cooperation can be good reason to refrain from telling the truth (say, by remaining silent), but not a good reason to positively lie.
Deacon Russell:
Thanks for the kind words. I wasn't suggesting that Vatican II here contributed to our understanding of the role of theologians, but rather to our understanding of the centrality of ordinary catechesis, and hence derivatively of the catechisms that are normative for the catechesis.
Between, say, Aquinas and Grotius, were there any Catholic bishops who taught that lying is sometimes permissible?
That said, I am much more interested in the substantive question.
9.30.2011 | 6:04pm
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Hi, Dr. Pruss--
I'm not sure whether there were any Catholic bishops teaching the permissibility of lying between the time of Aquinas and Grotius.
Perhaps, though, another illustration will be helpful in this regard. Just tonight, I heard a Catholic radio program featuring Bishop Fulton Sheen. In it, he clearly and directly taught the existence of the "limbo of the infants."
I would rather presume that almost *all* bishops of his age and before were in the habit of teaching the existence of the "limbo of the infants."
Is this teaching part of the ordinary universal magisterium of the Church?
It's not taught in the CCC. Yet bishops in great numbers were teaching this once upon a time, I suspect.
Today alternate views are permitted on the existence of limbo, despite the clear teaching on it of someone like Bishop Sheen, right?....
Could be a useful parallel to consider. Perhaps even in the time between Aquinas and Grotius--which I've not investigated yet, but I would suspect the existence of limbo of the infants as being commonly taught by bishops at that time as welll...might be worth examining....
Thanks again.
I'm not sure whether there were any Catholic bishops teaching the permissibility of lying between the time of Aquinas and Grotius.
Perhaps, though, another illustration will be helpful in this regard. Just tonight, I heard a Catholic radio program featuring Bishop Fulton Sheen. In it, he clearly and directly taught the existence of the "limbo of the infants."
I would rather presume that almost *all* bishops of his age and before were in the habit of teaching the existence of the "limbo of the infants."
Is this teaching part of the ordinary universal magisterium of the Church?
It's not taught in the CCC. Yet bishops in great numbers were teaching this once upon a time, I suspect.
Today alternate views are permitted on the existence of limbo, despite the clear teaching on it of someone like Bishop Sheen, right?....
Could be a useful parallel to consider. Perhaps even in the time between Aquinas and Grotius--which I've not investigated yet, but I would suspect the existence of limbo of the infants as being commonly taught by bishops at that time as welll...might be worth examining....
Thanks again.
9.30.2011 | 6:31pm
Tom R says:
Alexander Pruss: It is exactly your kind of logic to which Chesterton refers when he says:
*********
it was absurd to say that Catholics introduced a horrible sophistry of saying that a man might sometimes tell a lie, since every sane man knows he would tell a lie to save a child from Chinese torturers; that it missed the whole point, in this connection, to quote Ward’s phrase, “Make up your mind that you are justified in lying and then lie like a trooper,” for Ward’s argument was against equivocation or what people call Jesuitry. He meant, “When the child really is hiding in the cupboard and the Chinese torturers really are chasing him with red-hot pincers, then (and then only) be sure that you are right to deceive and do not hesitate to lie; but do not stoop to equivocate. Do not bother yourself to say, “The child is in a wooden house not far from here,” meaning the cupboard; but say the child is in Chiswick or Chimbora zoo, or anywhere you choose.”
******
*********
it was absurd to say that Catholics introduced a horrible sophistry of saying that a man might sometimes tell a lie, since every sane man knows he would tell a lie to save a child from Chinese torturers; that it missed the whole point, in this connection, to quote Ward’s phrase, “Make up your mind that you are justified in lying and then lie like a trooper,” for Ward’s argument was against equivocation or what people call Jesuitry. He meant, “When the child really is hiding in the cupboard and the Chinese torturers really are chasing him with red-hot pincers, then (and then only) be sure that you are right to deceive and do not hesitate to lie; but do not stoop to equivocate. Do not bother yourself to say, “The child is in a wooden house not far from here,” meaning the cupboard; but say the child is in Chiswick or Chimbora zoo, or anywhere you choose.”
******
10.2.2011 | 6:44am
Deacon Jim Russell says:
Two other resources that make it abundantly clear that the teaching on lying found in the CCC arises from the "common teaching of Catholic theology" and not from the Pope and bishops (magisterium):
Moral and Pastoral Theology, Vol. 2, by Henry Davis, S.J., 1943, Sheed and Ward, New York, pp. 410-417.
A Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries, Vol. 1, by Thomas Slater, S.J. (3rd ed.), 1909 Benziger Brothers, New York, pp. 464-469.
The Sheed and Ward 1943 work even says: "That a lie is never permissible was the commong teaching of the Fathers, and their teaching has been followed by nearly all subsequent theologians, relying both on the clear exrpessions of Sacred Scripture and on the principle that in lying the faculty of speech is abused." This sentence is footnoted, with the footnote reading: "A few modern theologians, Bolgeni, Martinet, Berardi, Dubois, Piat, attempt to distinguish between a formal moral lie--which is sinful--and a "falsiloquium," which is not. cf. Tanquerey, Prummer, and Vermeersch in "Gregorianum," 1920, p. 25."
So, in 1943, a "few modern theologians" take a view *different* from the CCC teaching on lying, and are *not* criticized as inadvertent dissenters or as proposing something contrary to *magisterial* teaching.....
The simple truth is that the CCC teaching on lying is common teaching, and at this time *other* theological opinions as to whether *all* so-called lying is intrinsically evil are still tolerated.
A mountain of evidence attests to this historical fact.
Moral and Pastoral Theology, Vol. 2, by Henry Davis, S.J., 1943, Sheed and Ward, New York, pp. 410-417.
A Manual of Moral Theology for English-Speaking Countries, Vol. 1, by Thomas Slater, S.J. (3rd ed.), 1909 Benziger Brothers, New York, pp. 464-469.
The Sheed and Ward 1943 work even says: "That a lie is never permissible was the commong teaching of the Fathers, and their teaching has been followed by nearly all subsequent theologians, relying both on the clear exrpessions of Sacred Scripture and on the principle that in lying the faculty of speech is abused." This sentence is footnoted, with the footnote reading: "A few modern theologians, Bolgeni, Martinet, Berardi, Dubois, Piat, attempt to distinguish between a formal moral lie--which is sinful--and a "falsiloquium," which is not. cf. Tanquerey, Prummer, and Vermeersch in "Gregorianum," 1920, p. 25."
So, in 1943, a "few modern theologians" take a view *different* from the CCC teaching on lying, and are *not* criticized as inadvertent dissenters or as proposing something contrary to *magisterial* teaching.....
The simple truth is that the CCC teaching on lying is common teaching, and at this time *other* theological opinions as to whether *all* so-called lying is intrinsically evil are still tolerated.
A mountain of evidence attests to this historical fact.
2 kings 10:19-20.
19 Now summon for me all Baal's prophets, all his worshipers, and all his priests. See that no one is absent, for I have a great sacrifice for Baal. Whoever is absent shall not live." This Jehu did as a ruse, so that he might destroy the worshipers of Baal.
20
Jehu said further, "Proclaim a solemn assembly in honor of Baal." They did so,
30 The LORD said to Jehu, "Because you have done well what I deem right, and have treated the house of Ahab as I desire, your sons to the fourth generation shall sit upon the throne of Israel."
...........................................................
Note that God himself is describing the goodness not just of the result but of the means: " you have done well what I deem right".
Aquinas was presented with this example via Jerome but again fails to deal with its exact wording and flees through quick dismissiveness sans logic:
" There is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (2 Kings 10:29-31
Hello....you did not Thomas Aquinas... deal with the words from God to Jehu:
" you have done well what I deem right".
I love Aquinas....read the ST cover to cover....he is fallible but one of the best reads on earth. But he is fallible.