In 2008, the Harvard-trained neurosurgeon Dr. Eben Alexander was stricken with bacterial meningitis and sank into a seven-day coma. He was astonished to awaken with phosphorescent memories of, as he describes it, nothing less than an extended Technicolor trip to Heaven. Puffy pink clouds, angelic beings on butterfly wings, ineffable life lessons, pitch-black orbs that nevertheless dazzle with light: the whole shebang.
Even more surprising to this neurosurgeon was evidence he gained later—evidence which he considers conclusive—that the brain regions associated with conscious experience were inactive for the duration of his coma, casualties of the bacteria eating his brain. Four years later, he’s written a book in which he argues from the circumstances surrounding his experience to the conclusion that, in his words, “we are more, much more, than our physical brains.” The physical facts about humans do not exhaust all the facts about humans. Dualism, as philosophers call it.
The skeptics have mobilized. Such a brazen affront to naturalistic dogma in science cannot go unanswered. Chief among the skeptics in this latest worldview skirmish is Sam Harris, most famous as the Sancho Panza of the “Four Horsemen of New Atheism,” but also a neuroscientist in his own right, having recently earned a Ph.D. in the subject from UCLA.
Harris is something of a rare bird in this debate. He concedes: “Unlike many neuroscientists and philosophers, I remain agnostic on the question of how consciousness is related to the physical world.” Indeed, he’s willing to entertain the possibility that mind cannot be reduced to matter, confident that, in his words, “if consciousness were, in fact, irreducible—or even separable from the brain in a way that would give comfort to Saint Augustine—my worldview would not be overturned.”
Despite this concession, Harris makes a go of debunking Alexander’s argument for dualism. Harris’ strategy is as you might expect: challenge the truth of Alexander’s claim that he was essentially brain-dead while he had these experiences. Says Harris: “Everything—absolutely everything—in Alexander’s account rests on repeated assertions that his visions of heaven occurred while his cerebral cortex was ‘shut down’.”
And so begins the cross-examination: Were the measures Alexander points to—namely, “CT scans and neurological examinations”—sufficient to prove that his cerebral cortex was inactive during his entire coma? (No.) Couldn’t Alexander have had these experiences while awakening, and have been left with the mistaken impression, as with our dreams, that the brief experiences lasted for substantial periods of time? (Yes.) Might his experiences have been the hallucinogenic offspring of an overabundance of painkillers he received in the hospital? (Yes.)
Serious questions, to be sure. And they do cast grave doubts on the veridicality of Alexander’s experiences. But I hope that these two neuro-nerds might stop bickering long enough to hear this modest contribution from a philosopher.
Look around you, gentlemen: Your battle was over before it began. Given what Harris conceded at the start, Alexander’s dualist conclusion was already secured. Harris was mistaken in believing that absolutely everything in Alexander’s account—including his belief that we are more than our brains—requires that Alexander’s experiences actually occurred while he was brain-dead. That, in fact, is not necessary in order to reach Alexander’s conclusion. We can safely conclude, with Alexander, that consciousness is not reducible to brain activity so long as it’s merely possible that Alexander’s experiences occurred while brain-dead. And this Harris has already granted.
Let me explain. If A is one and the same as B—that is, if “A” and “B” are two names for one thing, like the names “Bono” and “Paul Hewson”—then it is absolutely impossible for A to exist when B does not. After all, if there is just one thing, how could it both exist and not exist at the same time? And so, the mere possibility of A without B guarantees that A is different from B. This principle is as uncontroversial as any in philosophy.
And recall from above that Sam Harris—Captain Skeptic in this operation to debunk Alexander—freely grants the possibility of consciousness without brain activity. He says he’s open-minded on the question. Well, sometimes open minds make for broken hearts. Harris’ concessions at the start were enough to lock in Alexander’s dualist conclusion.
But is Harris right to grant that possibility? Don’t take his word for it. Ask the question of yourself. When Alexander tells us in earnest that he visited Heaven while brain-dead, is he asking us to believe something merely improbable, or something absolutely impossible? Is Alexander’s story on the level of a claim to have ridden a flaming unicorn (merely improbable), or on the level of a claim to have ridden a flaming square-circle (absolutely impossible)? To me, the answer is obvious: Alexander’s story, though quite hard to believe, does not drop to the depths of absolute impossibility.
Each side of this debate should take care to understand just how light the burden is for those who defend dualism against the reductive projects of naturalism. The naturalists should take care, so that they don’t mistakenly forfeit their cause as Dr. Harris unwittingly has. And the supernaturalists should take care, so that they don’t mistakenly believe that Dr. Alexander’s incredible story needs to be true in order to support their cause. Mere possibility, in this case, is enough.
Tomas Bogardus will join the philosophy department of Pepperdine University in January.
RESOURCES
Eben Alexander, “Heaven Is Real: A Doctor’s Experience With The Afterlife”
Tomas Bogardus, “Undefeated Dualism”
Sam Harris, “This Must Be Heaven”
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Comments:
To be dismissable to a confirmed materialist, even the slightest doubtability that Alexander's brain was completely inactive during his experience will suffice. To the extent that Alexander's book is discussed at all by the sciences dealing with the brain, it will be treated in this vein, for the primary purpose of being safely dismissable without close examination.
By the way, Bogardus' a priori counter-argument is fundamentally Cartesian. The conviction that attributes of thought cannot possibly inhere in matter, but must necessarily inhere in some other kind of substance (and that mental substance thus cannot be identified with physical substance), is basic to the line of thought advanced in the Meditations.
I happen to think that Descartes is correct on this, and that Bogardus' argument is thus probably also sound. But Descartes is regarded with little other than derision in science. As such, I think it is a safe bet also that arguments such as Bogardus' will have no impact in shifting well-entrenched materialist paradigms in science.
If it is objected that the first premise, "Nothing purely physical can do A," begs the question, then the burden of proof is shifted to the materialist: Point to ONE OTHER purely physical entity that can do the items in the list.
But that is a truth about concepts, not a truth about actual states. Our concept of "consciousness" is flexible: it could either apply to something reducible to brain activity or something not reducible to brain activity. The concept is BROADER than the physicalist might wish it to be.
But, like many other concepts, the concept of consciousness is supposed to REFER to something in the real world. This referent - say, my consciousness - may in fact be reducible to brain states. And I imagine you would admit this? But then, Harris is concerned with the actual state, not the concept. He concedes something about the concept, not about the state.
Or consider the concept "God". We cannot move from observations about the concept "God" to conclusions about the referent of the concept in the real world. This is the mistake of most (maybe not all) versions of the ontological argument.
(You are right, of course, that it's senseless to argue that dualism is impossible. This should be standard fare among philosophers, but I'm sure there are plenty of physicalists out there fallaciously arguing otherwise.)
Take the following statements:
A = The toaster in my kitchen.
B = The wedding gift I received from my Aunt Sally.
A = B if the toaster in my kitchen is the wedding gift I received from Aunt Sally.
However, my wife may tell me I am wrong. She may believe that Aunt Sally gave us the glasses in the cupboard. In that case A does not = B.
Now, my wife may be right. It is possible. We disagree. We know that one of us is right. And there may be an empirical way of proving it.
But just because my wife might POSSIBLY be right, does not mean that I am actually right.
What you are missing appears to be the difference between the ontological identity of objects, in which the possibility of non-identity means actual non-identity, vs. the epistemological evidence needed to determine which of the ontological realities is true.
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that it is irrelevant to Tomas Bogardus's position whether Dr. Alexander perceived heaven with his consciousness, or whether his consciousness concocted a wild fantasy that he is deceived into thinking must have been heaven. The only thing that is important is that his consciousness was active when his brain was not. But if Dr. Alexander has accepted a wild fantasy for reality, why should we not be suspicious of any other tricks his consciousness might have played on him, such as concocting the fantasy when first coming into consciousness and giving the impression that it happened over an extended period of time while the brain was allegedly shut down?
Yes, that's exactly it. Although, I think you have a typo in your 2nd-to-last sentence. Should it say: "But just because my wife might POSSIBLY be right, does not mean that I am NOT actually right"?
Suppose a person says that it is not always right to act in accordance with the virtues. They defend this by claiming that the concept of right action is independent of the concept of the virtues -- the question "Should I do what benefits everyone, or should I instead act virtuously?" is intelligible. Surely they have not proven their point, and shown virtue to be irrelevant!
I think that's a serious question! Thanks for the comment. In the Harris piece I link to, he does say "I remain agnostic on the question of how consciousness is related to the physical world." That sort of makes it sound like he thinks it's a toss-up between dualism and non-dualism, which supports the weaker epistemic-possibility reading of his remarks. (Like how I might say "Goldbach's Conjecture? Who knows! I remain agnostic.")
BUT, elsewhere, he gives arguments against dualism (at least against the kind of dualism that would be required for Alexander's story to be true), and he says these arguments are "very good" (http://ow.ly/gwRbw). So he seems to think that dualism is false. Yet, in the piece I linked to and in the link I just provided, he's willing to entertain dualism and speculate about whether his worldview would be overturned were dualism to turn out true.
I hope you'll think, as I do, that a fair interpretation is that Harris thinks dualism is, as a matter of fact, false, but that it could have been true; it's a coherent idea. It's possible. I try to point out the tension in those two views.
I had a bit more on this question in the original piece I submitted, but it was cut down for space. Sadly, 1,000 words just isn't enough to turn over all the interesting issues in the neighborhood. And that's why I linked to that Phil Studies paper I wrote; there, I deal with these epistemic possibility questions a bit more.
You said "I would be interested if Tomas Bogardus believes Dr. Eben Alexander went to heaven and came back to tell about it."
No, I don't think he did. I think he was trippin', as the kids say. But he *could* have, and that's enough to disprove materialism.
You wondered about this case:
A = The toaster in my kitchen.
B = The wedding gift I received from my Aunt Sally.
I agree that while the toaster in my kitchen might actually be the wedding gift I received from Sally, nevertheless there are many possible scenarios in which the toaster in my kitchen is not the gift I received from Sally.
This is a subtle point, but I was careful to restrict the reasoning in my piece above to cases where "A" and "B" are *names*. For proper names, what I said goes. The case you provide features definite descriptions. For definite descriptions, what I said does NOT go, as you point out.
And, technically, I should have extended my comments to natural kind terms like "consciousness" and "brain activity." With natural kind terms, as with proper names, what I said goes.
You may have already read this, but if not, the classic treatment of this subject is in Saul Kripke's "Naming and Necessity": http://www.amazon.com/Naming-Necessity-Library-Philosophy-Logic/dp/0631128018
Assuming, as many do that mind can exist without the brain, then mind is an intelligent energy with self awareness, which opens up a whole new line of both scientific and theological thinking.
Yes, you caught my typo. I saw it too, after I hit post. Too bad you can't edit these posts.
Also, ther are those who have them, like the highly respected neurosurgeon, who are intelligent, and educated. (NDE's happen even to atheists, such as the late philosopher A.J. Ayer.) Could they be deluded? Of course, but they have the education to help make this less likely.
There are many cases where the person having the NDE experiences things that they could not possibly experience, if they were just a brain lying unconscious on a hospital bed. What they claim to experience is corroborated by others who experienced the same thing, and don't seem to have any reason to lie for the person having the NDE. (e.g., see Michael Sabom, M.D.).
Alvin Plantinga, in an excellent review of Nagel's latest book, (MIND AND COSMOS), in THE NEW REPUBLIC, states that those who reject Theism, may not like the idea that God knows one's every thought. This violates one's privacy. http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/110189/why-darwinist-materialism-wrong#
Also, very few people, including hard headed scientists, like to be proven wrong; especially if they've devoted their lives to showing that a particular theory, such as materialism, is correct.
Enough to disprove "conceptual materialism", where the very concept of consciousness implies its identity with physical processes. But not enough to prove factual materialism, where (as a Humean "matter of fact") everything is matter.
The problem is that, from where I'm sitting, most materialists are perfectly comfortable with dualism being possible. They just think it isn't actual.
"Enough to disprove "conceptual materialism", where the very concept of consciousness implies its identity with physical processes. But not enough to prove factual materialism, where (as a Humean "matter of fact") everything is matter."
Well, actually, I think it's enough to disprove both. Most materialists these days are of the latter type: they don't think we can figure out, just by reflecting on our concept of consciousness, that consciousness is identical with something purely physical. They think we discovered that empirically, not through a priori reflection. But, still, for reasons I gave in my piece above, if consciousness just is brain activity (or whatever purely physical property we prefer), then there *cannot* be consciousness without brain activity. So if we think consciousness without brain activity is even *possible*, then that's enough to prove that consciousness is, actually, not brain activity.
"The problem is that, from where I'm sitting, most materialists are perfectly comfortable with dualism being possible. They just think it isn't actual."
I think that's a problem for them, not for dualists. I think the views of these materialists you mention are in tension. It's not a tenable position. And that's worth pointing out to them!
Surely, you're right that there are possible worlds where consciousness is not brain activity -- in fact, I see no reason why this world isn't one of them! But there are possible world where every consciousness is identical to brain activity. (Or why not?) And there are possible worlds where some consciousnesses are dualistic and others are not.
The real question is: what reason do we have to believe we are in one or another kind of world? But I don't think there IS any possible evidence here. Certain dualistic worlds would appear to be otherwise identical with certain materialistic worlds. This is why I am tempted to think of the materialism/dualism divide as a pseudoquestion.
So we're on the same page here, insofar as we agree that there can be no empirical proof of mind/brain identity. But I go further, and say that there can be no rational proof against it, either.
Neuroscience, of course, being an empirical science, cannot in an a priori fashion, dismiss NDE's. The latter are empirical claims that are no less "worthy'' of taking seriously than the empirical findings of neuroscientists; both types of evidence, being empirical, are the building blocks of respectable scientific theories. NDE's are so numerous, and so scrupulously documented, (e.g., the cardiologist Michael Sabom) that they transcend mere "anecdotal'' evidence, and have reached the level of impressive statistical evidence, the material that any self respecting scientist dreams about.
Problems arise, clearly, when one interpretes empirical data in a certain way, and then becomes resistent to subsequent empirical data that contradicts the interpretation. So, if one interpretes the impressive empirical data that clearly indicates that the brain is associated with the human self, in all its manifestations, as meaning that one should adopt the theory that the human self is IDENTICAL with the functioning of the brain, one may be disposed to inteprete NDE's in a way that's consistent with this materialitist theory.